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Abstract 
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Abstract 
 
The mobile phone is a ubiquitous tool in today’s society, a daily companion for the 
majority of British citizens. The ability to trace a mobile phone’s geographic position 
at all times via mobile phone networks generates potentially sensitive data that can 
be stored and shared for significant lengths of time, particularly  for the purpose of 
crime and terrorism investigations. This thesis examines the implications of the 
storage and use of mobile phone location data on individuals’ perceptions of privacy. 
The grounded theory methodology has been used to illustrate patterns and themes 
that are useful in understanding the broader discourses concerning location data 
relating to privacy, technology and policy-setting. The main contribution of this thesis 
is the development of a substantive theory grounded in empirical data from 
interviews, mobile phone location tracking and a survey. This theory is specific to a 
particular area, as it maps the relationship between mobile phone location data and 
perceptions of privacy within the UK. 
 
The theory confirms some arguments in the literature that argue that the concept of 
privacy is changing with individuals' increased dependence on electronic 
communications technologies in day-to-day life. However, whilst individuals tend to 
hold a rather traditional picture of privacy, not influenced by technology and solely 
related to their own personal lives, scholars paint a picture of privacy that is affected 
by technology and relates to society as a whole. Digital mass data collections, such 
as communications data retention, are not perceived as privacy invasive by 
individuals. Mobile phone location data is not seen as related to a citizen's daily life 
but instead primarily as a crime investigation tool. A recognition and understanding of 
the divergence between the perceptions and definitions of privacy between 
individuals and the academic literature in relation to mobile phone location data is of 
relevance, as it should impact on future policies regulating the gathering, storage and 
analysis of personal data.  
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Glossary of Terms 
 
1G: First generation mobile network or service; an analogue system. 
 
2G: Second-generation mobile network or service. Generic name for second 
generation networks, for example GSM. 
 
2.5G: Second-generation enhanced. Name given to enhanced 2G networks, for 
example GPRS and cdmaOne. 
 
3G: Third-generation mobile network or service. Generic name for third-generation 
networks or 
services under the IMT-2000 banner, for example W-CDMA. 
 
3GSM: 3G services delivered over the evolved GSM core network (GSM Association 
proposes the universal adoption of this term). 
 
Bit (binary digit): A bit is the primary unit of electronic, digital data. Written in base-
2, binary language as a “1” or a “0”. 
 
Bit/s: Bits per second. Measurement of the transmission speed of units of data (bits) 
over a network. 
 
Bluetooth: A radio technology that makes possible transmitting signals over short 
distances between mobile phones, computers and other devices. 
 
Bandwidth: The range of frequencies available to be occupied by signals. In 
analogue systems it is measured in terms of Hertz (Hz) and in digital unit and the 
size of which is independent of 
redundancy or framing techniques. 
 
Byte: (1) A set of bits that represent a single character. A byte is composed of 8 bits. 
(2) A bit string that is operated upon as a companies or between countries are not 
always meaningful. 
 
CLI: Calling Line Identifier is the telephone number that a person has used to access 
their required service.  
 
Coverage: Refers to the range of a mobile cellular network, measured in terms of 
geographic coverage (the percentage of the territorial area covered by mobile 
cellular) or population coverage (the percentage of the population within range of a 
mobile cellular network). 
 
CCTV: Closed circuit television 
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xv 
Digital: Representation of voice or other information using digits 0 and 1. The digits 
are transmitted as a series of pulses. Digital networks allow for higher capacity, 
greater functionality and improved quality. Examples of digital cellular networks 
include GSM, CDMA, and TDMA. 
 
Frequency: The rate at which an electrical current alternates, usually measured in 
Hertz (see Hz). It is also used to refer to a location on the radio frequency spectrum, 
such as 800, 900 or 1’800 Mhz. 
 
GPRS: General Packet Radio Service. A 2.5G mobile standard typically adopted by 
GSM operators as a migration step towards 3G (W-CDMA). Based on packet-
switched technology enabling high-speed data transmission (approx. 115 kbit/s). 
 
GPS: global positioning system, refers to a “constellation” of 24 “Navstar” satellites 
launched initially by the United States Department of Defense, that orbit the Earth 
and make it possible for people with ground receivers to pinpoint their geographic 
location. The location accuracy ranges from 10 to 100 metres for most equipment. A 
European system, Galileo, is also under development. 
 
GSM: Global System for Mobile communications. European-developed digital mobile 
cellular standard. The most widespread 2G digital mobile cellular standard, available 
in over 170 countries worldwide.  
 
Hand-off (US) or Handover (UK): A central concept of cellular technology, enabling 
mobility for subscribers. It is a process by which the Mobile Telephone Switching 
Office passes a mobile phone conversation from one radio frequency in one cell to 
another radio frequency in another as a subscriber crosses the boundary of a cell.  
 
HTTP: Hypertext transport protocol. A standard transport protocol for transferring 
'web pages' from one machine to another. 
 
Hz: Hertz. The frequency measurement unit equal to one cycle per second. 
 
IMEI: International Mobile Equipment Identity. Unique serial number used on mobile 
phones, typically those connected to the GSM network. 
 
IMSI: International Mobile Subscriber Identity, a unique number that is associated 
with all GSM and Universal Mobile Telecommunications System network mobile 
phone users. The number is stored in the Subscriber Identity Module (SIM). 
 
IP: Internet Protocol Address. A numeric value that serves to uniquely identify an 
interface that is connected to the Internet. 
 
ISDN: Integrated Services Digital Network. A digital switched network, supporting 
transmission 
of voice, data and images over conventional telephone lines. 
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xvi 
Location-based services (LBS): LBS make use of information on the location of a 
mobile device and user, and can exploit a number of technologies for the geographic 
location of a user. Some of these technologies are embedded in the networks and 
others in the handsets themselves. Location capability is already available to some 
level of accuracy (approx. 150 m) for most users of cellular networks. Increased 
accuracy can become available through location technologies such as GPS (Global 
Positioning System—see above). Commercial applications include the possibility for 
targeted advertising depending on the geographic region of a particular user. 
 
Mb: Mega bit. 
 
ITU: International Telecommunication Union. The United Nations specialised agency 
for telecommunications. See http://www.itu.int/. 
 
m-commerce: Mobile Commerce. Similar to ecommerce but the term is usually 
applied to the emerging transaction activity in mobile networks. 
 
Multimedia Message Service (MMS): MMS will provide more sophisticated mobile 
messaging than SMS. A global standard for messaging, MMS will enable users to 
send and receive messages with formatted text, graphics, audio and video clips. 
Unlike SMS, it is not limited to 160-characters per message. 
 
PDA: Personal Digital Assistant. A generic term for handheld devices that combine 
computing and communication functions. 
 
SIM: Subscriber identity module (card). A small printed circuit board inserted into a 
GSM-based mobile phone. It includes subscriber details, security information and a 
memory for a personal directory of numbers. This information can be retained by 
subscribers when changing handsets. 
 
SMS: Short Message Service. A service available on digital networks, typically 
enabling messages with up to 160 characters to be sent or received via the message 
centre of a network operator to a subscriber’s mobile phone.  
 
UMTS: Universal Mobile Telecommunications System. The European term for third-
generation mobile cellular systems or IMT-2000 based on the W-CDMA standard.  
 
URL: Unique/Uniform Resource Locator. A naming system for web resources. 
 
USIM: Universal Subscriber Identity Module (card). A printed circuit board (similar to 
a SIM) that is inserted into a mobile phone. Adopted by W-CDMA operators for 3G 
mobile. Capable of storing much more information and has strong security functions 
compared with SIMs. Also referred to as User Identity Module, or UIM. 
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WAP: Wireless Application Protocol. A license-free protocol for wireless 
communication that enables the creation of mobile telephone services and the 
reading of internet pages from a mobile phone, thus being a mobile  equivalent of 
HTTP (Hypertext Transfer Protocol). 
 
Wi-Fi (Wireless Fidelity): Wireless systems that provide internet connectivity. 
Refers to Wireless Fidelity, the 802.11b specification for Wireless LANs from the 
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE). It is part of a series of 
wireless specifications which also includes 802.11a, and 802.11g.  
 
Sources: International Telecommunication Union (2003)  
and Home Office (2003b) 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 Background to the study 
The early part of the 21st century might be characterised as a period in which 
terrorism and the fear of terrorism have entered into the awareness and lives of a 
large number of people in the Western world. This in turn has made citizens 
increasingly aware of their own security and the British government of its need to 
provide effective measures to protect its people. The consequence of such 
protection might be an intrusion into areas of personal life that might once have 
seemed unacceptable. However, any attempt to strike a balance between 
competing interests is difficult, particularly in a technologically fast-changing 
environment. It is in this complex context that this research is based.  
 
The mobile phone has become an omnipresent communication technology within 
our society and can be found in the pocket of almost everyone, from children to their 
grandparents, from senior managers to cleaners. It has an immense impact on our 
social lives and how we interact with other people. There are over 65 million mobile 
phone subscriptions in the UK (Mobile Operators Association, 2006) for an 
estimated UK population of 60.2 million (National Statistics, 2006). The ubiquitous 
mobile phone can also be seen as being Janus-faced - as having two sides with 
opposing attributes. On the one hand, mobile phones connect people and enable 
social interactions in a way that has not been possible before. On the other hand, 
the mobile phone has the capability to act as a universal tracking device on an 
individual basis. Every mobile phone routinely generates a host of data including its 
approximate geographical location. This data is known as mobile phone location 
data and is typically based on the nearest mast from which the handset receives a 
network signal. Location data, together with other data about communications, is 
stored by mobile phone service providers for billing and legal purposes. This 
communications data includes details such as the location from which phone calls 
are made, duration and destination of calls. It is used regularly in court cases and by 
the intelligence services as it provides a rich picture about a mobile phone user’s 
actions (Walker and Akdeniz, 2003; Green and Smith, 2004). Without technological 
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developments such as faster computer processors, increased storage capacities 
and networked technologies, today’s large scale collections of personal data would 
not be possible. The changing nature of computing technologies has resulted in the 
increased digitisation and routine generation of data, as well as its long-term 
storage and analysis. Converging platforms and infrastructures, such as the internet 
and mobile phones, increase the sensitivity of the data generated, as for example 
when mobile phone handsets are used to access the internet (Escudero-Pascual 
and Hosein, 2004). 
 
The Surveillance Studies Network (2006) raises concerns that the routine tracking 
and information gathering mechanisms used in today’s society are often not obvious 
to citizens. This makes it important to incorporate checks and safeguards when 
collecting data to ensure accountability. Especially the retention of mobile phone 
communications data bears the potential for identifying patterns in the collected 
data. It is possible to analyse the behaviour of particular groups of people or of 
mobile phone users located in a particular area, without identifying specific 
individuals  
(Marx, 2002). Britain’s Information Commissioner, has used the term ‘surveillance 
society’ to express his concerns about the vast majority of citizens being subjected 
to frequent collections of personal data on a day-to-day basis (Surveillance Studies 
Network, 2006). "Everyday life is subject to monitoring, checking and scrutinising", 
states Lyon (2001, p. 1). Dandeker (1990) argues that information systems equal 
surveillance systems, as surveillance can be interpreted in the broad sense of 
gathering information about individuals and populations. Hence, the term 
surveillance society should not merely be perceived in the context of totalitarian 
regimes or regarding a centralised Orwellian ‘Big Brother’ figure but rather as 
relating to the continuous gathering of information facilitated by networked computer 
systems. 
 
Webster (1995) emphasises the role of routine surveillance as a prerequisite of 
effective social organisation. He offers the example of supermarket shopping as an 
enormous organisational achievement, which would not be possible without the 
support of technologies to coordinate the daily routine of producers, suppliers, 
transport and customers. However to organise life, information must be 
systematically gathered on people and their activities, it needs to be known what is 
required and this can be interpreted as surveillance. Indeed, surveillance systems 
are necessary to ensure that citizens are paid correctly, receive state benefits, can 
Chapter 1 - Introduction 
 
Andrea Gorra             Page 3 
vote in elections and assist with crime and terrorism investigations (Lyon, 1994). 
Bureaucracy is a means to manage affairs in more efficient ways and involves 
systematic book keeping, building up of records, rules and procedures, as well as 
documentation of cases (Webster, 1995). "The age of bureaucracy is also the era of 
the information society" as Dandeker (1990, p. 2) convincingly observes. He 
perceives bureaucracy as a highly effective method of exercising surveillance over 
subject populations in industrial societies.  The increased use of IT-based 
surveillance can be seen as a response to risk, with the aim to achieve the pro-
active management of threats. Several underlying trends of Western societies have 
facilitated the notion of the surveillance society, such as the need to manage risks in 
order to deal with internal but also external threats in form of terrorism, as well as 
the growing routine generation and subsequent use of citizens’ personal data 
(Surveillance Studies Network, 2006).  
 
Beck (1992) describes the consequences of industrial and scientific development as 
consisting of risks and dangers that society has not previously faced. Dangers are 
not only defined as naturals hazards such as storms and earthquakes but instead 
the use of modern technologies and science has created additional, man-made 
hazards. Consequently, Beck characterises the risk society as driven by the 
distribution of 'bads' or dangers, as opposed to the industrial society, which was 
primarily concerned with the production of 'goods'. Even though Beck mainly had 
environmental 'bads' or negative effects of the modern society in mind, this also 
applies to social and political 'negatives', as resulting from routine tracking of 
communications data. Ericson and Haggerty (1997) share Beck's view and argue 
that "risk is a central feature of modernity". The risk society is a society that is 
organised in response to risks and governments are concerned with providing 
security. It is underpinned by a collective fear and a continual need for more 
knowledge of risk in order to obtain greater powers to reduce risk. Routine 
surveillance of everyday actions and communications enabled by networked 
technologies facilitates the categorising of individuals and populations with the aim 
to classify them in terms of potential risk. The accumulation and subsequent 
analysis of communications data, including mobile phone location data, can be seen 
as an aspect of the pro-active management of risks. 
 
Despite the positive aspects of technologies to facilitate the coordination and 
organisation of day-to-day life, as well as the use of IT-based surveillance to 
respond to social disorder and rising crime levels, Davies (1996) warns of the 
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surveillance mechanisms made possible by computers. He believes that linking 
computer systems to share information about citizens facilitates the potential of 
misuse by governments and the private sector. The constant surveillance of citizens 
may result in mistrust and could distance the citizen from the State. Some fear that 
communications data may be used by law enforcement for social sorting, in other 
words the differential treatment for different categories of persons as already 
performed with existing data (Lyon, 2005). Knowing a person’s location at any given 
moment in time can have implications for privacy, civil liberties and social justice. 
The retained location data can be used to analyse past movements and 
communication routines of a person, as well as predict potential future behaviour, 
which can have negative consequences for the individual  (Clarke, 2000; Lyon, 
2005). Hence, the purposeful, routine and systematic generation of individuals’ 
personal details can have an impact on the privacy of those whose information is 
being gathered. Clarke (1999) claims that privacy is important from a political 
viewpoint, enabling freedom of speech to think and act. In his view, the monitoring 
of individuals' communications and actions threatens democracy. Taylor (2002) 
argues in a similar fashion that considerable advances in technology have 
increased the powers of governments to carry out surveillance upon its citizens. 
While Lyon (1994) believes that it is not the widespread adoption of information and 
communication technologies which has resulted in a "totally new situation" but that 
technologies merely facilitate and accelerate the trend towards a surveillance 
society.  
 
Location technologies pose new challenges for privacy policy and law. Parallels with 
already existing surveillance in the form of recording of internet data, CCTV footage 
or consumer data, suggest that location data is valuable to various stakeholders and 
has the potential for commercial applications. Bennett and Crowe (2005, p. 1) argue 
that location is the “new dimension to the privacy problem”, as now surveillance is 
not only about who citizens are and what they are doing but also where citizens are 
taking actions that may be of interest to law enforcement and commercial actors. 
The monitoring of location data enables mobile surveillance, which is of significance 
as individuals are on the move in their professional and personal lives, representing 
the mobility of modern society. Location becomes a significant source of valuable 
information in itself (Bennett and Regan, 2004). The attribute location can offer 
many opportunities to businesses, governments and individuals. However, a 
distinction needs to be made between the use of data for law enforcement and for 
commercial purposes when looking at the relationship between mobile phone 
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location data and privacy. The role of individuals as consumer and as citizens differs 
from a legal point of view. The use of communications data by the government falls 
under state surveillance techniques and is regulated by legislation such as the 
Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (see section 2.3.3.2), whereas the use 
of communications data for commercial services is for example regulated by the 
European Union Electronic Communications Privacy Directive (Directive 
2002/58/EC).  
Governments have recently amended their legislative approaches to retention and 
access of communications data. This had been in response to threats resulting from 
criminal acts using technology and also the need to take into consideration the case 
law of the European Court of Human Rights. A right to privacy is enshrined in the 
European Convention on Human Rights (Article 8) and is brought into British 
legislation in form of the Human Rights Act 1998. Nevertheless, this 'right to private 
life' (Article 8.1) may be compromised if seen as necessary under a range of 
exclusive purposes listed in Article 8.2 ECHR, such as national security (see section 
2.2.1). In addition, the September 11 attacks in the US in 2001 have brought about 
a paradigm shift in Europe regarding the legislation of storage and access of 
communications data (section 2.3.3). In the United Kingdom data retention laws 
require mobile phone service providers to store communications data for 12 months 
on a voluntary basis (Home Office, 2003c, section 16). A European data retention 
Directive requires the implementation of a data retention regime by all member 
states by 2007, which however may be postponed in relation to “the retention of 
communications data relating to Internet Access, Internet telephony and Internet e-
mail” by individual member states until 2009 (Directive 2006/24/EC, 2006, Article 
15). 
 
Attention needs to be drawn in this context to the distinction between the concepts 
of privacy and security. Privacy can relate to the control over personal information, 
for example the commercial misuse of customer data. Privacy has been declared a 
fundamental human right by the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (see section 2.2.1), whereas security is concerned with the safety of 
information exchanged, possible loss and unauthorised access. Security constitutes 
a critical part in privacy protection but does not play a major role in this research 
investigation.  
Chapter 1 - Introduction 
 
Andrea Gorra             Page 6 
 
1.2 Research rationale 
The mobile phone is a ubiquitous tool in today’s society, a daily companion for the 
majority of British citizens. However, the ability of mobile phone networks to trace a 
mobile phone’s geographic position at all times generates potentially sensitive data 
that can be stored or shared for significant lengths of time. The continuous 
generation of mobile phone location data, besides other communications data 
shows that the mobile phone can also be a very privacy invasive technology, as it 
blurs the boundaries between different areas in life, such as family and work life. 
Communications data from mobile phone conversations is retained for ordinary 
citizens as well as for criminals on a long-term basis, including the geographical 
location from which the phone call was made. Mobile phone location data 
encompasses private and public spaces, it allows intrusions into traditional private 
areas like homes.  
 
An individual's use of mobile phone services falls under the protection of the 
'respect for privacy life', as enshrined in the ECHR under Article 8. This extends to 
the right of citizens to establish and develop relationships with other human beings 
(Whitty, Murphy and Livingstone, 2001).  Therefore the long-term retention of all 
mobile users’ communications data may be seen as violating some of the most 
important rights that a democratic society must defend: the right to privacy, freedom 
of expression and the presumption of innocence (section 2.2.3.1).  
 
Looking at the wider picture, location data can be seen as just one type of data that 
is collected about a person beside other data such as CCTV footage or financial 
data. However, location data differs as it tends to be specific to one person and is 
collected continuously, particularly if the mobile phone is carried by its user all day, 
every day. 
The focus of this research is on location data, as opposed to communications data 
in general (for more detail see Chapter 2, Part 3 Legal framework). The reason for 
this is that the relationship between location and privacy has so far received very 
little attention in the academic literature. Location is "a new dimension to the privacy 
problem" according to Bennett and Crowe (2005). It is certainly to become more 
important in the future, taking into account the increase of networked and location-
aware technologies, such as Bluetooth, RFID and Wi-Fi (for details about these 
terms see Glossary, p. xiii).  
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Existing comparable studies have either examined mobile phone users’ behaviour 
or attitudes towards privacy in general. Over the last decades numerous studies 
have looked at citizens’ and consumers’ attitudes towards privacy (see Zureik, 
2004). The motivations for these studies have either been of a commercial or a 
political nature. The studies mainly use questionnaires and quantitative data in order 
to focus on public attitudes on a large scale and hence cannot explore individuals’ 
perceptions in-depth. Much popular literature refers to location-based services as 
the 'new big brother' (see for example Spinney, 2004). Data identifying an 
individual's location with the help of electronic devices has been considered in the 
literature regarding a range of technologies other than the mobile phone, for 
example GPS (Monmonier, 2002; Van Riper and Whitfield, 2004), Wifi (Hosein and 
Escudero-Pascual, 2002; Varshney, 2003) or digitised financial transactions 
(Clarke, 2000).  
 
Academic literature has predominantly considered mobile phone location data in 
relation to the technical aspects in mobile phone and internet systems, including 
security (Drane et al., 1998; D'Roza, 2003; Beresfod, 2005; Steiniger et al., 2006; 
SnapTrack, 2003), or reviews legal implications of communications data in general 
(White, 2003; Escudero-Pascual and Hosein, 2004) or specifically regarding the UK 
(Green and Smith, 2004; Whitley and Hosein, 2005). Some literature focuses on 
particular areas of location monitoring such as for emergency services (Gow, 2004), 
employee monitoring (Kaupins and Minch, 2005) and children tracking (Mathieson, 
2004), and mostly in the country-specific contexts of Canada (Lyon et al., 2005; 
Bennett and Crowe, 2005) and the US (CDT, 2006). 
 
The particular strength of this study is its focus on empirical evidence which brings 
together individuals’ attitudes towards location data and their perceptions on the 
data’s implications on privacy. This study has followed Woolgar’s call for the 
assessment of underlying assumptions in social research related to modern 
technologies. Woolgar (2002, p. 7) encourages researchers to "disaggregate the 
phenomenon, to focus more on bottom-up experiences" and to find out how 
technologies are used and experienced in everyday life. This appeal for empirical 
data collection is echoed by Bennett (2005) and Marx (2006) who suggest 
conducting more empirical investigations, and argue that assumptions about 
technologies and their potential for surveillance practices need to be critically 
examined. Lyon (2001, p. 146) warns that "political questions fail to connect with the 
world we live in", because too little attention is paid to "actual empirical realities". 
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1.3 Aims and objectives 
The overall aim of the research project has been to investigate the implications of 
mobile phone location data on individuals’ perceptions of privacy. It has not been 
the aim to develop a conceptual framework for analysing the privacy and 
surveillance implications of mobile phone location data or to draw final conclusions 
about the condition of individuals' perceptions of privacy. Instead, the voices of 
ordinary citizens have been heard, when expressing their views regarding mobile 
phone location data and communications data retention. Grounded theory 
methodology (GTM) was used to illustrate patterns and themes that are useful in 
understanding the broader discourses concerning location data relating to privacy, 
technology and policy-setting. 
 
The five main objectives to advance the research aim are presented below, 
 
Objective 1 - to investigate individuals’ awareness of and attitudes towards 
mobile phone location data.  
It is important to portray and to represent the needs of ordinary citizens in the 
complex debate about technological influences on individual privacy, since the 
views of citizens can and should have an effect on future policies regulating the 
gathering, storage and analysis of personal data (Surveillance Studies Network, 
2006). In order to learn about citizens’ awareness of location data and its impact on 
people’s everyday lives, a number of empirical data collections, in form a location-
tracking pilot study, a survey and a series of interviews will be conducted. The 
methodology to guide the collection of data will be discussed in Chapter 3, and the 
findings from the data collections are presented in Chapter 4. 
 
 
Objective 2 - to provide a suitable background to the subject area of mobile 
phone location data and communications data retention in general.  
In order to fulfil the second objective, it is necessary to identify and discuss the 
current technological background regarding mobile phone location data within the 
UK. This will be supplemented by a review of relevant legislative developments, as 
well as the representation of privacy in the literature. The objective will be met by 
conducting an extensive review of the relevant literature, which will be provided in 
Chapter 2. 
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Objective 3 - to identify the positions of the different stakeholders involved, 
such as the UK and EU governments, mobile phone service providers, and 
individuals.  
This objective seeks to paint a picture of the dynamics in developing the regulative 
framework for communications data retention, while considering the view points of 
the various actors. The objective is predominantly addressed in Chapter 2 by a 
literature review, and in Chapter 5, where empirical findings are related to the 
relevant literature. A limited number of interviews with experts in the area 
supplement the review of the literature. 
  
  
Objective 4 - to analyse the relationship between individuals' perceptions, and 
the relevant literature regarding mobile phone location data.  
As part of this objective, privacy definitions commonly used in and known from the 
literature will be critically evaluated in the light of the analysis of empirical data. 
Discrepancies between the respondents' views of privacy and those represented in 
the relevant literature will be identified and discussed. This takes place in Chapter 5, 
where also the relationships between the grounded theory categories are 
explicated.  
 
 
Objective 5 - to offer an explanation about the phenomenon under study: 
individuals' views of privacy in relation to mobile phone location data.  
The final objective will be achieved by developing a theoretical model in the form of 
a grounded theory, which will map the relationship between mobile phone location 
data and individuals' perceptions of privacy. The theory will be based on the 
grounded theory categories and the relationships between them. The objective will 
be addressed in Chapter 5. 
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1.4 Methodology overview 
Central to this research was the choice of methodology. Grounded theory 
methodology is a methodological tool that offers a framework for qualitative analysis 
and can be used to develop new theory based on the collected data. For this study, 
initial data was gathered with the help of a pilot study, which involved identifying the 
geographical location of participants’ mobile phones and eight semi-structured 
interviews. Ten further in-depth interviews and a survey have been conducted to 
examine individuals' perceptions of privacy regarding mobile phone location data 
(see Table 1.1). All interviews were coded and analysed using grounded theory 
methodology. The study does not make use of predefined theoretical frameworks as 
a starting point but instead used an inductive approach to explore this research area 
from a fresh angle. The lack of existing theory regarding mobile phone location data 
and privacy justified the use of GTM as a suitable research methodology.  
 
Table 1.1: Steps in data collection 
 
Data collection 
Interview phase 1 + Mobile phone location tracking pilot study 
- Conduct and transcribe 2 x 4 Pilot study interviews 
- Track location of 5 mobile phones over 4 weeks 
Interview phase 2 
- Conduct and transcribe 5 in-depth interviews 
Survey 
- Develop and test pilot questionnaire 
- Distribute questionnaires paper-based and online, 477 respondents 
Interview phase 3 
- Conduct and transcribe 5 in-depth interviews 
Analysis 
- Develop final categories, based on codes and grounded theory memos  
- Triangulate findings from pilot study, interviews and survey and compare  
   to literature. 
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1.6 Guide to subsequent chapters 
The thesis consists of six parts: 1. Introduction, 2. Literature Review, 3. 
Methodology, 4. Presentation of data, 5. Discussion and analysis of findings, and 6. 
Conclusions and Recommendations.  
 
The purpose of this introductory chapter, Chapter 1, is to set the scene for the 
thesis by describing its overall context and rationale, including aims and objectives. 
Chapter 2 reviews the relevant literature, which is grouped into three strands 
significant to the research area: first, mobile phone technology with a focus on 
location data, second, definitions of privacy in the literature and third, the legal 
framework relevant to mobile phone location data. The methodological paradigm 
adopted for this study is described in detail in Chapter 3 along with the rationale for 
this choice. Grounded theory methodology has directed the methods used for data 
collection and is central to the way in which this thesis examines the empirical 
evidence. Interview questions for each of the three interview phases, screenshots of 
mobile phone location tracks and a copy of the questionnaire are provided in the 
Appendices A to L and referred to in the chapter.  
Chapter 4 reports the outcomes of the empirical data collection. The findings are 
presented with reference to the different stages of data collection: pilot study,  
in-depth interviews and survey. Codes, memos and visual displays of ideas provide 
an insight into how each of the five final categories was developed. 
Chapter 5 is divided into three parts. Part 1 draws together and triangulates the 
results from the different data collection methods. Empirical findings are contrasted 
with the literature and synthesised in order to provide a holistic interpretation of the 
research question. A theoretical model is presented depicting the implications of 
location data on individuals’ perceptions of privacy. Part 2 of Chapter 5 presents the 
four main findings developed from the categories and illustrates the relationships 
between the categories. Part 3 explains the divergences between individuals’ views 
of privacy and those predominantly discussed in the literature. 
The final chapter, Chapter 6, sets out the conclusions drawn from the study in 
relation to the aims identified above. It draws all data and interpretation together and 
makes suggestions for further research.  
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Chapter 2 Literature review: Privacy, Mobile phone technology and              
               Legal framework  
 
When examining the subject area of communications data retention broadly three 
areas need to be taken into account: a) technological matters, b) social values such 
as privacy and civil liberties, and c) law enforcement issues (Whitley and Hosein, 
2005; Raab and Bennett, 2006). Accordingly this chapter has been divided into 
three parts; the first part focuses on the role of geographical location within mobile 
phone technology, the second part discusses the relevant privacy related literature, 
and the final part of this chapter examines the legal framework relevant to mobile 
phone location data.  
Grounded theory methodology has been used to guide collection and analysis of 
empirical data for this study (for more detail see Chapter 3 - Research 
Methodology). GT methodology is an inductive method, which means that typically 
only a very broad review of literature takes place before collecting the data. 
However in addition to this initial review, the literature is visited again after the data 
collection has been completed. This study has followed this approach with the 
benefit that a second review of the literature could be guided by findings from all 
three empirical data collections - pilot study, interviews and survey. Particularly the 
development of the final GT categories, which was supported by written and visual 
memos, has prompted the review of further literature.  
The literature discussed in this chapter is a result of this iterative process and some 
literature particularly relevant to the findings from study will be revisited in Chapter 5 
and brought into relation to the empirical findings.
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2.1 Part 1: Mobile phone location data 
This section presents essential technical background to mobile cellular networks in 
order to provide an understanding of the role of location data. A brief history of 
mobile phone telephony is provided and followed by an explanation of the relevance 
of the cellular network architecture to mobile phone location data. Following this a 
technical overview of mobile communications network architecture is provided and 
finally location-based services and techniques of locating a mobile phone are 
discussed.  
 
2.1.1 Background to mobile phone location data 
The mobile phone is a key technology in an increasingly mobile and connected 
world. Growing technological convergence and ubiquitous networking leave behind 
a continuous and lasting trail revealing information about those involved in the 
communication. Picking up on this electronic trail makes it possible to identify the 
location of communication devices and individuals are indirectly locatable by 
carrying their mobile phone. In some cases, the location information supplied by a 
mobile phone can be very specific, depending in cell size and cell shape, which will 
be explained later in this section. Location-based services (LBS) for mobile phones 
(see section 2.1.3) are predicted to grow in the near future (see Lyon, 2005). A 
market research firm predicts that LBS revenues will reach €622m by 2010 (Moore, 
2006).  
 
The mobile phone as a location technology brings together the following three key 
features: 
 
1) identification of the approximate location of the handset 
2) on a continuous basis 
3) in real-time 
 
The combination of these features means that mobile phone users can potentially 
have their geographical location and movements traced at any time or all the time. 
In addition, a log of all data generated by a mobile phone is stored by the mobile 
phone service provider, and potentially shared, as discussed in the final part of this 
chapter (2.3 Part 3: Legal framework relevant to mobile phone location data). This 
makes the mobile phone unique in comparison to other location identifying 
technologies, such as CCTV or RIFD, particularly as a mobile phone tends to be 
carried by one person on a regular or sometimes even continuous basis. CCTV for 
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example can track individuals in real time but not continuously, RFID tags can also 
reveal location information but tend not to do this in real-time or o a constant basis. 
WiFi networks can also be used to locate the position of the device connecting to 
the wireless network (Hosein and Escudero-Pascual, 2002). However, this is limited 
to the size and the geographical area covered by this network. 
 
Location data can be perceived as both a threat and an opportunity. There are 
many opportunities that the attribute location can offer to businesses, governments 
and individuals. However, knowing a person’s location at any given moment in time 
can also have implications for privacy, civil liberties and social justice (Clarke, 2000; 
Lyon, 2005).  
 
2.1.1.1 History of mobile phone telephony  
The development of wireless communication systems started in the 1930s with the 
use of 'Walkie-talkies' during the Second World War to enable foot soldiers to stay 
in contact with the headquarters (Elliott and Philips, 2004). In 1946, AT&T Bell 
introduced the first commercial radiotelephone service in the US, which allowed 
communication between mobile users in cars and the public fixed network.. In the 
1960s, Bell Systems launched the Improved Mobile Telephone Service (IMTS), 
which laid the basis for commercial-sector mobile communications. Developments 
in microprocessor technologies in the late 1970s and early 1980s enabled the 
introduction of the reliable wireless communications system, the so-called first 
generation.  
 
First generation network - 1G 
The first generation wireless technologies, also known as 1G, were relatively simple 
and used analogue signals. Mobile phone handsets based on 1G technology were 
mainly used by government agencies and the military before this technology came 
into general use in the business domain in the 1980s (Elliott and Philips, 2004). The 
systems in Europe and the USA had in common that they provided coverage of a 
very large area by using only one transmitter mast. The coverage area of a mast 
was fairly large, up to 150km, and required minimal infrastructure. In order to 
connect via large distances, the base station as well as the mobile phone had to 
transmit simultaneously at high power. This meant that the mobile phones were 
larger than today’s handsets and used to be built into car boots. Moreover, due to 
the limited number of available frequency channels, only a small number of 
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subscribers could be connected to the mobile phone network (Walke et al., 2003). 
1G systems were based on analogue signals which are radio transmissions sent in 
a wave-like form. The mobile device sends the waves to a base station where the 
signal is reconstructed as accurately as possible and relayed to its destination. 
Noticeable differences in quality occur due to errors recreating the signal wave. In 
addition, analogue signals are relatively easy to intercept, as they are transmitted in 
the clear (Deitel et al., 2002).  
 
Second generation networks - 2G 
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the popularity of wireless communications grew 
and increased the demand for network capacity. Together with the disadvantages of 
analogue 1G systems, this led to the development of the second generation 
wireless system based on digital technology. Digital signals have different 
transmission properties than analogue signals and use binary coding using 
sequences of 0s and 1s to construct a signal's unique pattern. Digital signals use 
digital samplers and codecs to convert analogue voice data into digital data. Digital 
signals can be precisely duplicated by the receiving base station and send to its 
destination. This process results in a lower error rate than analogue transmission 
correction which results in clearer voice reception (Deitel et al., 2002). In addition, 
digital traffic is relatively simple to encrypt in order to prevent eavesdropping 
(Stallings, 2005).  
 
GSM, the Global System for Mobile Communications, fundamentally differs from the 
1G system because of its use of cellular network architecture, which will be 
explained in subsequent sections. GSM, also known as second generation network 
or 2G, was first developed in the 1980s through a pan-European initiative, involving 
the European Commission, telecommunications operators and equipment 
manufacturers. GSM is an open non-proprietary and interoperable digital standard 
for cellular mobile systems operating in the 900 and 1800 MHz band. In 1986, a 
number of different prototype systems put forward by companies and consortia from 
different European countries were trialled and led to the agreement of the main 
characteristics of the new system (Steele et al., 2001). 
 
GSM is still in use to date by all European countries and has also been adopted in 
other continents, such as Africa and South America.  There are over 540 million 
GSM subscribers in Europe, plus another 18 million Europeans using 3GSM 
networks, which are the 3G service delivered over the evolved GSM core network 
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(GSM Europe, 2005). With GSM it was also made possible to send and receive 
limited amounts of data via the Short Messaging Service (SMS) and mobile internet 
browsing via the wireless Applications Protocol (WAP) (Elliot and Philips, 2004). 
 
Second and a half generation networks - 2.5G 
2.5G technologies represent a state of development between 2G and 3G and have 
overcome the limited data and primarily voice-centred services of the 2G networks. 
In the 1990s and early 2000s higher transmissions rates and always-on connectivity 
were enabled by General Packet Radio Services (GPRS). Data transmission 
speeds were now 10 times faster with 115kbits per second and based on packet-
switching technology (International Telecommunication Union, 2003). Packet 
switching optimises the use of bandwidth available in a network and minimises the 
time it takes for data to travel across the network. The increased data transmission 
rates of 2.5G compared to earlier systems help to transfer data such as mobile 
internet content (Elliot and Philips, 2004) 
 
Third generation networks - 3G 
Third generation mobile telephony (3G) is the successor to the 2G and 2.5G 
systems. 3G improved previous systems by providing enhanced security and 
encryption features, improvements in screen displays and the ability to handle 
multimedia data, such as graphics and video streaming. 3G allows faster data 
exchange with data transmission rates up to 1920kbits per second, which enables 
the support of greater voice and data customers. Support can be provided for a 
wide variety of mobile equipment. 3G technologies were first introduced in Japan in 
2001 and spread to Europe and the USA in 2002. UMTS (Universal Mobile 
Telecommunications System) is the third generation mobile phone technology 
mainly used in Europe and also in Japan. It uses the GSM infrastructure and 
UMTS/GSM dual-mode phones sold in Europe are able to make and receive calls 
on both networks. Elliott and Philips (2004) describe as aims of all 3G networks the 
following: 
 
a) world-wide connectivity and roaming throughout Europe, Japan and North 
America 
b) high data transmission rates and broad bandwidth, suitable for multimedia 
content   
c) efficient spectrum utilisation 
(Philips and Elliot, 2004) 
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2.1.1.2 The cellular concept 
In terms of location data the most crucial concept was the introduction of the cellular 
network architecture with the change from the 1G to the 2G system. In 1972, a 
patent was registered by Bell Labs, the research subsidiary of the US telephone 
company AT&T that laid the foundations for today's second and third generation 
mobile phone systems (US Patent full-text and image database, 1972). The 
essence of this patent was to reduce the area covered by an antenna. In the 1G 
system, only one antenna served a very large area, whereas in the 2G this area 
was broken down into several cells. 
 
Each area or cell is served by a single base station and is in the approximate centre 
of each cell. Due to the increased number of cells in the 2G system compared to 
1G, many more masts were needed and this enormously increased the costs of 
infrastructure. Now it was possible to reuse the same frequency over relatively small 
distances, enabling coverage for a greater number of subscribers. This resulted on 
the one hand in the reduced size of antennas, and on the other hand in reduced 
distances between antennas. Another effect of this new system was that the long-
distance transmissions between mast and handset were not necessary anymore, 
which resulted in decreasing sizes of mobile phone handsets and improved handset 
operating times. Adjacent cells cannot use the same frequency, as this could result 
in interference. Hence, it is necessary to only re-use frequencies in cells that are 
sufficiently distant to each other. The transmission power of a base station has to be 
limited to prevent interference with frequencies from other cells and to reduce health 
concerns (Stallings, 2005).  
 
This concept of using an increased number of smaller cells required a mechanism 
to switch a user's connection from cell to cell. Hence, cells were arranged in a 
hexagonal pattern to enable all antennas to be the same distance apart, which is 
beneficial when a mobile phone user moves within a cell towards its boundary. This 
makes it easier to determine when to switch a user to an adjacent antenna and 
which antenna to chose. In comparison a square pattern, would only provide an 
equal distance to the centre of four cells (see Figure 2.1).  
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In practice, cells have irregular shapes and a precise hexagonal pattern is often not 
used due to topographical limitations, restrictions on positioning antennas and 
different amounts of traffic volumes as some cells have more mobile phone users 
than others. In addition, the coverage can overlap in looser shaped cells (Philips 
and Elliot, 2004). Different shaped cells have an impact on the accuracy of mobile 
phone location tracking based on the Cell-ID, as smaller cells provide a more 
accurate result than larger cells. 
Figure 2.1: Contrasting hexagonal and square pattern (after Stallings, 2005) 
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2.1.1.3 Increasing the capacity of a mobile phone network 
There was a considerable increase in the proportion of households with a mobile 
phone since 1998-99 from 27 percent to 78 percent in 2005 (National Statistics 
(2005). The increasing number of mobile users has caused the necessity to 
enhance the network capacity. According to the Mobile Operators Association 
(2006), base stations can only carry a maximum of around 120 calls at the same 
time. 
 
A mobile phone network can be made suitable for an increased number of phone 
users in several ways: 
- Add new channels (if possible) 
 
- Frequency borrowing from adjacent cells 
 
- Cell sectoring 
o divide cell into wedges, each with own channels (usually 3 or 6 
sectors per cell) 
o each sector has its own subset of channels 
o the base station has to use directional antennas  
 
- Cell splitting 
o generally cells are 6.5 to 13km in size 
o power level of antenna is reduced to keep signal within cell 
o since the cells are smaller, more frequent handovers (i.e. transfer of 
call from one Base transceiver to another) have to take place 
 
- Micro cells  
o Antennas move lower down, e.g. from top of buildings to smaller 
buildings or lamp posts 
o Cell size is decreased and a reduction of power takes place 
o Micro cells are usually in place on the high street where great traffic 
volume can typically be found 
o 10 - 400 metres radius circle 
 (Stallings, 2005) 
 
To summarise, due to an increasing number of mobile phone users, more mobile 
masts have been put up. This has resulted in smaller cells that can cope with the 
higher traffic volumes. In some cases, citizens have raised protests against new 
masts being put up in residential areas mainly due to concerns about health risks 
originating from the base stations (Mast Sanity, 2006). The use of smaller cells 
leads to a higher accuracy for mobile phone location identification based on Cell-ID. 
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Even though this is not the most accurate method, the cell-id or mast in use is a pre-
requisite for more accurate ways of determining a handset's location (as discussed 
in section 2.1.4, below). 
 
 
2.1.1.4 Health concerns in mobile telephony 
Health concerns are based on the radiation emitted by mobile phone handsets and 
base stations. The latter emits radiation continuously and much more powerfully. An 
independent expert group on mobile phones (IEGMP), also known as the Stuart 
Group, was established by the Minister for Public Health Tessa Jowell in 1999 to 
consider concerns about possible health effects from the use of mobile phones and 
bases stations (Independent Expert Group on Mobile Phones, 2000). The report 
concluded that no clear indication of short and medium term health hazards could 
be found. A precautionary approach to the use of mobile phone technologies was 
recommended until more scientific evidence was available. A more recent report by 
the board of National Radiological Protection Board states that “the main 
conclusions reached in the Stewart report in 2000 still apply today” (National 
Radiological Protection Board, paragraph 19, 2004). 
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2.1.2 Technical overview of mobile communications support 
An essential part of a mobile phone network's tasks is to monitor the location of 
every registered mobile phone device, as mobile phone users are free to roam 
throughout the coverage area of a cellular network. Therefore the network must 
possess some way to track mobile phones so that it can successfully route incoming 
calls and text messages to them. Mobile phone location data is an inherent feature 
of mobile communication and for this reason some technical background to mobile 
communication is provided in this section. At first the interplay between mobile 
phone handset and mobile phone base stations is explained, followed by what 
happens when a call takes place. It should be noted that this section only touches 
on the general principles of mobile communications based on cellular wireless 
networks. Detailed technological developments are not described here as they are 
not of relevance for this study. 
 
2.1.2.1 Overview of the cellular network architecture 
The GSM network architecture consists of three parts which are essential to enable 
mobile communication: the mobile phone handset, the base station and network 
subsystem. Each of these elements of a mobile phone network is described in more 
detail in subsequent sections to explain how the position of a mobile phone handset 
can be identified. See Figure 2.2 for an overview of the key elements of a cellular 
network. A mobile phone network continuously generates a host of information 
which is stored in various databases. The most relevant databases for determining 
a mobile phone handset’s location are the visitor location register (VLR) and home 
location register (HLR) database.  
 
Figure 2.2: GSM network architecture (after Walters and Kritzinger, 2000; Walke, 1999)
SIM 
Base station
BSC
VLR HLR 
EIR AuC 
BSC
MSC 
Public switched 
telephone 
network 
Base Station SubsystemMobile Station Network Subsystem 
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Mobile phone handset and SIM card 
A mobile phone handset contains a radio transceiver, digital signal processors and 
a removable smart card, known as subscriber identity module (SIM). The SIM card 
can be transferred between handsets and contains the international mobile 
subscriber identity (IMSI), which is used to identify the subscriber to the system. The 
mobile phone handset or device is uniquely identified by the IMEI number 
(International Mobile Equipment Identity) and depending on the mobile phone 
contract personal details about the user are known by the service provider. 
Customers of monthly paid contracts need to register their personal and bank 
details with their service provider, whereas for a pre-paid contract registration is not 
always necessary (Stallings, 2005).  
 
Base station subsystem: Base station (BS) and base station controller (BSC) 
The base station subsystem (BSS) is responsible for handling traffic and com-
munications between a mobile phone and the network subsystem. The BSS 
consists of two elements, one or more base station transceivers (BST) (commonly 
referred to as mobile phone masts) and the base station controller (BSC). 
Each base station transceiver includes a radio antenna which handles the radio-link 
protocols with the mobile phone and a link to one of the base station controllers and 
is assigned to a single cell. The base station controller manages allocation of radio 
channels, reservations of radio frequencies and handovers of mobile phone 
handsets from one cell to another within the BSS. The BSC can either be located 
with a BST or can control multiple BST units, hence serves multiple cells. A group of 
BSCs is connected to a mobile switching centre (MSC) via microwave links or 
telephone lines (Hubaux and Znaty, 2000; Steele et al., 2001). 
 
Network subsystem: MSC, HLR, VLR, AuC, EIR 
The network subsystem (NS) provides a link between the cellular network and fixed 
networks such as the analogue public switched telephone networks (PSTN) or 
digital integrated services digital network (ISDN). The NS controls handovers 
between cells in different base station subsystems, authenticates users and 
validates their accounts. It also provides functions for worldwide roaming of mobile 
users. The main part of the network subsystem (NS) is the mobile services 
switching centre (MSC), which is supported by the following four databases that it 
controls. 
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a) Home location register database (HLR) 
The home location register database (HLR) contains an entry for every SIM card 
issued, including details such as telephone number, mobile equipment number, 
equipment type and subscription type. Typically, GSM networks have only one HLR 
(Walke, 2003). In addition, dynamic information about the mobile subscriber is 
stored, for instance the current location area (LA). A location area consists of one or 
a number of cells. As soon as mobile phone user leaves his current LA, this 
temporary data held in the HLR is immediately updated (Steele et al., 2001).  
 
b) Visitor location register database (VLR) 
The visitor location register (VLR) is a temporary database that maintains 
information about subscribers that are currently physically in the region covered by 
the mobile switching centre (MSC). Entries are added when visitors enter the VLR 
domain and deleted when visitors leave the VLR’s domain. 
The VLR stores information transmitted by the HLR, such as authentication data, 
telephone number, agreed services, allowing the MSC to make a connection. It 
temporarily stores a user’s last known location area and records whether or not the 
subscriber is active and other parameters associated with the subscriber. The VLR 
also contains information that enables the network to find a particular subscriber in 
the event of an incoming call. 
 
c) Authentication centre database (AuC) 
The authentication centre database (AuC) handles authentication and encryption 
keys for all subscribers in the home and visitor location registers. It stores data 
needed to authenticate a call and to encrypt both voice and data traffic. 
 
d) Equipment identity register database (EIR) 
The Equipment identity register database (EIR) lists stolen phones, stores 
subscriber and equipment numbers (IMEI) of phones that are to be banned from the 
network or to be monitored. It can block calls from stolen mobile stations and 
prevent network use by handsets that have not been approved (Walke, 2003). 
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2.1.2.2 Steps in making a mobile phone call 
To demonstrate how the cellular architecture works, described below is what 
happens when a call takes place between two mobile users within an area 
controlled by the same mobile switching centre (MSC) (after Stallings, 2005; 
Walters and Kritzinger, 2000). 
 
Step 1: A mobile unit is turned on - initialisation  
The mobile phone scans and selects the strongest setup control channel. The 
mobile phone selects the base station antenna of the cell within which it will operate, 
which must not always be the geographically closest base station due to 
interference patterns or other electromagnetic phenomena. A so-called handshake 
takes place between mobile phone handset and the mobile switching centre through 
the base station, which is used to identify the mobile phone user and to register its 
location. As long as the mobile phone is switched on, this scanning procedure is 
repeated frequently and if the phone enters a new cell, a new base station is 
selected. 
 
Step 2: Call origination - request for connection 
A mobile phone initiates a phone call by sending the number of the called mobile 
phone on the pre-selected setup control channel. The mobile phone’s receiver first 
checks that the setup channel is idle by scanning the base station’s forward control 
channel, also known as reverse control channel. When an idle is detected, the 
mobile is able to transmit on the corresponding reverse control channel to the base 
station, which then in turn sends the request to the MSC. 
 
Step 3: Paging 
The MSC completes the connection to the called mobile phone by sending a paging 
message to particular base stations depending on the called mobile number. Which 
base stations are paged depends on the mobile phone network provider but is also 
dependant on the physical position of the mobile phone. The mobile phone network 
is aware of the current position of a phone because it is stored in the VLR. Hence, 
only the relevant base station and those base stations in surrounding cells are 
addressed. Each BS transmits the paging signal on its own assigned setup channel. 
 
Step 4: Call accepted 
The called mobile phone recognises its number on the setup control channel it 
monitors frequently (see step 1). The mobile phone then responds to the relevant 
base station, which in turn sends the response to the MSC. The MSC sets up a 
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connection between the calling and called mobile phone. At the same time, the 
MSC selects an available traffic channel within each base station's cell and notifies 
each base station, which in turn notifies its mobile phones. The two mobile phones 
tune to the channels assigned by the base station.  
 
 
2.1.3 Mobile location-based services (LBS) 
“Location-based services are information services accessible with mobile devices 
through the mobile network and utilizing the ability to make use of the location of the 
mobile device” (Virrantaus et al. 2001 in Steiniger et al., 2006). Location services 
are available to operators of all commonly used mobile phone networks in Europe: 
GSM (2G), GPRS (2.5) and UMTS (3G).  
The value of knowing the location of a mobile phone handset has been 
acknowledged by private and public sector services. The geographic location of a 
mobile phone can either be used to enhance existing service applications or to 
create new ones. The following categories of location-based services (LBS) are 
commonly distinguished: 
 
Safety and security 
o Emergency services (Europe: E112, US: E911) 
o Roadside assistance 
o Child finder  
o Asset tracking 
o Employee safety  
o Retention of traffic data, including location data in the EU 
 
Social 
o Games 
o Friend finder  
o Dating 
 
Navigation and information services 
o Traffic and weather reports 
o Navigation information (Find the quickest route / Find my nearest …) 
o Tourist services 
 
Tracking services and logistical telematics  
o Field Staff Management (Job scheduling) 
o Fleet management 
o Alerts on unauthorised locations  
 
 
 (Sources: Elliot and Phillips, 2004; m-location.com, n.d. ; Qualcomm, 2003) 
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These LBS typically use either active or passive location requests. The former are 
initiated by the mobile phone user, for example, when a mobile phone user wants to 
find the nearest bank. Passive location requests are not initiated by the mobile 
phone user and primarily encompass security and safety related applications, such 
as location tracking for emergency services and tracking of work force for business 
users. 
Location-based services need to meet the expectations of subscribers and of mobile 
phone operators in terms of implementation and cost requirements. Performance 
requirements of LBS include consistency, start time and accuracy. The 
requirements for accuracy vary depending on the application - the majority of 
applications require accuracy of 10-100 metres range. Implementation requirements 
consider impacts on handsets, e.g. drain on batteries, roaming between networks 
(2G to 3G) and network expansions. Costs to take into account by operators include 
handset costs, infrastructure, expansion maintenance and return on investment 
(Qualcomm, 2003). 
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2.1.3.1 Location-enhanced emergency call services 
In many emergencies people do not know their exact locations, which is particularly 
important when making the emergency call from a mobile phone. By using location-
identifying technologies, emergency response times and thus consequences of 
injuries can be reduced. Around 180 million emergency calls are made in the 
European Union every year of which 60 to 70 percent originate from mobile phones. 
Possibilities for emergency call management are being investigated by European 
initiatives (European Commission, 2003). In the US, business drivers for location-
based services include government mandates such as Enhanced 911 (E911) that 
require the incorporation of location-determination capabilities in mobile phones. 
The US’s Federal Communication Commission (FCC) required US mobile phone 
service providers to provide public safety agencies with location information in the 
event of an emergency. Particular performance characteristics for location 
determination were specified (Centre for Democracy and Technology, 2006).  
 
In Europe, calls made by mobile phone to '112', Europe's universal emergency 
number, will be able to inform the emergency services about the caller’s location 
based on Cell-ID.  Mobile phone service providers will share location information 
with the relevant emergency service. In Europe, opposed to the USA, no specific 
performance standards have been set for the member states. 
Article 6 of the Directive on Universal Service and Users’ Rights relating to 
Electronic Communications Networks and Services (2002/22/EC of 7 March 2002) 
states that: 
 
“Member States shall ensure that undertakings which operate public telephone 
networks make caller location information available to authorities handling 
emergencies, to the extent technically feasible, for all calls to the single European 
emergency call number 112" (European Commission, 2002). This makes it a legal 
requirement for mobile phone service providers to deliver location enhanced 112 
services across Europe.  
 
In the EU, similar to the US and Canada, consumer consent for use of location data 
for emergency services is implied. The European Union has left it to voluntary 
efforts by industry to exploit the commercial capabilities of location-based services, 
however, has made it mandatory for mobile phone operators to pass on the location 
of callers as it is technically possible for them (Gow, 2004).  
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2.1.4 Different methods for locating a mobile phone 
The various techniques for identifying the location of a device can be divided into 
network centric, handset centric methods or a combination of both. Network centric 
techniques locate a device based on information supplied by the network or with 
help of a number of mobile phone base stations, no handset enhancements are 
necessary. Handset centric methods require an upgrade to the mobile device as the 
location is calculated by the mobile phone itself from signals received from base 
stations. Satellite based technologies, such as GPS (see 2.1.4.2) are an example 
for handset- centric positioning (Steiniger, 2006).  
 
The following location technologies are relevant to mobile phone location data and 
will be described together with their particular performance and implementation 
characteristics. Table 2.1, below, list the different methods. 
 
Table 2.1: Mobile phone location technologies and supported mobile communication   
                 standard 
 
Mobile phone location technology Supported in mobile 
communication standard 
Cell of origin (COO)  GSM, GPRS, and UMTS 
AOA (Angle of Arrival)  GSM, GPRS 
TDOA (Time Difference of Arrivals)  GSM, GPRS 
E-OTD (Enhanced Observed Time Difference) GSM and GPRS 
OTDOA (Observed Time Difference of Arrival)  UMTS 
A-GPS (Wireless Assisted GPS) GSM, GPRS and UMTS 
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2.1.4.1 Network-based mobile phone positioning 
 
Cell of origin (COO) 
The simplest technique to identify the location of a mobile handset is based on  
cell-id, also known as Cell of origin (COO), see Figure 2.3. Since a mobile phone 
can be situated anywhere within a cell, the accuracy of these methods depends on 
cell size, which can vary from a few hundred metres to several kilometres (for more 
detail see section 2.1.2.1 above).  
This method of locating a mobile phone is the least accurate but also the most 
inexpensive one, as it does not require individual handsets or network infrastructure 
to be altered. The location of the cell used by the mobile phone can be identified 
within about three seconds (Lyon, 2005). Accuracy of the Cell-ID method can be 
improved by specifying the cell sector, as each base station typically has multiple 
antennas, each covering a sector of the cell (see Figure 2.4). For example, a base 
station with three antennas will produce a cell with three 120 degree sectors. By 
detecting the antenna with which the handset registers, the location can be 
narrowed down to a sector of the cell (D'Roza and Bilchev, 2003). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mobile Phone 
Base Station
  Figure 2.3: Cell-of-Origin tracking 
(after Walke, 1999)
Figure 2.4: Sectorisation of a cell 
(after D'Roza and Bilchev, 2003)
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Angle of Arrival (AOA) 
A technique known as Angle of Arrival (AOA) determines a user's location by 
measuring the angles from which a mobile phone's signals are received by two or 
more base stations. Because the mobile device is moving, this is not a very exact 
method (Steiniger et al., 2006). The base stations need AOA equipment to identify 
the direction of the phone's signal. The AOA equipment compares the angle 
between the caller and various receiving base stations and uses triangulation to 
determine the caller's longitude and latitude. Limitations of the AOA technique 
include its reduced accuracy; for example when various forms of signal interference 
occur. This can be due to signals bouncing caused by high buildings, which results 
in a weaker signal or none at all. AOA is known to work best in less populated 
areas, as there is a lower likelihood of interference. Many companies combine AOA 
with TDOA according to Deitel et al. (2002). AOA is more accurate than COO and 
the handsets do not have to be modified. However, it can prove costly to modify and 
configure the base stations (Lyon, 2005). 
 
Time Difference of Arrival (TDOA) 
The Time Difference of Arrival (TDOA) technique measures the time it takes a 
mobile phone signal to reach the receiving tower and two additional towers. The 
signal's travel time allows determining the user's distance from each tower, which in 
turn allows calculating the user's position. By calculating the user's distance from 
the receiving tower and two adjacent towers, a (virtual) set of arcs is created, which 
intersection indicate the handset's location. Handsets do not need to be modified to 
utilise this location technique, as the calculation of the position is done by the 
network provider (Deitel et al., 2002). 
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Enhanced Observed Time Difference (E-OTD)  
Enhanced Observed Time Difference (E-OTD), uses triangulation between at least 
three different base stations to provide more accurate location identification than 
Cell-ID. The distance between handset and base station is calculated based on the 
different times it takes a signal to arrive at the base stations once it leaves the 
handset. Accuracy can theoretically reach 30 metres but can lie in reality between 
50 and 125 metres (Lyon, 2005). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
E-OTD only works in GSM and GPRS networks, requires an upgrade to the mobile 
network infrastructure, and uploading of software to base stations to ensure 
compatibility. The base stations need to be fitted with location measurement units 
(LMUs) and, by measuring the signal from the mobile phone, the LMUs can 
triangulate the user’s position. This technique offers greater accuracy than cell-of-
origin but at a slower speed of response, typically around five seconds (Prasad, 
n.d.). Differing from TDOA, the calculation of the position is done by the mobile 
phone handset and for this reason a handset update in the form of software 
modification is necessary (Steiniger et al., 2006). A similar technique known as 
OTDOA (Observed Time Difference Of Arrival) operates only in 3G networks (Deitel 
et al., 2002).  
Base station 
 Base station Serving base station 
 
Figure 2.5: E-OTD (after Lyon, 2005) 
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2.1.4.2 Satellite-based mobile phone positioning 
 
Global Positioning System (GPS) 
The Global Positioning System (GPS) uses a set of satellites and ground receivers 
to determine the location of a GPS-enabled device. A GPS's receiver location is 
calculated by comparing time signals from several satellites, of which each has to 
have a direct line of sight to the receiver. At least three satellites are necessary to 
determine the receiver's two-dimensional location (i.e. latitude and longitude). To 
achieve additional and more accurate information, for example altitude, four or more 
satellite signals are required.  
The 24 satellites orbit the earth twice a day, transmitting radio signals from 
approximately 12,000 miles above the Earth. The satellite system, based on spy 
satellites utilised during the Cold War, was originally developed by the USA 
Department of Defence to help troops and missiles locate themselves on maps. In 
the 1980s, the US government made the system available for civilian use. Once a 
GPS receiver has been acquired, the location identifying service is free to use and 
accurate to an average of 15 metres. However, the drawbacks for GPS receivers 
that have been integrated into mobile phone handsets are that GPS receivers 
consume a considerable amount of battery power, are fairly expensive, and location 
positioning does not tend to work from inside buildings as a direct line of sight with 
satellites is needed. In addition, in urban areas the GPS signal can bounce of 
building walls and distort the result (Monmonier, 2002; Lyon, 2005). 
 
Assisted GPS 
Assisted GPS (A-GPS) links to the terrestrial-based system of cell sites to speed up 
the process of calculating a handset’s position. A-GPS can be combined with Cell-
ID, E-OTD or OTDOA. It requires an update to the handset and network 
infrastructure and shares the same drawbacks as all GPS receivers (Lyon, 2005). 
 
Galileo - European Satellite Navigation System 
Galileo is a European satellite navigation system currently in development. It aims 
to provide positioning services from 2011 and to offer at least the same 
performances as GPS (European Commission, 2006b). Galileo’s navigation 
infrastructure, which will consist of 30 satellites and relevant ground infrastructure, is 
funded by the European Union and the European Space Agency (European 
Commission, 2006a). Galileo is under civil control and aims to ensure that European 
economies are independent from other states’ systems, such as GPS. GPS is a 
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military system by the United States and is made available to civil users without any 
guarantee for continuity. 
 
Figure 2.6 below shows a comparison of the accuracy of positioning methods used 
by mobile phones: 
 
 
Figure 2.6: Accuracy of positioning methods (after Steiniger et al., 2006) 
 
As can be seen from the graphic above (Figure 2.6), the most accurate ways of 
determining a mobile phone’s geographical location involve the satellite based 
system GPS. Location identification by cell-ID is the least accurate method, 
however this technique makes use of the default properties of mobile phones. In 
other words, every mobile phone can be located by Cell-ID without any 
modifications of either software or hardware. 
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2.1.5 Summary Part 1 
As can be seen from this short discussion of technical background, the location of 
every mobile phone can be identified by triangulating the mobile phone signal, 
irrespective of mobile phone network generation and network provider. This first part 
of the chapter has explained this process by providing an overview of the cellular 
GSM network architecture and techniques used for locating a mobile phone.  
Location information as part of other communications data can be stored for future 
data-mining and analysis, as for example for commercial location-based services or 
for law enforcement purposes, as discussed in Part 3 of this chapter (section 2.3). 
The automatic generation of digitised personal data about every mobile user and its 
storage on a long-term basis, may also bear negative aspects that can impact in 
individuals’ privacy, as discussed in the next section. 
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2.2 Part 2: Privacy 
The second part of this chapter focuses on the representation of privacy in the 
literature and starts off by introducing and classifying the wide range of privacy 
definitions. Following this, legal and technological matters relevant to privacy are 
reviewed together with issues of surveillance and social justice. In addition, this 
section addresses the role of privacy enhancing and invading technologies, and 
finally explores the relationship between location-based services and privacy in the 
literature.    
 
2.2.1 Setting the scene 
The difficulty of defining the concept of privacy is often used as an introduction to 
reviews of privacy literature (see for example Introna, 1997; Solove, 2002; Bennett, 
2004). Alan Westin, a renowned US privacy scholar, comments on this subject 
matter that "no definition of privacy is possible because privacy issues are 
fundamentally matters of values, interests and power" (Westin, 1995, quoted in 
Gellman 1998, p. 194).). He suggests understanding privacy as an interest 
individuals have in leading a life free from interference by others. Despite this 
apparent slipperiness of the notion of privacy, numerous scholars have not ceased 
to provide their thoughts on this subject over the last several decades: such as 
regarding the impact of technologies on privacy (Cavoukian and Tapscott, 1995; 
Agre and Rotenberg, 1997; Bennett, 2004), surveillance and privacy (Clarke, 1988; 
Lyon, 1994; Zureik, 2005) or regarding communications interception in the 
information age (Diffie and Landau, 1998). 
  
Fried (1968 in Singh and Hill, 2003) observes that privacy is of high value for people 
because it allows for transactions that result in trust, which otherwise without the 
reassurance of privacy would not be possible. Privacy is seen as an interest of the 
human personality and by some believed to be the most essential human right of 
the modern age (Privacy International, 2003b). Despite the apparent difficulties in 
finding a suitable characterisation of privacy, a right to privacy is enshrined in 
international treaties, conventions, and agreements. In 1948, the UN declared 
privacy to be a fundamental human right in Article 12 of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (UDHR). The UDHR consists of 30 Articles which outline the United 
Nations General Assembly’s view on human rights guaranteed to all people. Yet, 
privacy was declared a fundamental right in the Universal Declaration of Human 
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Rights, differing from an absolute right, which is inviolable. Fundamental rights may 
under certain circumstances be removed (Gauntlett, 1999). 
 
Shortly after the UDHR the Council of Europe released the European Convention on 
Human Rights, which states in its Article 8.1 that "Everyone has the right to respect 
for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence". It has been 
established under the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR) (see for example Kopp v Switzerland (1999) 27 EHRR and Halford v 
United Kingdom (1997) 24 EHRR 523) that interception of post and 
telecommunications from business and private premises falls within the scope of 
Article 8.1 and therefore ensures private conversations to individuals (Davis, 2003). 
However, Article 8.2 ECHR allows interference with this right to respect for private 
and family if it is “necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national 
security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention 
of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the 
rights and freedoms of others" (ECHR, Article 8.2) (for more detail see section 
2.2.3.1).  
 
Meanwhile, some philosophers believe that privacy rights are unequivocal and 
unconditional (McWhirther and Bible, 1992; Velasquez, 1992 in Singh, 2003).  
Goodwin (1991 in Singh, 2003) interprets privacy as a two-dimensional concept 
requiring space and information, whereas Gavison (1980) identifies the following 
three elements of privacy: secrecy, anonymity and solitude. Fried (1968) defines 
privacy as "control over knowledge about oneself", which corresponds to Westin's 
(1967, quoted in Garfinkel and Gene, 2002, p. 205) definition "Privacy is the claim of 
individuals, groups or institutions to determine for themselves when, how, and to 
what extent information about them is communicated to others". Westin supplies the 
following views of privacy,  
 
a) Privacy as limited access to self, that is the extent to which we are known to 
others and the extent to which others have physical access to us  
 
b) Privacy as control over information, that is not simply limiting what others know 
about you, but controlling it. This assumes individual autonomy in that one can 
control information in a meaningful way. 
Privacy is again suggested to comprise the two factors control and knowledge by 
Foxman and Kilcoyne (1993 in Singh, 2003), in other words to have control over 
what information is collected and the knowledge that a data collection takes place 
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and including the purpose of collection. These definitions predominately relate to the 
categories of information privacy as discussed in the next section. Theoretical 
approaches to privacy predominantly differentiate between the following two 
aspects; protection of personal territory and protection against governmental 
intrusion. This relates to the traditionally recognised desire to balance the power 
between government and private individuals, as discussed by Nissenbaum (1998). 
 
2.2.2 Privacy categories 
The range of scholarly thoughts on privacy above indicates that there seems is no 
universally accepted definition of privacy. For these reasons, it seems the most 
useful approach to come to terms with the concept of privacy by applying different 
categories or spheres of privacy. All definitions of privacy supplied by the various 
authors above can be assigned to one or more of the following privacy categories.  
 
The following four spheres of privacy are commonly identified (see for example 
Nissenbaum, 1998; Clarke, 1999; Gauntlett, 1999; Privacy International, 2003b):  
a) Information privacy 
b) Privacy of communications 
c) Bodily privacy 
d) Territorial privacy 
 
In addition to these categories, Introna (1997) suggests the following three privacy 
categories, which share the element of ‘personal information’ as a common 
characteristic. These particularly relate to the empirical findings of this study, which 
will be discussed in detail in subsequent chapters:  
e) privacy as no access to the person 
f) privacy as control over personal information 
g) privacy as freedom from judgement by others 
 
These seven privacy categories as listed above are commonly referred to in the 
literature and are detailed in the following; the two categories relating to information 
(a+f) have been combined. 
In the context of mobile phone location data and its long-term storage, the most 
obvious threat to privacy is towards the right to respect for private life as contained 
in Article 8 ECHR (see section 2.2.3.1). Information relating to an individual’s 
geographical location and gathered on a continuous basis can be classified as 
privacy invasive according to six out of the following seven privacy categories:  
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a) Information privacy, f) Privacy as control over personal information 
The categories of 'information privacy' and 'control over personal information' are 
the most frequently referred to privacy categories in the literature and are 
particularly relevant regarding modern information and communication technologies 
(ICTs). Mason (1986) identifies two forces related to information that threaten 
individual privacy. For one part the growth of information technology with its ability 
to generate, store and analyse great amounts of personal information, and for the 
other part the increased value of information in decision making to policy makers.  
The increased deployment of computers in the 1960s and 1970s has enabled 
businesses to store vast amounts of data at relative low cost for almost unlimited 
periods of time and has facilitated the linkage and analysis of data stored in different 
locations. These technical developments have resulted in the need of rules to 
manage the collection and handling of personal data, particularly consumer 
information (Privacy International, 2003b). In addition, the increased use of 
technology had already in the 1970s resulted in growing concerns about the 
potential of information technologies to accumulate detailed collections of 
information about individuals. Therefore the data protection legislation has been 
developed, in order to prevent harm to individuals and negative consequences on 
society. At first by some individual countries and then at international level, for 
example through the European Union.  The UK’s domestic version of data 
protection law was enacted in form of the Data Protection Act 1984. Today, the 
Information Commissioner has responsibility for promoting and enforcing the Data 
Protection Act 1998 and Freedom of Information Act 2000 (Information 
Commissioner, 2007). 
 
The predominant aim of most data depositories or data warehouses is to analyse 
the accumulated consumer data and detect patterns in order to identify consumer 
choices and preferences. Profiles of consumers groups are generated, supposedly 
facilitating the establishment of long-term relationships between business and 
consumer. A well-known and often cited principle in customer relationship marketing 
proclaims, "it costs six times more to sell to a new customer than to an existing one" 
(Kalakota and Robinson, 2001, p.170). In addition to these commercial uses of 
personal data generated by information and communications technologies, the data 
is used for law enforcement by the police and intelligence services.  For example, 
the profiling of suspicious groups of citizens as part of a pro-active risk management 
by the government are matters that will be addressed later in this chapter (see 
section 2.2.5.2). Mobile phone location data is an example of personal information 
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specific to a mobile phone user and hence falls into this information privacy 
category. However, the mobile phone user does not have control over the 
generation of mobile phone location information or who has access to the data and 
for what purposes, which will discussed in further detail in subsequent sections. 
 
b) Privacy of communications 
The dimension of communications privacy deals with the claim of not being 
subjected to eavesdropping when communicating with others (Clarke, 1999a). This 
is also known as interception privacy. The European legal framework defines the 
right to communication privacy as fundamental and not as an absolute right, since 
court orders can be used to allow wiretapping (Gauntlett, 1999). However, it is 
widely agreed that wiretapping and electronic surveillance are highly intrusive forms 
of investigation that should be limited to exceptional circumstances (Privacy 
International, 2003b). Even though communications data does not encompass the 
content of communication, it nevertheless contains very personal information such 
as who has contacted whom, when, for how long and how often (see section 2.3.2). 
 
c) Bodily privacy 
The area of bodily privacy, also known as privacy of the person, is assigned to the 
matters of shielding one's physical self against procedures such as invasive body 
searches, genetic and drug testing. Person-identifying techniques based on physical 
and other characteristics, such as biometrics also fall into this category. However, 
mobile phone location data cannot be seen to be related to bodily privacy, as it 
contains information about a person's location and movements (see next privacy 
category). 
 
d) Territorial privacy  
This type of privacy deals with physical space and the protection of one's home or 
territory from direct intrusion. Territorial privacy also extends to the use of 
reasonable force to defend one's home against intruders (Gauntlett, 1999). The 
dimension of territorial privacy can also be categorised as media privacy, as it can 
also relate to behaviour in private and public places and visual surveillance, such as 
CCTV cameras. The standard of privacy protection regarding territorial and 
communication privacy was approved on international level in the UN Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 (for more detail see section 2.2.3). The use of 
CCTV was regulated for the first time by the Data Protection Act 1998 to put the 
collection and storage of citizens' information to closer legal control (Moran, 2005). 
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Mobile phone location data encompasses information about the physical space that 
the mobile phone user accesses, which is then retained on a continuous and long-
term basis under recent legislation (section 2.3.3.2).  
 
e) Privacy as no access to the person 
The privacy literature frequently refers to an article by Warren and Brandeis 
published in the Harvard Law Review from December 1890, in which the authors 
define personal privacy as the "right to be let alone" and "being free from intrusion" 
(Warren and Brandeis, 1890). However, this relatively early definition of privacy had 
not only related to the shielding of the home from intrusion but it was also a 
response to technology and market developments, i.e. the development of the 
camera and the emerging tabloid media.  Warren and Brandeis' legal opinion tends 
to be presented as the initial one on privacy and still greatly influences today's 
privacy advocates. Mobile phone location data gives access to a person's location 
and communications habits and hence falls into this category of privacy. 
 
g) Privacy as freedom from judgement by others 
Johnson (1989 in Introna, 1997) describes privacy as a concept that varies from 
context to context and points out that “it is quite possible that no single example can 
be found of something which is considered private in every culture”.  Privacy is here 
seen in the sense of a private space of immunity from the judgement of others, 
based on preconceived ideas and norms.  In the case of mobile phone location data 
this may result in an individual being judged by others depending on where she or 
he has been. From historical information it may be deduced how this phone user 
may behave in the future. 
 
To conclude, mobile phone location data can be seen as related to the majority of - 
six out of seven - commonly referred to privacy definitions. As will be discussed in 
further detail in subsequent sections (2.2.5), the long-term retention of mobile phone 
location data, together with other communications data, can be interpreted as a 
form of surveillance.  Hence, in order for citizens to accept and to consent to this 
form of surveillance, it is necessary to ensure that governments are accountable for 
its actions (Taylor, 2002). The following sections will focus on the legislative 
framework for privacy and surveillance in relation to communications technologies.
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2.2.3 Legal dimensions of privacy 
A common misunderstanding between legal rights, on the one hand, and moral or 
natural rights, on the other hand, is highlighted by Clarke (1999a) and Langford 
(2000). Privacy is seen as equivalent to liberty and this definition confuses the legal 
right of privacy with the condition of privacy. The notions of legal matters and 
privacy are not easily separable perhaps because the concept of privacy is often 
merely considered in the context of protection of privacy and therefore closely 
related to the legal framework. It could even be understood, that the subject of 
privacy is only recognised when an intrusion of privacy occurs. 
 
Four major models for privacy protection based on various international standards 
are identified by Privacy International (2003b) and Beresford (2005). Firstly, 
comprehensive laws that govern the collection, use and dissemination of personal 
information by both the government and private sector. For example, Europe has a 
comprehensive regulatory model with a public official in charge for enforcing data 
protection legislation. In the UK, the Office of the Information Commissioner is an 
independent public body established to enforce compliance with data protection 
legislation, such as the Data Protection Act 1998. Bennett (1995) has shown that 
countries that have established a data protection agency provide better privacy 
protection for their citizens. Secondly, sectoral laws regulating certain areas of 
privacy protection, for example financial or medical privacy. Thirdly, various forms of 
self-regulation in which industry adopts particular codes for self-control and engages 
in self-policing. However, Beresford (2005) remarks that industry-wide consensus 
does not necessarily result in satisfactory consumer privacy. The latter two privacy 
protection laws can be for example found the in the United States. Fourthly, 
technological self-help for consumers through methods such as encryption, various 
digital payment methods and anonymous remailers. Depending on their application, 
these models can be complementary or contradictory. Privacy International (2003b) 
believes that the joint use all of the models together provides the most effective 
privacy protection for citizens. 
 
The terms 'human right' and 'civil liberty' are often used in conjunction with the term 
privacy. Stone (2004) explains that the phrase human right is commonly drawn on in 
an international context, such as by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and 
the European Convention on Human Rights. The term civil liberty tends to be rather 
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used on the municipal level. However, Stone also acknowledges that the distinction 
between both terms can be blurred.  
 
2.2.3.1 Protecting Human Rights  
At the end of the 19th century, the American lawyers Warren and Brandeis have 
established the basis for privacy protection constituted in legislation (see section 
2.2.2). In Europe, the right to privacy is a highly developed area of law, and after the 
Second World War Human Rights have been laid out in legislation, also in an 
attempt of the democratic states to distinguish themselves from the Eastern Bloc 
regimes (Bowden, 2003). All Member States of the Council of Europe have ratified 
the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedom, also known as the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), 
which was adopted in 1950.  All Member States of the European Union (currently 27 
members) are members of the Council of Europe (a larger body of 45+ member 
states), and are thus bound by the ECHR. 
 
The Council of Europe established the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), 
based in Strasbourg, to ensure observance of the European Convention on Human 
Rights.  An important element of this Convention system is that an individual, 
company or other organisation can bring a case against their own government 
claiming a violation against the Convention. The UK had been a signatory of the 
ECHR since 1950 and thus has bound itself to observe the judgement of the 
ECtHR. Therefore, when the European Court in Strasbourg decides that the UK has 
violated a right under the ECHR, the UK needs to amend its law, policy or practice 
so as to give effect to the judgment, while it has some discretion in doing so. Hence, 
the British courts are not bound to follow the Strasbourg view, which makes it 
possible for a “distinct British approach to human rights” to develop (Davis, 2003). 
 
The jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights on privacy is more 
complex than that on other Convention rights, argue Whitty, Murphy and Livingstone 
(2001). The ECtHR looks at underlying values instead of artificially distinguishing 
private and public categories. The Court has adopted a definition of ‘private life’ that 
is more general than merely considering a person's intimate sphere of personal 
autonomy. For example, the ECtHR has considered worthy of respect a person's 
sense of self and well-being but also relationships within the wider society. Relevant 
cases that have been decided by the Court in Strasbourg involve personal 
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information on a card index (Amann v Switzerland (2000) 30 EHRR 843), private 
zones (in Niemietz v Germany (1992) 16 EHRR 97), respect for 'correspondence' 
which can involve an internal telephone system (Halford v UK (1997) 24 EHRR 
523), telephone conversations (Malone v UK (1984) 7 EHRR 14) and letter and 
telephone communications (Hewitt and Harman v UK (1992) 14 EHRR 657) (Whitty, 
Murphy and Livingstone, 2001). 
 
In the United Kingdom, the Human Rights Act made the European Convention on 
Human Rights part of British law and with it the right to privacy for the first time in 
British history. The HRA was introduced in 2000 and is only applicable to public 
authorities and private organisations acting as public authority. Despite these 
limitations, the HRA also affects the British law for all organisations and citizens as it 
contains a set of principles that need to be brought into court in order to be 
interpreted. However, even prior to the Human Rights Act 1998 coming into effect, 
the ECHR had already had an impact on the law of the UK when British judges 
sought compatibility with the Convention in their judgement (Davis, 2003).  
 
In addition, changes to the British law became necessary due to adverse rulings 
from the court in Strasbourg, for example, relating to telephone tapping and 
surveillance in the well-documented cases of Malone v United Kingdom (1984) and 
Halford v United Kingdom (1997), as mentioned above. In the former case, Malone 
claimed that he had experienced an infringement by a public authority to his right to 
privacy. He alleged that he had been under police surveillance, his telephone had 
been tapped and phone calls metered. 'Metering' is the equivalent of retaining traffic 
data from landline telephones and postal communication and includes data, such as 
the numbers dialled, time and duration of calls, as well as the address on a postal 
communication (Bailey, Harris and Ormerod, 2001). However, Malone’s legal 
challenge was unsuccessful as there was no enforceable right to privacy in English 
law. The public telephone system was not considered a confidential network and 
hence the interception of communications did not involve the violation of any of the 
applicant’s rights. Finally in 1985, the European Court of Human Rights ruled that 
police interception of individuals' communications was a violation of Article 8 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights. 
 
Subsequently, Malone’s case led to the ratification of the Interception of 
Communications Act 1985 to comply with the Strasbourg judgement in Malone v UK 
(1984) but also with the privatisation of the telecommunications service. The Court 
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ruled that the legal regulation of the circumstances of telephone interceptions was 
not expressed with sufficient clarity in the UK as required under Article 8.2 of the 
ECHR (Whitty, Murphy, and Livingstone, 2001; Taylor, 2002). 
 
The case of Halford vs United Kingdom (1997) concerned a private telephone 
conversation using an internal office telephone system, between a police officer and 
her lawyer regarding a sexual discrimination complaint against her police force. The 
interception of this conversation by the police had been declared admissible under 
English law as the Interception of Communications Act 1985 (IOCA 1985) did not 
apply to private telephone systems, and there was no other UK law that regulated 
these types of systems. However, Halford took her case to the European Court of 
Human Rights, which ruled that an intrusion on such internal telephone systems did 
not comply with the requirements under Article 8.2. 
 
The Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 was introduced partly to comply 
with Halford v UK (1997) concerning private telecommunications systems and other 
new communication technologies. Part 1 of RIPA supersedes the IOCA 1985 and 
extends the definition of interception to include most forms of electronic 
communications including email (Taylor, 2002) (see also section 2.3.3).  
 
 
2.2.3.2 European data protection law 
European laws aim to set a common standard across all member countries and 
have to take into account different cultures and laws regarding privacy protection. 
Nevertheless it needs to be pointed out that the impact of EU Directives is different 
in each country, and depends on the different mentalities of the different nations 
(Hosein, 2003).  
 
In 1997, the Telecommunications Privacy Directive (97/66/EC) was introduced by 
the European Union to specifically regulate telecommunications systems, such as 
mobile networks, telephone and digital television. The Directive guaranteed 'a right 
to privacy' regarding telecommunications traffic of individuals. Opposing to current 
practices, access to billing data for marketing purposes was restricted, and data 
related to phone calls had to be deleted after the phone call terminated (section 
2.3.4). Two years earlier, in 1995, the Data Protection Directive (95/46/EU) was 
introduced by the European Union to protect personal information to ensure the free 
flow of personal data within the EU and to harmonise privacy laws amongst its 
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member countries. This Directive established that personal data can only be 
collected with consent of the individual. The data should be processed fairly and 
lawfully for limited purposes and only retained for a limited period of time. 
Individuals should have the right to access data collected about them and to delete 
or change incorrect data. Some data is categorised as sensitive data, such as data 
relating to political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, trade union 
membership, and therefore cannot be processed without the individual's explicit 
consent. In spite of this, an individual's agreement is not required in exceptional 
cases of public interest, such as medical or scientific research, for which alternative 
protection mechanisms have been established (Bainbridge, 2004; Moran, 2005). 
 
The Data Protection Directive is, amongst other Directives, implemented in all 
European Union member states along with local laws. To enforce compliance with 
the EU Directive, a Data Protection Authority has been established in each country, 
to ensure independence of the executive governmental branch to avoid political 
influence. In July 1998, the British Parliament approved the Data Protection Act 
(DPA) to implement the European Union Data Protection Directive in March 2000. 
The British handling of data collection and dissemination is regulated by the Data 
Protection Act (DPA, 1998) and the Freedom of Information Act (FOI  Act, 2000).  
Both the DPA 1998 and the FOI Act 2000 reflect the development to put the 
collection and storage of citizens' information to closer legal control (Moran, 2005). 
For example, for the first time the DPA 1998 regulated the use of CCTV, a 
technology that was increasingly being used for surveillance. The DPA contains 
eight Principles that ensure adequate handling of personal data, which is data 
related to specific living individuals. However, information that is necessary for 
safeguarding national security is fully exempt from the Data Protection Principles 
(Davis, 2003). 
 
The FOI Act imposes a duty on public authorities, such as government departments 
and councils, either to publish or disclose on demand information and documents in 
their possession. However, many categories of information and documents are 
exempted from this duty, for example if the information could be accessed by other 
means or other legislation. The FOI Act is evidence of a move towards greater 
openness and accountability, which serves the idea of citizenship, makes abuse of 
power clearer to citizens and aims to enable voters to make informed choices 
(Davis, 2003). Compliance with the Data Protection Act and Freedom of Information 
Act is promoted and enforced by the Office of the Information Commissioner (ICO). 
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The ICO is the UK's independent public body set up to protect personal information 
and promote public access to official information an independent agency 
(Information Commissioner's Office, n.d.).  
 
Davies (1997) criticises that data protection acts are not concerned with the full 
range of privacy protection issues. He warns that the narrow scope of the acts can 
lead to serious limitations, as these laws are only information laws and protect data 
before the people. In other words, data protection acts are merely concerned with 
the way personal data is collected, stored and accessed but do not question the 
action of collecting data in the first place. British data protection laws react to 
complaints of non-compliance rather than to proactively examine whether 
organisations comply with the law. For these reasons, the awareness of individuals 
regarding privacy invasions is seen as crucial, as claimed by the Parliamentary 
Office of Science and Technology (2002), Cady and McGregor (2002) and 
Accenture (2003b). 
Further details about the British legislation relevant to mobile phone location data 
are discussed later in this chapter in sections 2.3.2 and 2.3.3.2). 
 
2.2.4 Impact of technologies on the concept of privacy 
Particularly considerations about the influence of technology on privacy are of 
relevance to this study. When Warren and Brandeis' published their definition of 
privacy at the end of the 19th century, protection of privacy might have sufficiently 
consisted in shielding one's home from intrusion and not being watched or 
overheard by others. Even though their definition of privacy as related to the "the 
right to be left alone" is still frequently referred to today, others increasingly focus on 
technological influences on the concept of privacy.  
 
Already two decades ago, Mason (1986) claimed that we live in at an information 
age, in an information society. Continuous advancements in information and 
communications technologies have resulted in faster computer processors, cheaper 
storage and growing use of networking technologies, such as the internet. One 
effect of this technological 'revolution’ is the increased digitisation of data. It enables 
routine storage and analysis of personal data on great scale, such as for example 
when using credit cards, the internet or mobile phones. Consequently, the increased 
power of computers together with the advent of the internet have influenced 
numerous aspects of life and hence the concept of privacy.  
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A number of predominantly North American publications tend to merely relate 
privacy to electronic communications, and seem to be primarily concerned about the 
'Death of privacy in the 21st century' caused by information and communication 
technologies (see for example Cavoukian and Tapscott, 1996; Gauntlet, 1999; 
Garfinkel, 2001; Cady and McGregor, 2002). However, their treatment of privacy 
provides a too narrow view of the subject matter. This highlights the importance of 
taking into account time and context of privacy publications, as well as country and 
regional specific regulatory approaches, in order to provide a sufficient 
understanding of the subject of privacy. 
 
Before electronic means of data storage were widely used by businesses, data 
could often be found scattered over different places. The cumbersome and 
sometimes impossible retrieval of this data could act as a kind of privacy protection. 
When merging data from different sources over time privacy related issues arise 
especially when data that has been perceived as non-sensitive at time of disclosure 
is combined with other data (Nissenbaum, 1998). The analysis of consumers' 
purchasing habits is often accompanied by the creation of consumer profiles, which 
is another area frequently mentioned in the literature feared to invade individual's 
privacy (Cady, 2002; Graeff and Harmon, 2002). Consumer profiling evokes 
associations with racial or criminal profiling; taking into account that not only past 
actions can be analysed but also future consumer behaviour, which is often tried to 
be predicted and possibly influenced. This entails the danger shared with all types 
of profiling in that assumptions are made about a person which are not necessarily 
accurate or complete. Bowden (2003) warns that collections of consumer data often 
take place without the unambiguous consent of consumers, who may give their 
agreement at the very beginning of a business relation but then over time forget 
about it. This also raises issues regarding the ownership of personal data, 
particularly in sensitive areas such as health.  
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2.2.5 Surveillance society - Threats to privacy by digital data collections 
The dictionary defines surveillance as “close observation, especially of a suspected 
spy or criminal” (The concise Oxford English dictionary, 2001). The French word 
surveillance means literally to “watch over, from sur- ‘over’ + veiller ‘watch’ from 
Latin vigilare keep watch, Origin: early 19th century.” However, 'to watch over' can 
be interpreted in two ways, which represent the two faces of surveillance: on the 
one hand, protection or care and on the other hand, control. Lyon (2001) argues 
that the worrisome and unsocial aspects of surveillance pay for mobility, 
convenience, speed, security and safety in modern life.  
 
Several authors claim that today's Western society has turned into a surveillance 
society (see Lyon, 2001, Marx, 2002 and Stalder, 2002). However, these authors do 
not perceive surveillance in the context of totalitarian regimes or regarding a 
centralised Orwellian ‘Big Brother’ figure but rather as relating to the continuous 
gathering of information facilitated networked computer systems: "Everyday life is 
subject to monitoring, checking and scrutinising" (Lyon, 2001, p. 1). In Lyon’s view, 
all societies that depend on information and communications technologies for 
administrative and control processes can be described as surveillance societies. 
Indeed, the UK is the country with the most CCTV cameras in the Western world, 
according to the Human Rights organisation Liberty (n.d.). There are 4.2 million 
cameras in the UK, which means that there is one camera for every 14 British 
citizens, according to McCahill and Norris (2003 in Norris et al., 2004).  
 
In its recent report commissioned for the UK Information Commissioner, the 
Surveillance Studies Network’s shares this broad definition of surveillance:  
 
“Where we find purposeful, routine, systematic and focused attention paid to 
personal details, for the sake of control, entitlement, management, influence 
or protection, we are looking at surveillance.”  
(Surveillance Studies Network, 2006) 
 
The report warns that the routine tracking and information gathering mechanisms of 
the surveillance society are often not obvious to citizens. This makes it particularly 
important to incorporate checks and safeguards when collecting data to ensure 
accountability. 
 
Nevertheless, some authors such as Bennett (2005), challenge the view of defining 
electronic data collections as a form of surveillance. Bennett stresses that a 
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distinction needs to be made between capture and storage of personal information 
on the one side, and on the other side, data analysis and manipulation of those 
whose data has been collected. He bases these claims on a case study in which he 
examines his own data tracks generated as an airline passenger when travelling 
within his own country Canada and across the border to the US. 
  
In his view, the collection and storage of his passenger data by the airlines and 
airports does not constitute surveillance, as there is no further analysis of that data 
from which decisions are made. He criticises the use of the term surveillance in this 
context, as he perceives surveillance as a too broad definition. Bennett suggests 
using another concept or term to explain the practice of humans to monitor data in 
order to make decisions about individuals. He believes that identifying these 
practices as surveillance trivialises the real surveillance, for which he gives as an 
example the special attention to passengers with ‘risky’ surnames. In this context, it 
could be seen as more suitable to use the term dataveillance, which Clarke (1988) 
has introduced almost two decades ago to describe the systematic monitoring of 
people’s actions or communications through information technology. Nonetheless, 
whether the term 'surveillance' is used or not, the extensive collection of individuals 
data is seen with unease by privacy scholars. 
 
2.2.5.1 Digital technologies changing the concept of surveillance: new 
versus traditional surveillance 
The traditional definition of surveillance as close observation of a suspect individual 
with the naked eye does not necessarily apply any longer, due to the capabilities of 
modern technologies to routinely record data. Several authors such as Lyon (1994), 
Marx (2002) and Clarke (2005), agree that the concept of surveillance has changed 
over the last decades and have declared the emergence of “new surveillance”. Marx 
(2002) identifies 28 dimensions in which traditional and new surveillance differ. For 
instance, Marx describes the differences between ‘new’ and ‘traditional’ surveillance 
as concerning the collection of data. The generation of predominantly digital data in 
private life and commercial settings leads to fewer costs of data handling. Data 
collections tend to occur on a continuous and routine basis, which makes the 
gathering less visible and enables real-time availability of information, such as for 
example CCTV data, use of credit cards and mobile phones. Inexpensive storage 
space enables the long-term retention of data. In addition, faster computer 
processors make it easier to organise, store, retrieve and analyse data and help to 
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make predictions for the future. This can be relevant for commercial companies for 
marketing their products, as well as for governments in order to increase accuracy 
of planning as suggested by Stalder (2002). However, it seems that Marx solely 
bases his distinction of the differences regarding the two types of surveillance on 
the capabilities of modern ICTs, such as assistance with the handling of great 
amounts of data, or in other words on the continuing development of the 
technological age. 
 
Marx (2002) places the emphasis of new surveillance on mass surveillance of 
groups consisting of anonymous individuals, rather than on the visible and 
noticeable monitoring of individuals. In addition, the increased storage and analysis 
capabilities enable a closer examination of certain subjects of surveillance, in real-
time but also in retrospective. Lyon (1994) points out that it is not necessary to 
identify individuals in order to conduct profiling of behaviour and habits in relation to 
social demographics. He fears that this can lead to social sorting and demographic 
discrimination of groups of individuals. Davies shares Lyon's view and offers as an 
example the use of statistics by the British government, instead of suspicion, to 
justify the use of a range of new powers, such as DNA test and finger printing (Talk 
Simon Davies at Leeds Metropolitan University, 28th October 2005). 
 
Different phases in the application of surveillance technologies are distinguished by 
Kim (2004). Firstly, physical surveillance, as described by Bentham (1791) and 
Foucault (1975), as for example by their ideas about the Panopticon; secondly the 
concept of electronic surveillance that places the emphasis on the use of 
technologies to expand the observing electronic gaze from prison or factory to the 
wider society with help of information technologies as discussed by Marx (1985) or 
Lyon (1994). Thirdly, data surveillance, also known as ‘dataveillance’ which is 
described as the systematic use of personal data systems in monitoring of the 
actions or communications of one or more persons by Clarke (1994b). As last phase 
of the social effects of surveillance technology, Kim (2004) introduces the notion of 
‘hyper-surveillance’ and refers to the authors Bogard (1996) and Haggerty and 
Ericson (2000). However, the author fails to explicate the difference between the 
phases of dataveillance and hyper-surveillance, which seems to be minuscule. 
 
Chapter 2 - Literature Review   
 
Andrea Gorra           Page 53  
Today’s immense data collections are performed by a number of different agents. 
This contradicts visions of surveillance related to Big Brother, as described in 
Orwell's novel 'Nineteen eighty-four', or in other words one single data collection 
agency. Different data collection agencies can encompass commercial companies 
logging consumers’ shopping or financial data, governmental agencies that record 
images of pedestrians crossing the streets, and interceptions of communication for 
keywords indicating terrorist activities by listening stations such as Menwith Hill in 
Yorkshire. 
Some perceive a change in the privacy debate in that citizens used to be worried 
about either commercial companies or the government having access to their data. 
Even though neither of these concerns have vanished, there are now relationships 
springing up between commercial companies and the government (13th Annual 
Conference on Computers, Freedom & Privacy, Plenary Session #9: Data Retention 
in Europe and America, 2003).  This collaboration between public and private sector 
actors particularly applies to the discussion about data retention. The government 
gains access to user's mobile phone communications data via privatised, 
commercial mobile phone and internet service providers.  
 
2.2.5.2 Data shadows of individuals and implications of ‘dataveillance’ for society 
The dangers and benefits of surveillance are identified most concisely by Clarke 
(1998) and Lyon (2001). Lyon believes that society profits of surveillance in terms of 
efficiency, mobility, security and public order. Clarke predominantly identifies the 
advantages of physical security and the data matching practices of organisations to 
combat fraud. Both authors point out as potential dangers of dataveillance the 
unintended consequences and negative dimensions of surveillance.  
 
The threats of mass dataveillance can be divided into dangers to individuals and to 
society. Clarke (1998) identifies as dangers of dataveillance for individuals that 
decisions based on incorrect data may lead to unfairness. This can particularly 
become a problem when an individual is unaware of the data collection and hence 
has no means to rectify wrong data. Consequently, this can result in blacklisting a 
person over a matter that is still under dispute or falsely related to that person. 
Metaphors such as 'data shadow', 'data trail' or ‘digital personae’ are frequently 
applied in the literature to depict the effects of dataveillance on individuals (see for 
example Clarke, 1994b; Lyon 2001; Stalder 2002; Bennett 2005). The 'data shadow' 
is made up of personal data and follows or precedes an individual. The danger here 
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is the potential judging and discrimination based on data that might not be accurate. 
Nissenbaum (1998) points out that even though those who are aware of collections 
of their data may be less easily targeted or manipulated. Nevertheless, the 
awareness of data collection can create a climate of self-consciousness and 
suspicion. Clarke (2000) further perceives as a danger of surveillance that it makes 
it possible for authorities to focus on undesirable classes of people before they 
commit an offence. For example, the 1984 Police and Criminal Evidence Act gives 
police the right to stop and search on grounds of suspicion. This situation results in 
an inversion of burden of proof from the accusing organisation to the individual who 
now needs to provide evidence of their innocence.  
 
Collections of personal data may not only be interpreted as a threat to personal 
privacy but more importantly as a danger to social justice. Clarke (1998) warns that 
"dataveillance is by its very nature, intrusive and threatening". Dangers of mass 
dataveillance to society can once again be described as to create a climate of 
suspicion, particularly when individuals are aware of the data collection, as well as 
decreased respect for the law and law enforcers, deteriorating of society’s moral 
fibre and solidarity. The STOA report (European Commission's Science and 
Technology Options Assessment office) cautions of the surveillance capability of 
ICTs that may be used to track the activities of journalists, campaigners and human 
rights activists (STOA report, 1998). These technologies can result in a chilling 
effect on those who participate in democratic protest warns Privacy International 
(1999). Along the same lines Clarke (2005) indicates that privacy is important from a 
political viewpoint, enabling freedom of speech to think and act. In his view, the 
monitoring of individuals' communications and actions threatens democracy. Lyon 
(2003) argues that concerns about surveillance used to be expressed in terms of 
privacy and freedom. He warns that the digital divide is not just a matter of access 
to information but that information itself can be a means of creating divisions. 
Hence, personal data and communications data retention cannot merely regarded 
as an individual privacy concern but need to be framed as bearing an effect on 
society as a whole. 
 
Already in his 1988 paper, Clarke identifies costs of collecting, storing and analysing 
data as a ‘natural control' to limit dataveillance. However today almost 20 years on, 
this reason does not ring true anymore. As a result of most data being generated in 
digital format, the costs of automatic data collections and their analysis have 
decreased significantly. Clarke highlights the moral obligations of IT professionals, 
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marketers and governments in creating and using computer systems to handle 
individuals' data in an ethical way. 
 
 
2.2.6 Privacy enhancing and invading technologies  
The question whether technology itself can be seen as 'neutral', 'good' or 'bad' is 
frequently addressed by scholars (Clarke, 1999b; Cady, 2002). "There is nothing 
inherently good or bad about the increased power of technology" maintains Marx 
(2006, p. 38), and suggests that new technologies with privacy invasive potential 
must be subjected to empirical and ethical questions and not simply accepted as 
good because they are novel.  In the same manner, Lyon (2002) argues that new 
information and communications technologies do not by themselves create 
surveillance but rather the application of technology and the policies accompanying 
its usage. May (2002) asserts that ICTs do not fundamentally change society and 
do not constitute an information 'revolution' that requires entirely new thinking. Even 
though the author admits that technology has social, political and economic effects 
and transforms some activities within society, he also argues that this does not alter 
society’s substance. In addition, he challenges the widely accepted view that the 
arrival of the ‘information society’ has fundamentally transformed society.  
 
Some place technologies into categories according to their ability to invade or 
protect individual privacy (Clarke, 1999; Bowden, 2003). Data warehousing and 
data mining, as introduced in previous sections, are often perceived as 
predominantly privacy invasive technologies (PITs). To this category are also often 
counted authentication technologies such as biometrics and technologies, as they 
do not allow the anonymisation of data. Technologies that can be used to protect 
the privacy of users are known as privacy enhancing technologies (PETs). They 
protect the privacy of individuals and provide anonymity in transactions or provide a 
pseudonym. Examples of PETs are anonymous web browsers, remailers and 
encryption (Agre, 1997; Clarke, 1999, 2001). These PETs are an important part of 
the privacy model of technological self-help as introduced in section 2.2.3. Kim 
(2004) claims that PETs may help transparency as well as reconstruct interpersonal 
trust in the networked environment and can help the promotion and protection of 
privacy rights. However, the author also admits that PETs fail to acknowledge the 
drive (or motivation) for exploitation or dominance.  
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2.2.7 Mobile phone location data and privacy 
It can be argued that location technologies pose new challenges for privacy policy 
and law. As explained above, location data has the potential to be used to create 
profiles, social sorting, discrimination and differential treatment, which often remain 
invisible to most members of the public (see Clarke, 2000; Lyon 2005; Surveillance 
Studies Network, 2006). Despite these claims, it needs to be clarified that a mobile 
phone’s location may or may not correspond to the whereabouts of an individual 
presumed to be the user. 
 
Mobile phones have always been 'location-aware', because location awareness is 
an inherent feature of mobile telephony as discussed in the previous part of this 
chapter (see for example section 2.1.2). However, in recent years the accuracy with 
which mobile phones can be located has improved, as well as the ability to store 
and process large amounts of data. It is now possible to preserve and access 
present and past movements of all mobile phone users over prolonged periods of 
time. As discussed in previous sections, British citizens are ensured a right to 
privacy under the European Convention on Human Rights, which as been brought 
into the domestic context by the Human Rights Act 1998. However, this right to 
privacy can be interfered with under a range of exclusive purposes listed in Article 
8.2 ECHR (see previous section 2.2.1) and in accordance to the ECtHR’s 
jurisprudence . Some have argued that the blanket retention of all citizens' 
communications data violates those rights to privacy and details will be provided in 
the subsequent section 2.3.3.2. Regarding the privacy categories commonly 
identified in the literature, it can be argued that location data falls into six out of the 
seven categories (see section 2.2.2). Only the category of bodily privacy, which 
relates to a person’s physical self, cannot be seen as directly affected by location 
data. Particularly in the area of information privacy, which is concerned with 
individuals' personal data, a distinction needs to be made between the use of data 
for law enforcement and for commercial purposes. The use of communications data 
for the former falls under state surveillance techniques and is regulated by 
legislation such as the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (section 
2.3.3.2).  
 
The use of communications data for commercial services is for example regulated 
by the European Union Privacy Directive (Directive 2002/58/EC) and Vodafone's 
Code of Practice that regulate the access to location data (Vodafone's Code of 
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Practice, 2005). The Directive explicitly covers unsolicited messages for marketing 
purposes and stresses the need for prior consent (Article 13). Article 9 of the 
Directive deals with the use of location data and requires that location data may only 
be processed when made anonymous or with the consent of the user. Vodafone's 
Code of Practice (2005) distinguishes two types of location services, active and 
passive (see section 2.1.3), and stresses that particularly the latter require the 
informed consent of the mobile phone user. Gow (2004) stresses the role of consent 
as establishing the legal grounds regarding location data and its importance for 
understanding location privacy issues in the commercial context. He distinguishes 
between three moments of consent: collection, use and disclosure of personal data. 
In the same manner, White (2003) refers to three processes to identify privacy 
issues particular relevant to location techniques; firstly location identification, 
secondly data processing and thirdly value-added use. Spiekermann (2004) 
predominantly perceives unsolicited messages ('mobile spam') as privacy intrusions 
and points out that the mobile phone is a more personal device than for example a 
desktop PC. 
 
To summarise, the authors highlight that the informed consent of mobile phone 
users is required to use mobile phone location data for commercial purposes. 
However, for the use of location data by governmental agencies, such as for crime 
and terrorism, the consent of mobile phone users is not explicitly obtained but 
acquired by the signature in the mobile phone contract. Further discussion of this 
matter will be provided in the next section. 
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2.2.8 Summary Part 2 
As can be seen from the first part of this chapter, the continuous generation and 
long-term storage of digitised personal data is an inherent part of today’s networked 
information and communication technologies. This second part has discussed the 
relationship and impacts of these technologies on individual’s privacy. In addition to 
this, a range of privacy definitions were introduced and categorised according to 
several criteria. Current legislation relevant to mobile phone communications data 
and privacy were presented, while the use of location data for law enforcement and 
commercial use was differentiated. It has become clear that privacy is a concept 
that is hard to define and this is reflected in the jurisprudence of the European Court 
in Strasbourg, which decides on infringements of human rights, including privacy, on 
a case by case basis.  
The following section offers an introduction to the legislative framework regarding 
the retention and access of communications data by law enforcement agencies, as 
relevant in the European Union with focus on the UK. 
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2.3 Part 3: Legal framework relevant to mobile phone location data 
This final section of the chapter provides an insight into the legal framework relevant 
to mobile phone communications data. Firstly, the section provides some definitions 
for mobile phone communications data, of which location data is one element. The 
subsequent sections review the legislation and context up to and beyond the 9/11 
terrorist attacks in the US, and as relevant to the retention of mobile phone 
communications data in England. The main two British legal instruments that is the 
Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIP Act) and the Anti-Terrorism Crime 
and Security Act 2001 (ATCS Act) are discussed, as well as the European Data 
Retention Directive 2006/24/EC. Finally, the predominant arguments in the disputes 
and debates about the compulsory storage of all British’ and also European mobile 
phone users’ communications data are presented.  
 
 
2.3.1 Definitions of mobile phone communications data 
While Part 1 of this chapter (see section 2.1) has already provided some technical 
background to mobile phone location data, this section focuses on the legal 
definitions of communications data of which mobile phone location data is one 
element.  The ATCS Act refers to the RIP Act for definitions of communications data 
to be retained by mobile phone and internet service providers. Communications 
data is defined under the RIP Act (section 21, 4 a, b, c) as follows: 
 
Table 2.2: Definition of communications data (RIP Act, sect. 21, 4 a b c) 
(4) "Communications data" means any of the following- 
  (a) any traffic data comprised in or attached to a communication 
(whether by the sender or otherwise) for the purposes of any postal 
service or telecommunication system by means of which it is being or 
may be transmitted; 
  (b) any information which includes none of the contents of a 
communication (apart from any information falling within paragraph (a)) 
and is about the use made by any person-  
  (i) of any postal service or telecommunications service; or 
  (ii) in connection with the provision to or use by any person of 
any telecommunications service, of any part of a 
telecommunication system; 
  (c) any information not falling within paragraph (a) or (b) that is held or 
obtained, in relation to persons to whom he provides the service, by a 
person providing a postal service or telecommunications service. 
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The 'Consultation paper on a code of practice for voluntary retention of 
communications data' (Home Office, 2003b, section 15) explains that 
communications data can be divided into three broad categories, such as: 
 
o Traffic data identifies who the user contacted, at what time the contact was 
made, the location of the person contacted and the location of the user. 
 
o Service use information are for example itemised telephone call records, 
i.e. the numbers called from a mobile phone, including times and duration. 
 
o Subscriber data identifies the user of the service, providing their name, 
address, telephone number. 
 
Appendix A of the consultation paper provides further details about data types 
retained and their retention periods, that is for example:  
 
Subscriber information relating to the person encompass for example, name, date 
of birth, installation and billing address and payment methods.  
 
Telephony data includes amongst other data, 
- all numbers (or other identifiers e.g. name@bt) associated with call (e.g. 
physical/presentational/network assigned CLI, IMSI, IMEI, exchange/divert 
numbers) (for details about these see section 2.1.2.1 and glossary) 
- Date and time of start of call, duration of call/date and time of end of call 
- Location data at start and/or end of call, in form of lat/long reference. 
- Cell site data from time cell ceases to be used. 
 
SMS and MMS data include for example 
- Calling and called number, IMEI 
- Date and time of sending 
- Location data when messages sent and received, in form of lat/long reference. 
 
Subscriber information and telephony data are stored for 12months, whereas SMS 
and MMS data is only stored for 6 months. 
 
To summarise, the British legislation defines mobile phone location data as an 
element of traffic data, which is one of the three categories of communications data. 
The European Directive on Privacy and Electronic Communications (Directive 
2002/58/EC, Article 2, c) defines location data as "any data processed in an 
electronic communications network, indicating the geographic position of the 
terminal equipment of a user of a publicly available electronic communications 
service". This Article applies to computers, PDAs and mobile as well as landline 
telephones. This Directive was more comprehensive than previous rules as it used 
the term 'electronic communications', instead of being restrictive to certain 
technologies. 
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The Directive 2002/58/EC was amended by Directive 2006/24/EC regarding the 
purposes for which the data can be retained by the service providers (see section 
2.3.4). The 2002 Directive (section 14) further specifies that "Location data may 
refer to the latitude, longitude and altitude of the user’s terminal equipment, to the 
direction of travel, to the level of accuracy of the location information, to the 
identification of the network cell in which the terminal equipment is located at a 
certain point in time and to the time the location information was recorded".  
 
Hosein and Escudero-Pascual (2002) argue that new legislation concerning traffic 
data tends to be technology-neutral which does not take into account the 
differences in traffic data across different communications infrastructures and 
protocols. The authors point towards the differing definitions of traffic data from the 
Council of Europe (CoE) and the Group of eight industrialised countries (G8). Both 
definitions explain that traffic data "does not include" (G8, see Statewatch, 2001) or 
"does not refer to" (Council of Europe, 2001) content, however, Hosein and 
Escudero-Pascual (2002) point out that there are ambiguities particularly regarding 
internet data. For instance, click stream information of internet access logs closely 
relates to the content of everything that has been accessed and downloaded 
(Walker and Akdeniz, 2003). For example, within a communication, data identifying 
www.homeoffice.gov.uk would be traffic data, whereas data identifying 
www.homeoffice.gov.uk/kbsearch?qt=ripa+traffic=data would be content (Home 
Office, 2003a, page 7; Escudero-Pascual and Hosein, 2004).  
 
As highlighted in the previous section 2.2.7, communications data is of relevance for 
commercial but also for law enforcement use. In this context, Green and Smith 
(2004) point out that different actors use differing interpretations of mobile phone 
location data, particularly regarding the relationship between mobile device and the 
individual associated with this device. On the one hand, location data is described 
as being connected to particular individual consumers and hence has economic 
value. It is for example used for mobile location-based services (see section 2.1.3), 
however only with the explicit consent of the mobile phone user (see section 2.2.7). 
On the other hand, industry sources and regulatory bodies claim that location data, 
as part of traffic data is anonymous and not connected to a specific individual. 
Green and Smith base this claim on one of their own case studies which highlighted 
the difference between billing data and traffic data. The former is personal, as it 
includes information such as the subscriber's name and address, and therefore 
needs to be regulated under the Data Protection Act. The latter is anonymised at 
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the end of the phone call but archived by the unique phone number and therefore 
still of commercial value to the telecommunications companies, according to Green 
(2006).  
Nonetheless, it can be argued that even though an individual can hardly be 
identified solely by the mobile phone location data of his or her phone, the 
combination of location data with other data may constitute an infringement on a 
mobile phone user's privacy. 
 
Mobile phone location data discloses location at the beginning and end of the call 
and hence records changes in location. The following shows an example of 
outgoing mobile phone call records: 
 
 
Figure 2.7: Example of a telecommunications call data record  
(UK Presidency of European Union, 2005, p.8) 
 
 
2.3.2 Background to communications data retention  
Communications technologies, such as the internet and mobile phones, are an 
inherent part of daily lives for the majority of European citizens. Every 
communication facilitated by such technologies generates a host of data, such as 
the source, destination, mobile phone location and partial web browsing logs. The 
data is stored for billing and legal purposes by mobile phone and internet service 
providers, which are, in the following, referred to as communications service 
providers (CSPs). This data about communication is also known as communications 
or transactional data. Since in western European societies citizens but also 
criminals increasingly use electronic communications and rely on technological 
infrastructure, the focus of legislators has turned to communications data in 
response to the September 11 US attacks. Attacks on the communications 
infrastructure are also included in the definition of 'terrorism' (Terrorism Act 2000, 
(2)) (Walker and Akdeniz, 2003).  
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Particularly, the process of adopting European Directives relating to 
communications data retention (2002/58/EC, 2006/24/EC) highlights the political 
climate change following the September 11 attacks (see section 2.3.4). 
Communications data is seen by security, intelligence and law enforcement 
agencies as a useful tool to prevent and investigate crimes related to national 
security. It is important to recognise that communications data does not include the 
content but instead only refers to information about a communication. The retained 
communications data can be analysed and helps investigators to identify suspects, 
relationships between them and to establish profiles. The Home Office, the ministry 
responsible for justice and internal affairs in the UK, points out that evidence from 
use of telecommunications can be the only physical evidence available to 
investigators (Home Office, 2003b, section 5). The rapidly changing technological 
environment and the requirements of law enforcement agencies to access the data 
while ensuring human rights of those affected by the legislation, poses challenges in 
legislating the area of communications data retention. 
 
Historically, the content of communication has been perceived as more sensitive 
and personal than data about communication. Therefore greater authorisation and 
oversight mechanisms are still needed to gain access to the contents of com-
munication (Escudero-Pascual and Hosein, 2004). However as Privacy International 
(2003b) points out, the sensitive nature of transactional data of new technologies 
makes it similar to content of communication. Data generated by an internet user’s 
transactions convey a great deal about this person, because a profile of interests, 
associates and social context can be constructed. Similarly, location information 
included in mobile phone communication data is more sensitive than the location 
information of traditional fixed telephony communication.  
Hence, the long-term retention of mobile phone communications data can be seen 
to affect a wide variety of human rights, including the right of freedom of speech and 
assembly, as well as the right to privacy. Considering the jurisprudence of the 
European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg, the long-term retention of mobile 
phone communications data may be seen as a disproportionate interference in the 
private lives of citizens, and in turn the interference is not necessary in a democratic 
society (see section 2.2.3.1). 
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Digitisation and privatisation 
With the invention of the microprocessor in the 1970s and with it the widespread 
use of personal computers, the processing power and storage capacity of 
computers has dramatically increased. The change from analogous to digital 
communications infrastructures makes it easier to store, gain access to and search 
transactional data. Difficulties of retrieving analogous transactional data had acted 
as a natural protection against unsolicited and excessive access and misuse of 
data. In addition, transactional data from analogous systems does not carry as 
much information as digital data carries today.   
 
In 1981, the British Telecommunications Act transferred the responsibility for 
telecommunications away from the Post Office, creating a separate organisation, 
British Telecom (BT). At this time competition was introduced into the UK 
telecommunications industry. In 1984, the Telecommunications Act 1984 was 
passed and BT was privatised and thus lost its monopoly in running 
telecommunications systems. This was the first of a series of privatisations of state-
owned utilities throughout the 1980s and into the 1990s (Daβler et al., 2002). This 
privatisation process has resulted in a situation where law enforcement agencies 
needed to approach businesses and not state owned companies for transactional 
data. In addition, changes in business models such as "always on internet access" 
and flat rates for internet and mobile phone use, have made itemised billing largely 
unnecessary. Hence communications service providers only store detailed data 
about mobile phone and internet usage for billing purposes for a limited time. These 
changes, away from state owned telecommunications business to private 
companies, made it more difficult for governmental agencies to access the 
communications data, hence, the introduction of new laws became necessary 
(Walker and Akdeniz, 2003). 
 
As new telecommunications technologies emerge, many countries adapt their 
existing surveillance laws and for example, the case law in Strasbourg has been 
used to update existing British legislation to take into account new technological 
developments (see section 2.3.2). However, often governments apply old legislative 
instruments to new technologies to address the interception of networked and 
mobile communications without analysing how the technology has changed the 
nature and sensitivity of information (Privacy International, 2003b; Who Knows 
Where You've been? Privacy Concerns Regarding The Use of Cellular Phones As 
Personal Locators, 2004). Changes in legislation were the most obvious and 
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immediate responses in Europe to the terrorist threats by the 2001 attacks in the 
US. Security and law enforcement agencies worldwide have encouraged their 
governments to adopt more comprehensive approaches to the retention and access 
of communications data (Blakeney, 2007). This may explain why much research 
regarding communications data retention has focused on these legislative changes 
(see for example Walker and Akdeniz, 2003; Escudero-Pascual and Hosein, 2004; 
Whitley and Hosein, 2005).  
 
2.3.3 Legislative developments regarding communications data in the UK 
In the United Kingdom, two pieces of legislation are particularly relevant regarding 
communications data: the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIP Act), 
which regulates the access to communications data, and the Anti-Terrorism Crime 
and Security Act 2001 (ATCS Act), which lays down rules for the retention of 
communication data. The European Directive on Data Retention (2006/24/EC) also 
has an influence on the data retention regime in the UK, as it lays down 
requirements for the retention of communications data for all European member 
states. 
 
The value of interception of communications for law enforcement agencies and its 
role to fight terrorism of all kinds has long been recognised by the British 
government. Already the 1999 Home Office Consultation paper ‘Interception of 
Communications in the United Kingdom’ proposed and justifies changes to the 
interception regime by law enforcement agencies at the time (Home Office, 1999). 
In this consultation paper the Home Office admitted that legislation had not kept up 
with changes in the telecommunications and postal market. For example, the 
number of telecommunications companies offering fixed line services had grown 
from 2 to around 150, and there was the beginning of mass ownership of mobile 
phones, as well as citizens embracing communicating via the internet. Together with 
this increase in electronic communication, the threat of cyber crime emerged, which 
is defined as criminal acts using technology or action against technology. Hence 
interception was thought to play an important role in law enforcement (Akdeniz, 
Taylor and Walker, 2001). Consequently, these technological developments made a 
more comprehensive legislative approach more desirable. 
 
The Consultation paper 1999 proposed to establish a clear, statutory framework for 
access to communications data and this has resulted in the introduction of the RIP 
Act. Part 1 of RIPA addresses those proposed amendments regarding interception 
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of communications, also in response to rulings from ECtHR in Strasbourg where the 
case of Halford v UK has been particularly relevant (see section  2.2.1). In this case, 
the UK legislation at the time in form of the Interception of Communications Act 
1985 did not extend to non-public telephone networks and hence this form of 
interception could not be carried out in accordance with the law.  
 
2.3.3.1 Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIP Act) 
The RIP Act 2000 is the latest step towards the development of an inclusive code of 
policing and surveillance, including the surveillance of internet data. As described in 
the previous section, the increased use of mobile phones and internet by citizens, 
as well as rulings from the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg made a 
more comprehensive approach necessary (Akdeniz, Taylor and Walker, 2001; 
Bailey, Harris and Ormerod, 2001). The RIP Act also sought to regulate surveillance 
of the types of communication not dealt with in the Police Act 1997, as for example 
pagers, mobile phones or emails. The Act extends the legislative powers in relation 
to post and telecommunications surveillance by replacing the Interception of 
Communications Act 1985, which it repealed. The Interception of Communications 
Act 1985 permitted law enforcement agencies to have access to communications, 
which later had to be limited under the Human Rights Act 1998 (Hosein and Whitley, 
2002). Prior to the 1985 Act, the interception of communications was not regulated 
by statute but by Home Office administrative practice that was given implicit 
recognition by the Post Office Act 1969, s. 80. (Bailey, Harris and Ormerod, 2001).  
 
The Regulation of Investigatory Powers Bill was introduced to the House of 
Commons on February 9th 2000 and was given the Royal Assent, which means that 
it became law, on July 28th 2000. The RIP Act aimed to ensure compliance with the 
ECHR and the Human Rights Act 1998, as Secretary of State for the Home 
Department, Mr. Jack Straw, highlights in the RIP Bill’s Second Reading in the 
House of Commons: 
“This is an important Bill, and represents a significant step forward for the 
protection of human rights in this country. Human rights considerations have 
dominated its drafting. None of the law enforcement activities specified in the 
Bill is new. What is new is that, for the first time, the use of these 
techniques will be properly regulated by law and externally 
supervised. That will serve to ensure that law enforcement and other 
operations are consistent with the duties imposed on public authorities by the 
European Convention on Human Rights and by the Human Rights Act 1998.”  
(HC Debate, 2000, Column 767) 
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The RIP Act enables secret services to monitor all online activity in the fight against 
cyber crime. It allows senior members of the civilian and military police, customs 
and members of the judiciary to demand that users hand over the plaintext of 
encrypted material or in certain circumstances decryption keys themselves. Part I of 
Chapter II of the Act deals with acquisition and disclosure of communications data. 
The provisions of Chapter II came into force on 5th January 2004 (Home Office, 
2000).  
 
The RIP Act was highly contested when it was introduced into Parliament, as the 
viewpoints of government, industry and privacy advocates differed widely.  
Issues of discussion were the development of legislative instruments in the face of 
continuously changing technological developments, meeting requirements of law 
enforcement agencies to access the data while at the same time maintaining the 
human rights of those affected by the legislation (Hosein and Whitley, 2002). After a 
public consultation in August 2001, controversies arose regarding surveillance 
concerns, as the RIP Act allowed the Home Secretary to designate a large number 
of public authorities to access communications data without a warrant. 
In June 2002, David Blunkett, the home secretary at the time, suggested expanding 
the RIP Act greatly by extending the number of public bodies to 1039 public 
authorities to monitor citizens' communications data. The draft secondary legislation 
under section 25 RIP Act proposed allowing access to communications data without 
a warrant to Government departments, such as the Department for Environment, 
Food and Rural Affairs, and the Department of Health, as well as Local authorities 
and other bodies, such the Environment Agency and the Scottish Drug Enforcement 
Agency (The Regulation of Investigatory Powers, Communications Data: Additional 
Public Authorities Order, 2002 ). 
This resulted in a controversy about the expansion of power and those plans 
became known as "Snoopers' charter" (BBC News, 2002). The Surveillance 
Commissioner admitted in his annual report that he could not ensure meaningful 
oversight of so many bodies without assistance. Following protests of civil liberties 
groups, the media and opposition in Parliament and from the Information 
Commissioner, the Statutory Order was withdrawn on 18 June 2002 (Statewatch 
News, 2003; Reporters without borders, 2004).  
 
In 2003, the Home Office initiated a second public consultation in form of two 
consultation papers, one on access to communications data (Home Office, 2003a) 
and one on the retention of communications data (Home Office, 2003b). These 
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provided some background and further justifications for the need for a range of 
public authorities to access communications data as a necessary and proportionate 
requirement. For example, the consultation paper 'Access to Communications Data 
- Respecting Privacy and Protecting the Public from Crime' (Home Office, 2003a) 
seeks consultation regarding permitting access to only parts of communications 
data, that is service use information and subscriber data, to certain public 
authorities.  
 
After this consultation period, Parliament approved the implementation of Chapter II. 
In summer 2006 the Home Office published a further consultation paper relating to 
Chapter II, Part I of the RIP Act to invite comments regarding the revised draft code 
of practice (Home Office, 2006). In September 2003, the Home Secretary proposed 
a new amendment to the RIP Act. As before, this amendment gave many bodies 
including local authorities, the power to access communications data of citizens. 
The government appointed an Interception of Communications Commissioner to 
protect citizens from abuses of the RIP Act and ATCS Act (Reporters without 
borders, 2004).  Sir Swinton Thomas was appointed as the Interception of 
Communications Commissioner from 11 April 2003 to 10 April 2006 under Section 
57(1) of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000. His role requires him to 
publish annual reports which review the interception processes (see for example 
Swinton, 2007). Hosein argues that instead of making the retention of 
communications data mandatory in UK, the government took the issue to Europe 
(Grossman, 2006). 
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The following table (Table 2.2) gives details about reasons for access and 
organisations that are entitled to gain access to communications data under the RIP 
Act: 
 
Table 2.3: Access to communications data: reasons and organisations  
 
 
Communications data can be obtained for the following reasons: 
 
• in the interests of national security;  
• for the purpose of preventing or detecting crime or of preventing disorder;  
• in the interests of the economic well-being of the United Kingdom;  
• in the interests of public safety;  
• for the purpose of protecting public health;  
• for the purpose of assessing or collecting any tax, duty, levy or other 
imposition, contribution or charge payable to a government department;  
• for the purpose, in an emergency, of preventing death or injury or any 
damage to a person's physical or mental health, or of mitigating any injury or 
damage to a person's physical or mental health; or  
• for any purpose (not falling within paragraphs (a) to (g)) which is specified for 
the purposes of this subsection by an order made by the Secretary of State. 
(Home Office, 2000, Chapter II, section 22)
 
 
The following organisations hold the powers to obtain communications data: 
 
• Any Police Force including PSNI, any Police Force of HM Forces and British 
Transport Police  
• National Criminal Intelligence Service (NCIS)  
• National Crime Squad (NCS)  
• HM Customs & Excise  
• The Inland Revenue  
• The Security Service (MI5)  
• The Secret Intelligence Service (MI6)  
• The Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ)  
• Local Authorities such as FSA, DTI, the Emergency Services; government 
departments such as DEFRA, Dept of Health, Home Office Immigration 
Service; as well as County and District Councils (see SI 2003 No 3172). 
• Department of Work and Pensions 
 
(The Investigatory Powers Tribunal, 2005)
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Communications data can be obtained by the authorisation of a relevant and named 
senior official of an organisation listed in Table 2.2, who must consider the request 
for communications data to be necessary and proportionate in order to authorise it.  
There is a much wider range of purposes, such as public safety, preventing serious 
harm or collection of tax (see Table 2.2, above), than those for which a warranted 
interception of a communication can be made in order to obtain the content of the 
communication (Davis, 2003). As explained in the previous section 2.3.2, the 
content of communication is considered as more intrusive than information about 
the communication. 
There is a requirement for organisations to liaise with Communications Service 
Providers through a Single Point of Contact (SPoC) to ensure the smooth provision 
of service by CSPs. A SPoC is "an individual or group of individuals within a public 
authority who has been trained and accredited to facilitate lawful access to 
communications data" (Home Office, 2003a, section 9). SPoCs assess whether 
access in a particular case is reasonably practical for the CSP and also consider 
costs and resource implications for the CSP and the public authority. The 
Interception of Communications Commissioner oversees authorisations of access to 
communications data. CSPs may be compensated for the costs involved in retaining 
and giving access to data, with money that may be provided by Parliament (RIP Act, 
section 24). The Office of Surveillance Commissioners (2003) provides an oversight 
of the conduct of covert surveillance by public authorities according to Parts II and 
III of the RIP Act. 
 
2.3.3.2 Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security Act 2001 (ATCS Act)  
The Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 did not require communications 
service providers to retain data, and instead only regulated access to the data that 
may reside in CSPs networks. However some mobile phone service providers had 
admitted to store communications data for months and years (Millar and Kelso, 
2001), which would not have been permitted by the Data Protection Act 1998 
(section 2.2.3.2). The Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security Act 2001 provided a legal 
basis for the retention of data and specified periods of time during which 
communications providers would be required to retain communications data. 
 
In August 2000, a proposal to store communications traffic data for up to 7 years 
was submitted to the Home Office by the National Criminal Intelligence Service 
(NCIS) on behalf of a number of UK law enforcement agencies, such as MI5, MI6, 
the Association of Chief Police Officers, and GCHQ (Ahmed, 2000). The reasons 
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given for these proposed changes were the growing need to fight cyber crime, 
international drug trafficking and the use of computers by paedophiles (Privacy 
International, 2002; Whitley and Hosein, 2005). The author of this report was the 
Deputy Director-general of the NCIS, which oversees criminal intelligence in the UK. 
The document proposed giving access to the retained communications data under 
the provisions of the RIP Act. Communications data was suggested to be retained 
for real-time access by communications service providers for 12 months. Once the 
data was 12 months old, it should be retained for a further six year period and 
deleted afterwards. Mobile phone location data was described as beneficial to 
investigations, as it could be used to locate the proximity of a mobile phone user to 
a crime scene, to trace associates of suspects and to locate places of significance. 
Oversight was proposed to be given by the designated chief officer (Gaspar, 2000). 
 
This proposal was never formally adopted as government policy, even though the 
government’s policy did change in the months and years after. In addition, capturing 
traffic data of all citizens was not seen, at the time, as a reasonable and 
proportionate response to the growing use of new technologies by criminals. 
Britain's Deputy Data Protection Commissioner pointed out that the retention of 
traffic data would constitute a conflict with the right to privacy as laid down by Article 
8 of the Convention on Human Rights (Ward, 2001). 
  
This situation changed with the introduction of ACTSA.  The Anti-Terrorism Crime 
and Security Bill was introduced to Parliament two months after the September 11, 
2001 attacks and received the Royal Assent already on December 14, 2001. The 
bill passed through the House of Commons with the government allowing it only 16 
hours of debate, which was seen as an inappropriate length of time, considering the 
complexity of the Bill and the extensive number of 129 sections. While the House of 
Commons did not impose a single amendment on the Government, the House of 
Lords voiced more opposition to the Bill. A number of Lords who are also lawyers 
warned that the Human Rights Act could not provide a sufficient safeguard against 
the illiberal measures (Fenwick, 2002). The swift schedule of introducing and 
debating the Act has led a Parliamentary Committee to question whether the Act 
had been discussed and examined in sufficient detail, as its provisions result in 
major implications for civil liberties (Select Committee on Home Affairs, 2001). 
Others consider that the September 11 attacks served as a blanket reason for 
establishing measures that had been previously in preparation by government 
departments (Whitley and Hosein, 2005). 
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Tomkins (2002) criticises the Act as “the surely the most draconian legislation 
Parliament has passed in peacetime in over a century”. Other commentators refer to 
the Home Secretary's “mantra that they are merely protecting democracy” (Fenwick, 
2002, p. 724), and warn that “draconian anti-terrorist laws have a far greater impact 
on human rights then they ever will on crime” (Wadham, 1999). 
Indeed, supporting this view is the fact that a voluntary code had been agreed 
between government and the communications industry (section 102.4). The ATCS 
Act requires communications service providers to voluntarily retain communications 
data "to safeguard national security or to prevent, detect or prosecute crimes related 
to national security" (ATCS Act, 2001, explanatory notes, Section 29). These 
voluntary requirements can be made mandatory if deemed necessary by the 
Secretary of State (ATCS Act, 2001, Section 104). Walker and Akdeniz (2003, p. 
14) point out that this might indicate “how hesitant Parliament felt about the grant of 
these powers”.  
 
At first a draft Code of Practice was established, which was consulted upon (section 
103.1.a and b) and then brought before Parliament (section 103.4). The Act allowed 
the Secretary of State to make the Code of Practice compulsory (section 104). 
Whitley and Hosein (2005) point out that the Code did not introduce the process of 
data retention in the UK. A sunset clause was included within ATCS Act, which 
meant that if the government failed to introduce a Code of Practice within two years, 
the provision would not be implemented (Reed and Angel, 2007). The ATCS Act 
builds on the anti-terrorism measures enacted in the Terrorism Act 2000, such as 
the extension of police powers, and the implementation of criminal co-operation 
measures under the Third Pillar of the EU (Shah, 2005). The September 11 attacks 
have let to the introduction of additional powers addressed specifically to 
international terrorism, however many of these powers contained in the ATCS Act 
were to prove even more contentious than the provisions of the Terrorism Act 2000 
which they complement (Bradley and Ewing, 2007). 
 
The ATCS Act sets the maximum retention period for data held under the provisions 
to 12 months, whereby longer retention periods may be justified by the business 
practices of the communication service provider (Home Office, 2003c, section 16). 
The Act contains regulations dealing with terrorism and protecting national security, 
such as terrorist finances (part 1-3), racial hatred (part 5), bribery and corruption 
(part 12). Part 4 made it possible for the Home Secretary to detain non-British 
terrorist suspects indefinitely, which was deemed to be incompatible with the 
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European Convention on Human Rights and ceased to be in force. Relevant for 
data retention is Part 11, as it deals with the retention of communications data for 
national security purposes. The retention of communications data is a form of 
personal data processing, and hence it is subject to the Data Protection Act 1998. 
Oversight of the 1998 Act is by the Information Commissioner (Home Office, 2003c, 
Section 29). 
 
The provisions made in Part 11 amend the RIP Act so that communications service 
providers must retain communications data and disclose it to secret intelligence and 
law enforcement agencies far more extensively than the RIP Act had initially 
envisaged. The Parliamentary committee for human rights, that is the Joint 
Committee on Human Rights expressed concern about the rule-making authority of 
the Secretary of State by this part of the Act (HL 51, HC 420, 2001-02). For 
example, the Secretary of State may add to the organisations that can obtain 
communications data and increase the purposes for which the data can be 
obtained. This is perceived as controversial since this enables the Secretary of 
State to greatly increase the ability of public authorities to acquire information about 
citizens and organisations (Davis, 2003). Finally, the Secretary of State had been 
made required to publish the code of practice in draft, consult with the Information 
Commissioner and not to bring the code into effect until it had been approved by 
both Houses of Parliament. The Information Commissioner also showed concern 
and referred to earlier discussions about communications data retention:  
 
“The Commissioner has been aware for some time of pressure from 
the law enforcement community to require communications providers 
to retain details of communications data. This, it is claimed, would assist 
the detection of particular crimes and help with criminal intelligence gathering. 
Although such calls have been made it has not always been clear to what 
extent such retention is required beyond the period for which the 
communications providers would retain this for their own business reasons”  
 (HL 51 and HC 420, 2001-02) 
 
The ATCS Act was perceived as controversial for mainly two reasons. Firstly, some 
of the anti-terrorist powers are seen to be disproportionate to the actual threat facing 
the UK. It does for example not seem adequate to include Part 11, which deals with 
the retention of communications data, in an emergency Bill that had to be rushed 
through Parliament (Shah, 2005). Secondly, it has been argued that there is a lack 
of connection to the September 11 attacks, as the Act contains miscellaneous 
provisions that relate to criminal law and criminal justice matters, as well as it 
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increases the general powers of the police and other governmental agencies. One 
example of these new powers is ACTSA Part 11, which is about the new Code of 
Practice on retention of communications data (Fenwick, 2002; Davis, 2003). The Act 
also included an extension of already controversial police powers, as it amended 
the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 and the Criminal Justice and public 
order Act 1994 (Shah, 2005). 
Lord Waddington, a former Home Secretary, also argued that some of the 
legislative measures where not related to the September 11 attacks, as for example  
“The proposal to make incitement to religious hatred a criminal offence has 
been hanging around in the Home Office for a long time, at least since 1985 
when it featured in a Law Commission report. So it has precious little to do 
with the events of September 11th (..)”. 
(HL Debate, 2001) 
 
In its jurisprudence, the European Court of Human Rights found that retention of 
data by governments constitutes an interference with a citizen’s right to respect for 
private life (Article 8.1), whether or not the governments use the data against the 
individual. For example in the legal case of Rotaru v Romania (2000, App. no. 
28341/95), the ECtHR found a violation with Article 8 took place, when the 
Romanian security services had stored information on Mr Rotaru’s past activities as 
a university student. Privacy International (2003a) has argued that the data retention 
as put in place by ATCS Act is more invasive than this case, even though it is only 
the traffic data that is stored and not the content. 
  
Davis (2003) claims that proportionality as a human rights concept has the most 
considerable impact on the law of the United Kingdom. The doctrine of 
proportionality provides that any interference with a Convention right must be 
”proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued by that interference” (Whitty, Murphy, 
Livingstone, 2001). Three criteria need to be met to satisfy the proportionality test; 
firstly an immediate and very serious threat should be evident, secondly measures 
that are designed to meet the legislative objective must be connected to it, and 
thirdly the measures should not go further than needed to combat the threat. 
Fenwick (2002) argues that the “ATCS Act fails to meet the first and last of these 
tests”, and as discussed above, some claim that some of ATCS Act’s provisions are 
not connected to the September 11 attacks.   
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2.3.4 European Data Retention Directive (2006/24/EC) 
The importance of the role that communications data can play in crime and 
terrorism investigations had been recognised by European enforcement agencies. 
However, the long-term retention of every citizen's communications data had been 
treated with hesitation before the September 11 attacks in the US. In response to 
the attacks, the cooperation on criminal affairs of a wide range of European law 
enforcement agencies on fighting terrorism had increased while previously the 
jurisdiction over police matters was mainly national and so were the rules for data 
protection (Bignami, 2007).  
 
The Data Retention Directive 2006/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council was approved on 15th March 2006 after lengthy negotiations. The Directive 
was seen to affect the balance of power between the privacy of individuals and the 
right of the state to protect national security. It gives rise to a significant change in 
the basic principles of personal data protection (Davies and Trigg, 2006). According 
to Stefano Rodota (2006), then-chairman of the EU’s Article 29 Data Protection 
Working Party highlights, any changes affecting data protection have an effect on 
the degree of democracy of European citizens, since the protection of personal data 
is an important element of freedom in society. The dynamics in the run up the final 
approval of the contested Data Retention Directive were complex and numerous 
stakeholders (such as the European Union institutions, civil liberties groups) were 
involved in the negotiations. 
 
The European Data Protection Commissioners had been aware of the law 
enforcement agencies’ desire to for the long-term retention of communications data 
(Statewatch News, 2001b). Before the 11 September attacks in the US, the tone in 
the European Parliament had been largely critical of data retention proposals. The 
long-term retention of communications data had been largely dismissed as 
"improper invasion of the fundamental rights guaranteed to individuals by Article 8 
of the ECHR", as for example by the Data Protection Commissioners in the EU at 
their spring conference in April 2000 (Munir, 2005). In July 2001 the European 
Parliament's Civil Liberties Committee approved the draft Directive on Privacy and 
Electronic Communications without data retention. A report by the radical MEP 
Marco Cappato argued that EU should restrict the powers of law enforcement 
agencies regarding the retention and access of communications data, and also 
rejected proposals to retain traffic data for up to seven years  (McAuliffe, 2001). 
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However, shortly after the September 11 terrorist attacks, in October 2001, external 
pressures from the US were applied to European Union representatives. President 
George W. Bush sent a letter to the European Commission President Romano 
Prodi, which made a suggestion to retain data that would otherwise be destroyed 
under the European Data Protection Directives to counter terrorism: “Revise draft 
privacy Directives that call for mandatory destruction to permit the retention of 
critical data for a reasonable period” (Statewatch News, 2001). Despite these 
propositions to the European Union, the US does not require communications 
service providers to retain communications data of all of its customers but instead 
uses data preservation, which means that only data about certain suspect users is 
held. Nevertheless, in the US communications service providers may store traffic 
data for marketing purposes, whereas in Europe, the CSPs used to be required to 
erase this type of data as soon as it is no longer needed for billing purposes 
(Bignami, 2007). 
 
Until a few weeks before the final vote on 30th May 2002, the majority of the 
Members of Parliament opposed any form of data retention. However, after 
pressure by the European Council and European Union governments, 
parliamentarians voted in favour of the Council's position on data retention (EPIC, 
2007). The EU Directive 2002/58/EC on Privacy and Electronic communications 
was adopted on 25 June 2002, and states that member states may now pass laws 
permitting the retention of internet and mobile phone communications data. It leaves 
each EU member State free to adopt laws authorising data retention and it could be 
argued that the Directive encourages the retention of data, which can be seen as 
the first step towards the development of a more detailed data retention Directive. 
The Directive 2002/58/EC reverses the position of the 1997 Telecommunications 
Privacy Directive by explicitly allowing EU countries to require communications 
service providers to store the communications data of their customers:  
 
“Member States may adopt legislative measures […] when such restriction 
constitutes a necessary, appropriate and proportionate measure within a 
democratic society to safeguard national security (i.e. State security), 
defence, public security, and the prevention, investigation, detection and 
prosecution of criminal offences or of unauthorised use of the electronic 
communication system […] Member States may, inter alia, adopt legislative 
measures providing for the retention of data for a limited period justified on 
the grounds laid down in this paragraph.”  
(Directive 2002/58/EC, Article 15) 
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The 2002 Directive in its Article 6 requires CSPs to erase all traffic data that is no 
longer needed for providing services. This however had been changed in the 2006 
Data Retention Directive, which allowed exceptions in its Article 15.1. 
 
A 'Questionnaire on traffic data retention' was distributed by the Danish presidency 
of the EU to all Member State's governments in August 2002. The objective was to 
collate comments regarding the practice and experiences of traffic data retention in 
European member states in order to "facilitate the development of strategies and 
working agendas" (Questionnaire on traffic data retention, 2002). The responses 
showed that 10 out of 15 member states already had a legal obligation to store 
traffic data or were finalising a new legislation (Responses to the data retention 
questionnaire, 2002). A new questionnaire was issued two years later to obtain the 
practices of the new European member states (Questionnaire on traffic data 
retention 10767/04, 2004). 
 
After the train bombings on March 11 2004 in Madrid, in which telecommunications 
played an important part, a proposal for the European-wide retention of 
communications data was debated at the EU spring summit end of March 2004 
(Blakeney, 2007). Following this, in April 2004, the UK together with France, Ireland 
and Sweden submitted a joint proposal to the European Union for a framework 
decision on the retention of communications data for between one and three years 
or possibly longer. Interestingly, Spain, the country where the bombings had taken 
place, was not involved in this proposal. This data retention proposal suggested 
retaining communications data to "increase prevention, investigation, detection and 
prosecution of criminal offences, including terrorist acts" (Alvaro, 2005; Statewatch 
News, 2005a). This proposal was widely criticised. The Article 29 Data Protection 
Working Party in its opinion from November 2004 reiterated its previous view that 
the mandatory retention of communications data was not compatible with human 
rights and privacy laws and in conflict with the current data protection legislation. In 
addition, they raised concerns about the cost of the European-wide implementation 
(Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, 2004).   
 
Finally, in June 2005, the controversial data retention proposal was partly deemed 
illegal by the Legal Services of both the European Council and Commission 
(Statewatch News, 2005b; EDRI, 2005a). This legal opinion was based on the fact 
that the proposed legislation about data retention was put forward as a framework 
decision. A framework decision is a legal instrument under the third pillar (criminal 
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law, policing), where the European Parliament only has a consultation right but no 
real influence.  However, the proposed legislation should have been presented 
under the first pillar (economic, social and environmental policies) as it contained 
obligations addressed to civil parties, namely the service providers to retain and 
collect data. However, placing the legislation under the first pillar would have 
weakened the proposal because Directives cannot create substantive and 
enforceable rights. A Directive has distinct objectives but leaves the national 
authorities the choice of form and method within a set time frame (Storey and 
Turner, 2005; informal talk with a desk officer for this dossier of the European 
Union). 
 
The Article 29 Working Party criticised the Data Retention Directive again in their 
opinion issued in October 2005. They argued that “Traffic data retention interferes 
with the inviolable, fundamental right to confidential communications” and that this 
should be limited to exceptional cases (Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, 
2005). As mentioned above, the Working Party had continuously questioned the 
appropriateness of the mandatory data retention regime and issued 20 
recommendations which, however, were not fully taken into account (Davies and 
Trigg, 2006). 
 
The Data Retention Directive 2006/24/EC amended the Directive 2002/58/EC on 
Privacy and Electronic Communications, by adding a paragraph allowing data to be 
retained for purposes stated in the 2006 Directive, which are "investigation, 
detection and prosecution of serious crime, as defined by each Member State in its 
national law" (Directive 2006/24/EC, Article 11). The Data Retention Directive aims 
to harmonise obligations on communications service providers of the EU member 
states but does not aim to regulate the technologies for retaining data. 
Communications data shall be retained for a period between six months and two 
years (Article 6). Exceptions are possible, so that data can be retained for longer 
periods (Article 12). The Directive requires member states to introduce laws 
complying with this Directive by 15 September 2007, however all members states 
asked to postpone parts of the application of the Directive until 15 March 2009 
(Article 15). For example, the UK has asked to postpone the retention of internet 
access, internet telephony and internet email.  
 
There is the possibility for criminal law sanctions for intentional access or transfer of 
data that is not permissible under national law (Article 13). Access to data shall be 
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provided to the competent national authorities (Article 4). However as Davies and 
Trigg (2006) points out, a harmonisation of approaches between member states 
might be difficult, considering the lack of equivalent law enforcement authorities. 
Each member state should appoint a public authority to be responsible for 
monitoring the security of the stored data. This should be the same authorities as 
those referred to in Directive 95/46/EC (Article 28), which is in the UK Office of the 
Information Commissioner, an independent government authority and reports 
directly to Parliament. The Directives leave the issue of who is going to pay for the 
retention of communications data up to the individual member states. Critics of the 
2006 Data Retention Directive point out that the Directive does not provide a clear 
definition of offences, nor procedures for data access. It does not specify security 
measures required to safeguard the data, which may result in an increased risk of 
breach of privacy in member states with weaker data protections. Finally, the Data 
Retention Directive 2006/24/EC does not provide a definition of "serious crime" and 
this may hence lead to different definition in the member states, the same is true for 
penalties that may be imposed upon failure to comply with the regulations resulting 
from the Directive (Data Protection Working Party, 2004; Vilasau, 2007). 
 
 
 
2.3.5 Discussion about the rightfulness of communications data retention 
All groups involved in the discussion acknowledge that the retention of some 
communications data is a useful tool for tackling cyber crime and terrorism, as it 
serves as evidence of mobile phone and internet communications. However, there 
are various arguments against the retention of communications data of all citizens 
for 12 months in the UK (up to 24 months under the European legislation) and 
access to this data by a range of governmental agencies in the UK. 
 
2.3.5.1 Argument 1: Objection on the ground of human rights and civil liberties  
The violation of human rights is the most frequently used argument against the 
retention of all European citizens’ communications data for an extended period of 
time (see also 2.3.3.2). The retention of communications data by service providers 
for longer periods than for business purposes can be seen as conflicting with the 
European Convention on Human Rights, specifically with Article 8 'Right to respect 
for private and family life'. In 1998 the Parliament approved the Human Rights Act to 
incorporate the European Convention on Human Rights into UK law, which 
established an enforceable right of privacy in British law for the first time in history. 
Chapter 2 - Literature Review   
 
Andrea Gorra           Page 80  
Article 8.1 provides that "everyone has the right to respect for his private and family 
life, his home and his correspondence". However, this is subject to restrictions and 
there can be interference by a public authority "in the interests of national security, 
public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of 
disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the 
rights and freedoms of others" (ECHR, Article 8.2). As the data retention legislation 
is implemented to assure national security and support the fight against terrorism, 
European member states can implement the Data Retention Directive in 
accordance with Article 8 ECHR.  
 
Since the Human Rights Act 1998, human rights standards have been routinely 
incorporated in legislation. Under section 19(1)a of the HRA, Ministers responsible 
for introducing government Bills to either house need to provide a written statement 
that in her or his view, the Bill is compatible with the Convention rights, or 
alternatively that it is not compatible and that the government nevertheless wishes 
the Parliament to enact the Bill into law. The Home Secretary made this 
compatibility statement with regard to the ATCS Act, however, the ATCS Act 
contains a number of provisions that affect human rights, which make the Act is not 
compatible with HRA. For example, the detention without trial is incompatible with 
the right to liberty of the person under ECHR Article 5(1), and this required a formal 
derogation from Article 5(1) under Article 15 of the ECHR (Tomkins, 2002, p. 7; 
HL38, HC 381 (2003-04).  
 
Privacy International (2003a) argues that ‘‘blanket data retention would subject 
every citizen to the certainty of ongoing and unremitting interference in his or her 
private life’’. The richness of mobile phone communications data which conveys 
who has been contacted when and from where for how long, makes it possible to 
compile a detailed profile of a person's interests, including communications 
patterns, network of acquaintances and social context. Data relating to mobile 
communications is more sensitive than those associated with traditional fixed 
telephony, as it conveys the location at the beginning and end of call, as well as 
details about text messages exchanged with other parties. Converging platforms 
and infrastructures, such as internet and mobile phones increase the sensitivity of 
traffic data, for example when mobile phone handsets are used to access the 
internet (Escudero-Pascual and Hosein, 2004).  Communication technologies, such 
as mobile phones and email, serve as everyday means of communication in private 
and business life in Britain and the rest of Europe. They are a vital element of 
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modern life and the blanket storage of all communication transactions does not give 
citizens a choice to circumvent this type of mass surveillance. It could be argued 
that individuals can be discriminated from taking part in essential interactions with 
friends, family, businesses and employers when trying to avoid the use of modern 
means of communications.  
 
2.3.5.2 Argument 2: Data preservation instead of retention 
The question whether the retention of all citizens' communications data is 
proportionate is also at the heart of data retention debates (see for example Whitley 
and Hosein, 2005). Data preservation instead of data retention is seen as a more 
proportionate measure in responding to terrorism than a blanket data retention 
regime requiring the storage of all citizens' data (European Data Protection 
Commissioners in Home Office, 2003b). Data preservation is more targeted than 
data retention, as CSPs are requested only to retain data on a case-by-case basis, 
which means data about a particular user for a specified period of time. For 
example, the Data Protection Working Party had in their Opinion 05/2004 suggested 
the use of less invasive mechanisms, such as the so-called “quick freeze-
procedure”. Instead of a general storage of all data, this system would have allowed 
law enforcement authorities to request the service providers to store particular data 
and to obtain a court order to access this data (Article 29 Data Protection Working 
Party, 2005). 
 
However, this approach has been rejected by the Home Office as data preservation 
"will never aid in the investigation of a person who is not currently suspected of 
involvement with a terrorist organisation" (Home Office, 2003b, p15).  
It is also debated whether surveillance of communications data can help to prevent 
terrorist attacks at all. Tony Blair is quoted to have said that "all the surveillance in 
the world could not have prevented the London bombings" (Davies, 2005).  
A Dutch study by the Erasmus University claims that data retention is unnecessary 
based on a review of 65 police investigations. 'In virtually all cases' the police could 
get access to all traffic data required based on existing account and billing 
information retained on average for three months (EDRI, 2005b). 
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2.3.5.3 Argument 3: No definite link between communications device and 
user 
Communications data cannot be linked without any certainty to a personal identity, 
thus blanket data retention is ineffective in fighting crime. Even though 
communications data can serve as evidence for crimes planned with help of 
communications technologies, an undoubted link between the device that had been 
used for communication and an individual can not be established with any certainty 
and further investigations, according to Walker and Akdeniz (2003). This becomes 
particularly apparent when a web-based email system such as Hotmail is used from 
a PC in an internet café, as Microsoft's Hotmail does not verify details of registered 
users and internet cafés do not require identification. The use of prepaid phones 
that do not need registration poses a challenge to law enforcement agencies, as 
they do not require the subscriber to be identified (Gow, 2005). 
 
2.3.5.4 Argument 4: High cost of storage and retrieval of data 
The telecommunications and internet industry have highlighted the high costs for 
storage and searches of the retained data, as legislation requires CSPs to store 
communications data for longer than needed for billing purposes. The internet 
Service Providers' Association (Ispa) expects costs of £26 million a year to set up 
sufficient data retention measures and £9 million in running costs to respond to law 
enforcement requests based on estimates from one large UK-based internet service 
provider (Leyden, 2005). 
 
The requirement of communications service providers to store the customers' data 
for up to two years and the costs associated with it could also affect global 
competitiveness of the European industry compared to other western countries. 
Particularly as countries such as US and Canada have rejected the blanket 
retention of communications data. At the same time some fear that data retention 
may have an effect on consumer confidence, as citizens may avoid using electronic 
commerce in order to not have their legal transactions logged (Open Letter from civil 
society groups, 2005). 
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2.3.5.5 Argument 5: Potential use of data for other purposes 
With the introduction of the ATCS Act, communications service providers are now 
required to keep customer records which they previously had to erase or 
anonymise. Under the Data Protection Act 1998 data could not be kept for any 
longer than necessary (fifth principle) and the data stored had to be adequate and 
relevant for purposes and not excessive (third principle). The DPA 1998 implements 
the European Union Directive 95/46/EC and governs the collection and process of 
personal data of individuals by the government and private sector. 
As the current data retention legislation obliges CSPs to keep various types of 
customer data for longer than before, there are concerns that the data may not only 
be stored for the access by police and other public authorities but also for 
commercial purposes, such for consumer profiling, marketing purposes and CRM 
(customer relationship management). Green (2006) points out that the requirements 
of the state for long-term retention of communications data coincide in an 
unprecedented way with the extensive data-gathering practices of the 
telecommunications industry. 
 
The retained communications data is also of interest to the music and recording 
industry to investigate music piracy and illegal file sharing in the European Union. 
The Creative and Media Business Alliance (CMBA), which represents large 
companies in the entertainment industry such as Sony BMG, Disney and EMI, has 
suggested to members of the European Parliament to be included in the latest 
European Directive on data retention (Sherriff, 2005; Thompson, 2005).  
 
An additional concern regarding the use of data for law enforcement is that the 
European Data Retention Directive (2006/24/EC) does not define the term 'serious 
crime' used in its Article 1. In the same manner, the RIP Act allows access to 
communications data under a wide range of purposes, such as public safety or 
protecting public health (see section 2.3.3.1). Tony Bunyan, editor for Statewatch 
points out that the retained communications data maybe also be of interest to future 
uses of governments, as the data could be used for social and political control 
(Statewatch News, 2005c). 
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2.3.6 Synopsis of data retention discussion 
The retention of some communications data to be accessed by law enforcement 
agencies is seen as beneficial and is supported by all stakeholders involved. The 
central elements for debates have been whether the blanket retention of all citizens' 
data for an extended period of time is justified and proportionate for the purpose of 
fighting terrorism. In the UK, there are discussions about whether some agencies 
should only have access to certain types of communications data, as traffic data is 
seen as more sensitive than user and service data. As a result of the 2003 
consultation process, access by numerous agencies to communications data has 
been deemed justified by the Home Secretary.  
 
A strategy of data preservation is favoured by many parties, as it would not infringe 
on the privacy of innocent communications users. In addition, this would also save 
money to the CSPs as less data would have to be stored and accessed in response 
to requests by eligible organisations under the RIP Act. Nevertheless, preservation 
is not seen as sufficient by the Home Office, as this would only enable access to 
data for a limited time before it would be deleted by communications service 
providers. The main issue seems to be whether retention of data is seen as 
proportionate and the responses by stakeholders differ widely. 
 
 
2.3.7 Summary Part 3 
The third and last part of this chapter has introduced the legal framework as 
relevant to the retention of mobile phone communications data in the UK. It has 
become apparent that a complex interplay is taking place between the national 
legislation in the United Kingdom and the European legislation, such as the 
European Convention on Human Rights. This section has detailed the legal 
instruments relevant to communications data retention: the Regulation of 
Investigatory Powers Act 2000, the Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security Act 2001 and 
the European Directive 2006/EC/24. Legislation on data retention has been widely 
debated within the United Kingdom and the European Union, from its initial 
introduction to the implementations of the RIP Act and the ATCS Act in the UK and 
the Data Retention Directive 2006/24/EC by the European Union. The section has 
painted a picture of data retention in legislative terms, while carefully ensuring to 
consider the viewpoints of the most relevant stakeholders in the debate the 
retention.  
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2.4 Summary of chapter 
The multidisciplinary nature of the subject area of mobile phone location data and 
the long-term retention of communications data retention in general have been 
addressed with a threefold approach. This chapter has firstly focused on recent 
technological developments regarding mobile phone location data within the UK, 
followed by a discussion of privacy in the literature. The last part has provided 
essential background to the legislative landscape of the UK and the European 
Union. 
 
Mobile phone location data is an inherent part of mobile communications, and 
advances in computer technologies have facilitated the long-term storage and 
analysis of this data. Communications data may be obtained and used by law 
enforcement for crime and terrorism investigations but also by commercial providers 
to offer services based on location. The widespread use of information and 
communications technologies for administrative and control purposes is seen as a 
trait of surveillance societies. The potential of inappropriate use of the retained 
communications data may result in infringements of the mobile phone user's 
privacy, which makes checks and safeguards to ensure accountability necessary. 
Before the September 11 attacks there had been widespread criticism of the long-
term retention of communications data. However, the attacks have been used in the 
UK and EU-wide to evoke a paradigm shift in storing and accessing this type of 
data. The retention of data was justified under Article 8.2 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights, but the wide range of purposes for which the data 
can be accessed under the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2001 and the 
European Data Retention Directive 2006/24/EC, have been widely criticised.  
 
The next chapter focuses on the methodology that has been used to collect 
empirical data in order to portray the views of ordinary citizens in the complex 
debate about technological influences on individual privacy. 
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Chapter 3 Research Methodology 
This chapter introduces the research methodology used for this study and how it 
has guided data collection, analysis and development of theory. Firstly, essential 
background and fundamental guidelines common in different approaches to 
grounded theory methodology (GTM) are provided. The subsequent three sections 
describe the data collection phases for this study, which consisted of a mobile 
phone tracking pilot study, in-depth interviews and a survey.  The chapter concludes 
by explicating the analysis approach for the empirical data.  
 
3.1 Grounded theory methodology - an overview 
"If someone wanted to know whether one drug is more effective than another, then 
a double blind clinical trial would be more appropriate than grounded theory study. 
However, if someone wanted to know what it was like to be a participant in a drug 
study [..], then he or she might sensibly engage in a grounded theory project or 
some other type of qualitative study." 
(Strauss and Corbin, 1998, p. 40). 
 
Strauss and Corbin’s quote above encapsulates the essence of when it is best to 
use grounded theory methodology for a research project. GTM provides useful tools 
to learn about individuals’ perceptions and feelings regarding a particular subject 
area. Quantitative data may be useful in measuring attitudes across a large sample, 
however, GTM offers a powerful methodological framework if the aim of the study is 
to learn about individuals’ perceptions. 
 
GTM shares the following characteristics with other qualitative methods, which 
correspond to those of this study: 
 
• Focus on everyday life experiences 
• Valuing participants' perspectives 
• Enquiry as interactive process between researcher and respondents 
• Primarily descriptive and relying on people's words 
(Marshall and Rossman, 1999) 
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Grounded theory originated in the 1960s in the United States in the fields of health 
and nursing studies. Barney Glaser and Anselm Strauss' influential book from 1967 
‘The Discovery of Grounded Theory’ articulates the authors’ research strategies for 
studies of patients dying in hospitals. Their successful collaborative study was 
perceived as a response to the predominantly quantitative research paradigms at 
the time. Grounded theory methodology advocates creating new theory consisting 
of interrelated concepts rather than testing existing theories. A study guided by GTM 
does not seek representativeness to achieve statistical generalisability but instead 
aims to explain and sometimes predict phenomena based on empirical data. The 
data collection typically encompasses in-depth interviews but can also include other 
sources of data such as existing research literature and quantitative data. GTM 
provides guidelines for data collection and analysis consisting of coding, 
comparisons between data, memo writing and theoretical sampling.  
 
 
3.1.1 Data collection and analysis in grounded theory 
GTM uses a form of purposive sampling, known as theoretical sampling, where 
participants are selected according to criteria specified by the researcher and based 
on initial findings. Early analysis of data indicates issues that need exploration; 
hence the sampling process is guided by the on-going theory development. Data 
collection and analysis take 
place in alternating 
sequences (see Figure 3.1). 
This can also be described 
as an iterative cycle of 
induction and deduction, 
consisting of collection of 
data and constant 
comparison between results 
and new findings in order to 
guide further data collections 
(Strauss and Corbin, 1990; Miles and Huberman, 1994). For these reasons the 
development and identification of variables does not take place prior to data 
collection but instead as part of the data collection process. Consequently, the 
variables or concepts are initiated by the interviewee and further developed and 
conceptualised by the researcher. Data is collected until theoretical saturation is 
Figure 3.1: Steps in developing a grounded theory 
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reached, in other words until no new or relevant data emerges regarding a category 
and relationships between categories are established (Strauss and Corbin, 1998). 
 
Interview questions should give as little guidance as possible to allow the 
interviewees to talk about what is of importance to them regarding a given context. 
The researcher then needs to extract those phenomena or experiences significant 
to the interviewee by assigning a conceptual label, known as a code. Several codes 
can be grouped into more abstract categories which will eventually form the basis 
for the developing theory.  
 
3.1.1.1 Coding interviews as part of the analytic process 
Interview coding is used to capture what is in the interview data, to learn how people 
make sense of their experiences and act on them. Coding is the first step of data 
analysis, as it helps to move away from particular statements to more abstract 
interpretations of the interview data (Charmaz, 2006).  
 
Grounded theory methodology advocates using several coding techniques to 
examine interviewee’s accounts at different levels. Open coding, also known as  
line-by-line coding, provides a good starting point to identify initial phenomena and 
produce a list of themes of importance to the interviewee. Conceptual labels are 
attached to almost every line in the interview transcript to capture what has been 
said. These labels can correspond closely to the interview context and when taken 
from the interviewee’s own words, are known as in vivo code. Codes are assigned 
to participants’ words and statements to develop concepts, constituting the start of 
the analytic process.  
The detailed and meticulous process of line-by-line coding helps to open up the text 
and interpret the transcript in new and unfamiliar ways which also helps test the 
researcher’s assumptions. Strauss and Corbin (1998) suggest using initial or 
‘sensitising questions’, to help the researcher grasp what the data might be 
indicating. Suggested questions are "Who are the actors involved?", “What are the 
actors’ definitions and meaning of these phenomena or situations?” (Strauss and 
Corbin, 1998, p. 77).  
The next coding phase is more abstract than open coding and known as focused 
coding or selective coding. Focused codes are applied to several lines or 
paragraphs in a transcript and require the researcher to choose the most telling 
codes to represent the interviewee’s voice. Using open codes as a starting point, 
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the process of focused coding helps to verify the adequacy of the initial concepts 
developed. As the focused codes will be applied and therefore 'tested' on further 
interview transcripts. 
 
Another subsequent phase of coding is axial coding, defined by Strauss and Corbin 
as "the act of relating categories to subcategories along the lines of their properties 
and dimensions" (Strauss and Corbin, 1998, p. 123). The aim of axial coding is to 
add depth and structure to existing categories (see also 3.1.1.2, below). Charmaz 
(2006) explains that axial coding re-assembles data that has been broken up into 
separate codes by line-by-line coding. Strauss and Corbin (1998) use axial coding 
to investigate conditions of situations described in the interview, their actions and 
consequences. Charmaz (2006) warns that axial coding applies a too rigid and 
formal frame to the data analysis. Instead she recommends the less formalised 
approach of reflecting on categories, sub-categories and to establish connecting 
links between these to make sense of the interview data. The most abstract level of 
coding is theoretical coding, which explores the relationships that have been 
established between categories. Several ‘rules’ or “analytic coding families” are put 
forward by Glaser (1978) to develop an advanced analysis of the subject area. 
 
 
3.1.1.2 Developing categories 
The general process of how to code an interview and develop a theory is depicted in 
simplified form in Figure 3.2, below. After coding several interview transcripts a 
researcher can identify many issues that are of importance to the respondents. 
These issues are also known as phenomena and are assigned a conceptual label to 
become a code, also known as a concept by Strauss and Corbin (1998). Some 
codes or concepts will share the same or similar characteristics and can be pulled 
together into more abstract categories, which can typically be interlinked and build 
the basis for a theory.  
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It should be stressed that categories have to ‘earn’ their way into an emerging 
theory (Glaser, 1978). Grounded theory methodology typically does not use 
quantifying data to obtain meaning. However, counting the frequency with which 
categories occur in interview transcripts can be useful to confirm their importance 
for the interviewees. Categories can carry so-called properties and dimensions. A 
property is a general or specific characteristic of a category, whereas a dimension 
denotes the location of a property along a continuum or range (Strauss and Corbin, 
1998). For example, the category 'phone ownership' could have the property 
'spending' with dimensions ranging from 'low' to 'high spending'.  
 
The central or core category is a distinctive category that sits at the heart of the 
developed theory and summarises what is happening. All other major categories 
should relate to the core category, which ought to appear frequently in the data 
(Strauss and Corbin, 1998). The development of the core category for this study is 
described in Chapter 4 - Presentation of Findings, section 4.2.4 to demonstrate the 
development of categories from codes. 
Coding shapes the analytic frame and provides the skeleton for the analysis 
(Charmaz, 2006). Charmaz sees coding as an important link between collecting 
data and developing theory but also as a connection between empirical reality and 
the researcher's view of it. Coding highlights problems, issues, concerns and 
matters of importance to those being studied. Strauss and Corbin (1998) refer to 
categories as having 'analytic power', due to their potential to explain and predict. 
‘Constant comparisons’ between collected data, codes, categories and initial 
findings help to crystallise ideas to become part of the emerging theory.  
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object, action or idea 
Interview 
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Figure 3.2: Coding steps in grounded theory (after Straus and Corbin, 1998)
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3.1.2 Use of grounded theory methodology for this study 
The data collection and analysis for this study followed a cyclical process typical for 
GTM, by using early findings to shape the on-going data collection (see Figure 3.1). 
The pilot study involved tracking participants’ mobile phones and conducting eight 
interviews. This data collection phase was followed by five more in-depth interviews 
that helped to explore issues raised in the pilot study. The survey aimed at exploring 
the research area on a wider scale than would have been possible with interviews 
being conducted and analysed by a sole researcher. More interviews were 
undertaken after the completion of the survey and these could address issues 
brought up by initial survey findings. Details about the sampling approaches for 
each of the three data collection phases can be found in the relevant sections in this 
chapter (3.2 Pilot study:  Mobile phone location tracking , 3.3 Interviews, 3.4 
Survey).  
 
For this study, open coding was used for the pilot study interviews with the help of 
qualitative analysis software NVivo. However, using the software did not produce 
meaningful results and hence the pilot study interviews were re-coded with pen and 
paper after conducting the survey (see section 4.1.4 False starts with initial coding 
in NVivo). Focused coding was utilised for the next two interview phases, which 
used the initial codes as a basis. Axial coding was not used in this study because 
the method of specifying properties and dimensions for each category seemed too 
prescriptive and did not help the analysis of the data (see section 4.2.6 Importance 
of mobile phone settings). For the same reasons, theoretical coding was not 
adopted. Instead, careful comparisons between respondents’ statements, as well as 
between codes and categories were undertaken, without being restricted to interpret 
participants’ words within a framework of properties and dimensions. 
 
The researcher’s decision to use grounded theory methodology was only taken after 
conducting the pilot study.  An initial analysis of the pilot interviews showed that it 
was not suitable to base the overall research project on existing theoretical models. 
The focus needed to be on participants’ experiences and views of privacy and 
mobile phone location data. Hence an inductive approach was chosen to explore 
the subject area through the participants’ eyes. The decision to use grounded theory 
methodology was further supported by the lack of existing theory regarding mobile 
phone location data and privacy.  
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Grounded theory scholars have different opinions about the most suitable time at 
which to review the literature. Glaser (1978) advocates waiting to conduct the 
literature review until initial findings have been made in order to not influence the 
researcher with preconceived ideas. This study has followed the advice of Charmaz 
(2006) and has carried out an initial review of the literature before the first data 
collection in form of the pilot study took place. The reason for an early review of 
literature was, on the one hand, to learn whether any similar research had already 
been conducted in this area and, on the other hand, to satisfy requirements of the 
university's research committee for the research proposal. 
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3.1.3 Substantive and formal theory 
A grounded theory is directly related to the data from which it has been generated; it 
is therefore grounded in the data. Two types of theory are distinguished: substantive 
and formal theory. 
Substantive theories provide a theoretical interpretation or explanation for a 
particular area, in other words this type of theory is used to explain and manage 
problems in a specific setting. Formal theories, however, are more abstract and 
provide a theoretical dealing of a generic issue which can be applied to a wider 
range of disciplinary concerns and problems (Strauss and Corbin, 1998). For 
example, a substantive theory can be about a limited area such as family 
relationships or professional education while a formal theory might deal with the 
construction of culture or the development of ideologies or stigma (Charmaz, 2006; 
Glaser, 1994). Charmaz (2006) suggests combining and conceptualising the results 
from several substantive grounded theories to develop a more general formal 
theory. Each substantive theory can help to refine the formal theory, in other words, 
a formal theory can relate to or 'cut across' several substantive ones. Charmaz 
(2006) points out that most grounded theories are substantive theories as they 
focus on particular problems in a specific, substantive area.  
 
This study has developed a substantive theory as the collection of data and their 
interpretation focus on the explanation of a particular area, that is the relationship 
between mobile phone location data and individuals' perceptions of privacy in the 
UK. This PhD thesis does not provide the scope to raise the very specific, 
substantive theory to a formal theory that would be generalisable across a wider 
area, such as additional types of digital data or mobile phone users from other 
cultural backgrounds. 
 
3.1.4 Memo writing 
The process of coding and developing categories is supported by writing memos. 
Memos are a set of notes, that kept continuously, support the researcher by 
providing a record of thoughts and ideas. Memos enable the researcher to reflect on 
the interviews and given codes to enter into a dialogue about the collected data. 
Initial thoughts are of high relevance as they often spark the best ideas. Hence it is 
important to write the memo immediately when reading and coding the interview. At 
later stages in the research process, initial thoughts are represented through 
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memos and can be revisited, reflected upon and considered for the overall analysis. 
Memos can be used to ask questions, philosophise about potential meanings of 
interviewee's statements and compare concepts identified in interview transcripts to 
each other and to the literature.  
 
3.1.5 Criteria for grounded theory studies 
Charmaz (2006) gives the following criteria that grounded theory studies should aim 
for. She highlights that a combination of credibility and originality enhances the 
other two criteria resonance and usefulness. 
 
a) Credibility 
- Are there strong links between gathered data and argument?  
- Are data sufficient to merit claims  
- Do categories offer a wide range of empirical observations? 
- Has the research provided enough evidence for the researcher's claims to 
allow the reader to form an independent assessment? 
 
b) Originality 
- Do the categories offer new insights? 
- What is the social and theoretical significance of this work?  
- How does grounded theory challenge, extend, refine current ideas, concepts 
and practices?  
 
c) Resonance 
- Do categories portray fullness of the studied experience? 
- Does the GT make sense to the participants?  
- Does analysis offer them deeper insights about their lives and worlds? 
 
d) Usefulness 
- Can the analysis spark further research in other substantive areas?  
- How does the work contribute to knowledge  
- Does the analysis offer interpretations that people can use in their everyday 
lives/worlds? 
(Charmaz, 2006, p. 182) 
 
Chapter 6, Conclusions and Recommendations, revisits these four criteria of 
grounded theory research and addresses how each criterion has been met by this 
study (section 6.4). 
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3.1.6 Objectivist and constructivist approaches to GTM 
Grounded theory methodology has evolved since its inception in the 1960s in the 
United States. Particularly, the writings of Glaser (such as 1967, 1978), Strauss and 
Corbin (such as 1990, 1998) and Charmaz (e.g. 2000, 2006) are seen as influential 
for the development of GTM. The original work of Glaser and Strauss from 1967, 
‘The Discovery of Grounded Theory’, suggests that the researcher should start 
collecting data with a 'blank mind', meaning without reviewing the existing literature 
in order to carry out a truly inductive study. Consequently, theory is built from 
observation and based on the understanding that the theory is already contained in 
the data and only needs to be dug up or 'discovered', as Glaser and Strauss' book 
title (1967) suggests. This perspective assumes that every individual will see and 
understand the data from the same point of view, making the same observations 
and therefore will come to similar conclusions. The researcher should take a 
passive stance and 'let the data emerge', which can be seen as a characteristic of 
an objectivist or positivist paradigm (Bryant, 2003; Charmaz, 2000).  The alternative 
view in social sciences is the so-called constructivist or interpretivist view.  
Constructivist grounded theory methodology is for example advocated by Kathy 
Charmaz in her book ‘Constructing Grounded Theory’ (Charmaz, 2006). This strand 
of grounded theory methodology emphasises the research participants’ experience 
and how they construct their view of reality. Knowledge, and hence the grounded 
theory, are constructed by both researcher and research participant and aim at 
interpreting the empirical evidence within the research context. 
 
A divergence between the two authors of 'The Discovery of Grounded Theory' 
occurred in the 1980s, after which Glaser postulated his understanding of grounded 
theory methodology (Glaser, 1992). The late Strauss, however, together with his co-
author Juliet Corbin, developed a different perspective on grounded theory 
methodology (Corbin and Strauss, 1990; Strauss and Corbin, 1998). The major 
difference between Glaser's and Strauss' views is Glaser's stance that "data 
emerges" and thus presents the same picture of facts to every researcher in form of 
some objective truth. Strauss' viewpoint on the other hand stresses that a 
researcher has to actively obtain theory from data. Hence, it is likely and even 
expected that each researcher will place the focus on different aspects of the 
collected data depending on their background, beliefs and values. Stern (in Morse 
ed., 1994) calls the former the Glaserian School and the latter Straussian School, as 
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both approaches to GTM differ in process and product and in her view represent 
completely different methods.  
 
Charmaz (2000) argues that both Glaser's and Strauss and Corbin’s approaches to 
GTM assume an objective external reality and hence take a positivist and objectivist 
stance. She, on the contrary, advocates a constructivist approach to GTM that 
assumes multiple social realities. Charmaz does not support the view that theories 
are discovered but believes that the studied world needs to be portrayed in an 
interpretive way because interviewee and researcher embark together on the 
process of constructing reality (Charmaz, 2006).  
This study has been inspired and guided by Strauss and Corbin’s and Charmaz’ 
interpretation of grounded theory. The researcher disagrees with Glaser’s stance 
that reality is objective and neutral, particularly regarding the intangible and 
personal subject area of privacy. 
 
3.1.7 Limitations of the grounded theory methodology 
Grounded theory methodology has limitations like any other research methodology. 
Some point out that GTM is very complex and time-consuming due to the tedious 
coding process and memo writing as part of the analysis (Bartlett and Payne in 
McKenzie et al., 1997). This study has dealt with the lengthy process of coding by 
using specialised software to help speed up organisation and analysis of data.  
Others name as a limitation that the use of GTM to explain, predict a phenomenon 
or to build a theory is a very subjective process, which relies heavily on a 
researcher’s abilities. This study has followed the methodological guidance of 
Charmaz (2006) and Strauss and Corbin (1998) to gather and analyse the interview 
data. In addition, findings from the survey and pilot study were used to strengthen 
those findings based on interview data with the aim of fulfilling the criteria for GTM 
as described in sections 3.1.2 and 3.1.5. Many studies make use of the term 
grounded theory inappropriately and Bryant (2002) points out that the flexibility of 
the method can be used to provide a justification for studies lacking in 
methodological strength. Stern (in Morse ed., 1994) criticises some researchers for 
mixing methods such as ethnography and phenomenology and then use the label 
grounded theory to explain the analysis of their research findings.  
 
The following three sections describe the data collection process for this study. 
Details about the findings and their analysis will be provided in the following two 
chapters, Chapter 4 and Chapter 5. 
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3.2 Pilot study:  Mobile phone location tracking  
The pilot study explored technical aspects of mobile phone location data and 
participants’ perceptions of privacy regarding this subject area. Four participants’ 
mobile phones were registered with an internet-based service provider that offered 
identification of the phones’ geographical location 24 hours a day.  
The aims of the pilot study were twofold: firstly to explore the technical side of 
location tracking by locating the participants with help of the commercial tracking 
service provider. Secondly, to learn about the participants' awareness of and 
attitudes towards location tracking in relation to privacy. Potential disadvantages of 
pilot studies were accepted and considered. These consisted primarily of the small 
sample size which could not provide representative results and the danger of 
making inaccurate predictions or assumption based on the pilot data.  
 
3.2.1 Sample and ethical considerations 
The participants were selected based on the researcher's judgement. This was due 
to the potentially invasive nature of the research design and the explorative 
characteristics of the pilot study. Two male and two female participants were chosen 
for the study and it was ensured that all four UK GSM mobile phone networks (O2, 
Orange, Vodafone and T-Mobile) were represented. It was a requirement of this 
study that all phones were operating on the GSM network in order to be locatable by 
any of the commercial mobile phone tracking providers. Out of the several internet-
based companies offering similar mobile phone tracking services, one company was 
chosen for reasons of convenience and pricing. This service provider offered the 
registration of five mobile phones for £5 plus VAT per month. The phones of four 
participants and the researcher’s phone were registered. Due to the small sample 
size and the limited age range of the participants (25 to 35 years), the study cannot 
be seen as representative for the overall population. The time span of four weeks 
was seen as a sufficient to generate a number of tracking results and to enable the 
participants to experience location data in their daily routines. 
 
This study was guided by the ethical principles on research with human participants 
set out by Leeds Metropolitan University (Leeds Metropolitan University, 2006). 
Particularly the researcher's ability to determine a participants' geographical location 
24 hours per day over a period of four weeks was perceived as the most profound 
ethical implication. The only possibility for a participant to not have his or her mobile 
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phone’s geographical location identified would have been to either switch the phone 
off or to terminate the participation in the research project. For these reasons, the 
participants were informed about the study in great detail before asking for their 
consent to take part. Aims and objectives of the pilot project, together with details 
about the data collection process were explained to the participants. The 
participants were informed that they could withdraw from the study at any time 
without questions being asked. All data collected was anonymised by replacing the 
participants' names with ascending code numbers (P116 - P119) in the order of the 
initial interviews. Appendix A provides the email that has been sent out to the 
participants before giving their definitive agreement to take part in the pilot study.  
 
3.2.2 Data collection procedures 
After all four participants agreed to take part in the study, their mobile phone 
numbers were registered with the tracking service. The overall data collection had 
two main aims. For one part, to compare the geographical data that was generated 
by the location tracks to the participants' actual location. The second part aimed at 
exploring participants' perceptions, feelings and opinions regarding privacy, mobile 
technologies and particularly location data before and after the study. The data 
collection process is shown in Figure 3.3, below. 'Open track' denotes a location 
request known to the participant at the time of tracking and 'covert track' indicates a 
location request without the participant's knowledge. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Tracking 
Initial Interview 
Final Interview 
Week 1: 'Open track’ – weekday, evening 
Week 2: 'Covert track’ – weekend, daytime 
Week 3: 'Covert track’ – weekday, morning 
Week 4: 'Covert track’ – weekday, evening 
Data Analysis: 
- tracking data (quantitative) 
- interviews (qualitative)
'Open track’ during interview
Figure 3.3: Data collection process for pilot study
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3.2.2.1 Part one of pilot study: Location tracking of participants’ mobile 
phones 
A weekly location request was submitted for each participant over a period of four 
weeks and the results were stored 
electronically by the researcher. The 
participants were not contacted during 
this time to avoid influencing their 
tracking experience. The research 
participants could not know when a 
request for their mobile phone’s 
geographical location was submitted to 
the tracking service provider. 
Figure 3.4 shows an example of a 
location request in form of a map depicting the participants' geographical location at 
the time of tracking. In order to be able to compare the participants' location 
provided by the service with their actual location, it was suggested to the 
participants to keep a location diary. To make it easier for the participants to recall 
their location at the time of tracking, the phones’ locations were requested at 
different weekdays and times (see Figure 3.3). Immediately before the first location 
request only, all participants were contacted on their mobile phone. This phone call 
helped to familiarise them with the study and to obtain a first valid actual location. 
The participants were unaware of the three subsequent tracking requests. Hence, 
the participants’ actual location had to be compared to the one supplied by the 
tracking service based on diary entries and memory in the final interview. A fifth 
track was conducted in the researcher's office as part of the final interview to 
demonstrate the service to the participants and to be able to compare the accuracy 
of tracking results between the four different mobile phone service providers. 
 
Mobile phone tracking served two purposes, which tied in with the overall aims of 
this study. Firstly, mobile phone location tracking allowed comparison of the 
participants' location derived from location data with their actual whereabouts at 
time of tracking. The main purpose for this was to evaluate the service regarding 
reliability, validity and accuracy. Results from the location requests aimed at 
bringing location data into context with claims of privacy invasion through retention 
of location data. The researcher believes that police and emergency services have 
access to more detailed geographical data than a commercial tracking service 
provider. This assumption is based on media reports. However, using a commercial 
Figure 3.4: Example of location track
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service provider was seen as the only feasible way to get access to location data 
and to visualise this hidden aspect of mobile communication. The second purpose 
of location tracking was to raise the phone users' awareness of this type of data. 
The 'visualisation' of mobile phone location data by using a tracking provider proved 
to be a useful tool to enrich the qualitative data collection both for the participants 
and the researcher.  
 
3.2.2.2 Part two of pilot study: Interviews  
Respondents' perceptions and beliefs are at the heart of qualitative research and 
this was the main motivation for complementing the location requests with 
interviews. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with all four participants 
shortly before and after the four week tracking period to learn about their opinions 
and perceptions regarding mobile phone location data and privacy. The interview 
questions were of exploratory nature due to the small scale of this study and early 
stage in the overall research project. The questions were designed to identify 
patterns and common themes in the participants' accounts and sought to identify 
the meaning of privacy in relation to mobile phone location data in the participants' 
everyday lives. 
During the interviews it was important not to restrain the participants but to give 
them time to talk about how they understood and described their experience of 
mobile phone tracking. This was particularly important as privacy is such an elusive 
concept, that can be perceived differently by different people. Figure 3.5, below, 
gives an overview of the interview themes and Appendix C - Interview questions for 
pilot study, provides a detailed list of interview questions. 
Awareness 
of location 
Technology 
Legal 
Framework 
Control 
over location 
data 
Access 
Dissemination 
 
Concern
Trust
   Misuse 
In government
In service 
provider 
Retention 
Tracking
Geographical 
Location Participants' 
definition 
Nothing to worry, 
nothing to hide? 
Trade for 
personal gain? 
 
Privacy
Figure 3.5: Graphical representation of interview themes
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The interviews that took place prior to the tracking period focused on participants' 
awareness and knowledge of location data, as well as their descriptions and 
thoughts about privacy. Responses to these initial interviews have helped to 
develop the questions for the second set of pilot study interviews which was 
conducted soon after the four week tracking period. The final interviews aimed at 
learning about participants' experiences of taking part in the tracking study and any 
thoughts or potential concerns regarding privacy. 
The pilot study proved useful to familiarise the researcher and the participants with 
the concept of location data. The pilot interviews provided valuable leads to be 
pursued later on in the research project in more in-depth interviews.  
 
3.3 Interviews  
The interviews for this study were conducted in three phases: the first phase 
consisted of eight explorative interviews for the pilot study and the second phase 
consisted of five interviews, after which the survey was initiated. The reasons for 
conducting the survey at this point was for one part to allow time to reflect on how to 
approach the next set of interviews and for the other part to learn about individuals’ 
awareness and opinions regarding location data on a greater scale than it would 
have been possible with interviews. The third and last interview phase took place 
after the paper-based survey was completed.  
 
Interviews can provide insights that are not available to researchers working with 
large survey samples and are known to be the most suitable approach when 
seeking rich data illuminating individuals’ experiences and attitudes. Drawbacks are 
that interviews are very time-consuming to conduct and analyse. The interview 
questions for interview phases two and three were based on findings from the pilot 
study. The questions were asked in as non-directive a manner as possible to meet 
the study’s principal aim of learning about the interviewees' perceptions. The data 
collection and analysis for this project took place in alternating sequences and was 
guided by the grounded theory methodology. This meant that the interviews were 
transcribed and coded immediately after they took place. Hence, initial findings from 
interview coding could help to shape the questions for subsequent interviews.  
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3.3.1 Sample design and ethical considerations 
For the second and third interview phase, the participants were initially contacted 
informally, which was followed up by an email explaining the study’s aims and the 
interview procedure.  The email ensured participants about anonymity and 
confidentiality of data collected and informed them that the interview was recorded 
for transcription (see Appendix B - Email sent out prior to interviews). The interviews 
were recorded with a digital voice recorder and the files transferred to a PC for 
transcription. When transcribing the interviews, participants’ names were replaced 
with code numbers. Participants of the pilot study were assigned the codes P116_F, 
P117_M, P118_F and P119_M. "M" indicates males and "F" stands for female. The 
codes for respondents of the second and third interview phase followed the same 
system, starting with number P131_F. In addition to the eight pilot study interviews, 
ten more in-depth interviews were conducted which were between 30 and 90 
minutes in duration.  
 
Respondents were selected based on initial findings. The pilot study had for 
example highlighted different types of mobile phone users and it seemed as if 
different types of users utilise their phone settings in different ways to regulate how 
others can get in touch with them (see section 4.2.8). Hence it was sought to 
interview male and female mobile phone users from different age groups and with 
different mobile phone contracts. A list of respondents, including demographic 
characteristics, can be found in Appendix F - List of Interviewees. 
 
3.3.2 Interview preparation 
The information sent out before the interview included some technical and legal 
background about mobile phone location data. The email did not make any 
references to potential impacts of data retention on civil liberties or privacy so as not 
to influence the respondents’ views. The aim of sending out information prior to the 
interviews was to familiarise the participants with the subject area. This seemed 
necessary because early survey findings showed that the majority of people had 
either not heard of location data or were not sure about the details.  
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3.3.3 Development of interview questions 
The interview questions were based on initial findings from pilot study and survey 
and the following themes were addressed (see Table 3.1, below). Appendices D 
and E provide a detailed list of interview questions. 
 
Table 3.1: Themes of interview questions for second and third interview phases 
Theme Notes about question 
Mobile Phone Mobile phone usage and habits in everyday life situations. 
Privacy An open question as to what privacy means to the interviewee. 
Deliberately trying to avoid mentioning any categories of privacy 
known from the literature. 
 
CCTV, Loyalty 
Cards 
Do interviewees perceive these as privacy invasive? 
Phone as 
tracking device 
Referring to technical and legal facts of mobile phone location 
data that were sent out prior to the interview. 
- Is the interviewee aware of location data before this study? 
- Are any issues or concerns raised? 
 
Government & 
mobile phone 
service provider 
- What is the participants’ opinion towards storage of 
communications data (and its availability to government)? 
- What else is mentioned in this context? Regarding government, 
regarding data retention? 
 
In addition to these themes, participants mentioned terrorist attacks, current politics 
and ID cards.  
 
The interview questions changed and improved over time, influenced by codes and 
categories developed for previous interviews. For this reason, two sets of interview 
questions are shown in the appendices: Appendix D - Interview questions March 
2005 and Appendix E - Interview questions December 2005. The second set of 
questions was guided by Kathy Charmaz’ approach to GTM, particularly her chapter 
on how to phrase interview questions to allow respondents to express their views 
without constraints (Charmaz, 2006). For example the question 'Have you ever 
heard of mobile phone location data before taking part in this study?' was changed 
to 'What do you know about mobile phone location data?'. A question mentioning 
consumer loyalty cards and the storage of personal information by commercial 
companies was removed after the second interview phase. The reason for this was 
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that initial interview findings and the survey showed that respondents did not 
perceive this area as related to privacy. 
 
3.3.4 Use of software for data management and analysis 
Weitzman (2000) advocates the following benefits of using software in research 
projects: writing up, editing, coding, storage, search and retrieval, data 'linking', 
memoing, content analysis, data display and graphic mapping. However, he warns 
of 'false hopes and fears', pointing out that no software will be able to actually carry 
out the analysis process for the researcher. Software can support the research 
process but ideas and intellectual efforts have to come from the human being 
conducting the research and analysis.  
For this study a word processor, Microsoft Word, and the qualitative analysis 
software NVivo were used to support the analysis and to help manage the interview 
data. The computer was utilised as efficiently as possible to reduce the amount of 
time spent on organising data and findings, to increase the speed of tiresome tasks, 
resorting the material and redefining codes. Qualitative analysis software facilitated 
following potentially promising analytic routes but also enabled these routes to be 
discontinued with ease. Dynamic and real-time representation of the findings 
considerably assisted reflection on data and connections between the data. 
 
3.3.4.1 Transcribing interviews and importing into NVivo 
The use of the NVivo software has significantly facilitated the process of organising, 
re-arranging and managing the considerable amount of data. For example, after 
coding the interviews in NVivo, all passages assigned to a specific code could be 
viewed on screen and printed. In the same manner, searches for specific text 
strings could be conducted across all interviews and relevant paragraphs containing 
the search string could be compared on screen or printed. The interview transcripts 
were formatted in a particular way in Microsoft Word to facilitate importing the 
transcripts into NVivo. This meant for example, that the interview questions were 
assigned a 'Heading 1' format. When importing the transcript into NVivo, this 
resulted in the questions being displayed in the content panel in the NVivo explorer. 
Hence when selecting a question, it was possible to jump to this section in the 
interview transcript. Furthermore, meaningful information about the interview was 
placed into the first two paragraphs of each transcript. This enabled this information 
to be automatically put into the properties of the interview document when importing 
the interview into NVivo.  
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The appropriate formatting of the interview transcripts from the beginning helped to 
organise the data efficiently and thus facilitated the analysis of the interviews. In 
addition, by using the NVivo software much tedious and time-consuming work for 
managing and resorting the data could be avoided which freed time for more 
meaningful tasks, such as analysis and interviewing. Different sets of interviews 
could be assigned with different colours in NVivo for easy distinction.  
An advantageous feature of NVivo is that the software keeps a log of all data that 
has been entered, which means that all codes and memos are automatically 
assigned a date and time stamp. This feature helped to trace the development of 
codes. After coding the interviews in NVivo, all passages assigned to a specific 
code could be viewed on screen and printed. In the same manner, searches for 
specific text strings could be conducted across all interview sets.  
 
3.3.5 Interview coding 
The first set of interview transcripts were coded with the help of the qualitative 
analysis software NVivo, which however did not prove to be the most beneficial 
approach (see section 4.1.6.1 Some initial concepts not confirmed). After setting 
aside several months for the survey, a fresh and more suitable approach to the 
analysis of interviews was adopted. This time interview codes were not devised on 
screen with help of software but with pen and paper. Following the GTM guidance 
on coding (see section 3.1.1.1), the researcher worked through each of the 
transcripts and used line-by-line coding to take note of themes and phenomena on 
the margins. The codes were not devised strictly microscopically and some more 
abstract categories came into view; some codes were very close to the 
interviewee’s accounts and others more abstract or conceptual. Keywords and 
phrases were noted on differently coloured post-it notes and stuck onto a blank A2 
flip chart sheet (see Appendix I). The post-it-notes were arranged in a logical order 
on the paper sheet. As more and more interviews were coded, this sheet started 
looking less like a random collection of labelled post-it notes but more like a brain 
storm map or a tree where branches of thought grew from certain categories. 
Memos were written throughout this exercise to keep track of thoughts and ideas 
regarding the data analysis.  
 
This system of creating codes, combined with reflection was maintained for coding 
all interviews. At the end of this coding exercise, three A2 sheets were covered with 
post-it notes containing categories and codes. In addition, a matrix had been 
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devised, which held codes, properties and dimensions, as well as some comments 
and quotations. This list of codes was revised continuously as more interviews were 
coded. The codes were modified and verified by being applied to further interview 
transcripts but stayed alike for the most part. Subsequently, the codes were keyed 
into the NVivo software to allow searching the interviews, re-sorting of material and 
consistent redefining of codes in order to support the analysis process. 
Figure 3.6, below, shows a summary of the coding process. More details about this 
analysis process are discussed in the subsequent findings and analysis chapters. 
Appendix J provides a summary of the development of codes. 
 
  
Codes on Post-it notes Matrix with properties & 
dimensions in MS Word 
(Re-)apply codes to 
interviews in NVivo 
Final codes in NVivo 
Categories and initial 
theoretical framework 
Writing Memos 

 = when developing the final 
categories and links between them, the 
writing of memos became particularly 
important. 
Figure 3.6: Graphical representation of coding process
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3.3.6 Memoing to develop and clarify categories 
The extended coding process, as described in the previous sections, has facilitated 
reflections on codes and categories, which were captured by writing memos (for 
examples of memos see next chapter, section 4.2.2 Situational map as a memo to 
consider wider social context). The memos were consulted when establishing links 
between categories and setting up the initial theoretical framework. The following 
chapter details how initial codes have developed into focused codes and finally to 
abstract categories (section 4.2 Development of categories based on interview 
data).  The writing of memos ('memoing') was particularly useful as this helped the 
researcher to keep a note of thoughts without the pressures of having to 
immediately determine how ideas fitted within the overall research findings and 
analysis. Memoing allowed the freedom to jot down ideas so that these could be 
sorted, categorised or discarded at a later point in time. The writing and reflecting on 
memos has been a crucial step in the development of the final categories based on 
initial and focused codes. Some examples of memos and how they have influenced 
the analysis process are shown in the next chapter (for example section 4.2.4 
Memo ‘Balancing security and privacy’). 
 
3.4 Survey 
A survey was conducted in form of a questionnaire and distributed after the pilot 
study and some further interviews took place. The survey complemented findings 
from the interviews and helped to obtain a better idea of individuals' opinions 
towards privacy and mobile phone location data. Additionally, the survey highlighted 
interesting cases which could be approached in further data collection stages and 
thus supported the purposive sampling approach of interviews. It could be 
understood as a weak point of questionnaire-based surveys that they only capture 
surface opinions, seeing that respondents will not necessarily report their beliefs 
and attitudes accurately. These are easier to identify in interviews, as also prompts 
can be used. In addition, the use of mainly closed questions in a questionnaire 
merely allows respondents to choose between a limited number of responses 
(Robson, 2002). However, some of the respondents of this survey have overcome 
this limitation by making comments on the questionnaire’s margins to express 
further opinions and thoughts. A significant advantage of using a survey for this 
study was to collect larger amounts of data in a shorter time scale than would have 
been possible with interviews. 
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3.4.1 Sample design and ethical considerations 
It is hardly ever possible to survey the entire population to be studied and for this 
reason sampling techniques need to be employed. A representative sample 
produces results which can be used to formulate generalisations. However, this can 
only be achieved by using probability sampling where the likelihood of the sampling 
unit - in this case an individual - to be included in the sample is known. The 
sampling population for this research project consisted of British residents older 
than 15 years, as the survey was not designed to explore the views of children.  A 
representative sample was not chosen as it had not been possible to obtain a large 
enough random sample due to time and monetary constraints. For these reasons 
purposive sampling, a form of non-probability sampling, was used. Participants were 
not selected randomly but judged to be of interest to the researcher, which should 
not be understood as a limitation since the survey was designed as an explorative 
study. In addition, this approach tied in with the sampling procedures common in 
studies using grounded theory methodology (see section 3.1.1).  
 
The questionnaire was distributed to individuals of different age groups, diverse 
professional backgrounds and users with different types of mobile phone contracts. 
The sample size of 477 respondents was deemed to be sufficient for an explorative 
survey and provided an overview of participants’ opinions at the time of data 
collection. Statistical measures such as confidence intervals could not be produced 
as the sample was not a probability sample and the survey did not have a defined 
population. Ethical guidelines were carefully followed when collecting the survey 
data: all data were treated confidentially, which was explained to the respondents 
together with the aims of the study. Respondents were free to fill in their name on 
the last page of the questionnaire if they were interested in taking part in a follow-up 
interview. The section revealing individuals’ names could be handed in separately 
from the questionnaire responses to ensure anonymity. 
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3.4.2 Pilot testing of survey 
The questionnaire was thoroughly pilot tested before dissemination to uncover flaws 
and potential causes of confusion, such as misleading questions that could 
potentially result in invalid responses. For the pilot test 15 questionnaires were 
distributed to friends and other well-known contacts to verify feasibility and 
compliance with objectives set out by the overall study. The following steps were 
undertaken to pilot test the questionnaire: 
 
1) Develop questions  
The survey questions were based on interview questions from the pilot study. 
Five questionnaires were distributed to friends and colleagues, who were 
informed that the questions were developed for a survey. Their comments and 
feedback was used to modify some of the questions.  
 
2) Pilot testing 
Ten revised questionnaires were distributed to other friends and colleagues 
and their feedback helped to develop the final version. The number of 
questions was reduced from 23 to 20 and the layout was condensed, so that 
the number of pages could be reduced to four instead of seven pages. 
 
3) Pilot analysis 
Frequency tables for the responses to each question were generated to obtain 
an early impression of the results. This trial analysis ensured that the survey 
would fulfil the survey's aims and yield data valuable to the overall study.  
 
 
3.4.3 Changes undertaken after successful pilot testing 
After the initial analysis of pilot data, some changes in questionnaire design and 
coding were undertaken. The most significant change was to amend the answer 
choices of question 15 “Have you heard of mobile phone location data before taking 
part in this study?” to: 
 
- I have heard of location data from the media and other sources, but I am not          
  exactly sure about the details 
- Yes, I know what location data is and how it works. I could explain it to a friend  
- No, I have never heard of location data  
 
The reason for this change was that the previous answer choices were not 
meaningful enough, as the questionnaire merely asked whether people had 'heard 
of' the data and if yes from which sources. However, it was acknowledged that it 
would be more important to learn how much respondents would consider 
themselves to know about the subject. The drawback of these answer choices was 
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that respondents had to use their own judgement. Nevertheless, it was not seen as 
appropriate to examine participants' knowledge, since it was more important to gain 
respondents’ trust to enter into a dialogue. An additional change regarding question 
15 concerned the layout. This significant question was moved to the bottom of the 
page, so that the box providing explanations about location data would only appear 
on the subsequent page of the questionnaire. Hence, this forced respondents to 
make a judgement of their awareness of location data before being presented with 
further background information on the subject area. Appendix L contains the final 
version of the questionnaire. 
 
3.4.4 Distribution of questionnaires 
The survey was disseminated in two formats, paper-based and online via the 
internet; the majority of questionnaires were distributed paper-based. Initially the 
survey was given to individuals working and studying at Leeds Metropolitan 
University, ranging from respondents with an academic background (lecturers, post- 
and undergraduate students) to administrative, cleaning and security staff. Friends, 
personal contacts from various leisure activities and colleagues from part-time jobs 
were also invited to fill in the questionnaire. In addition, acquaintances working in 
different professions (landscape architect, engineer, manager in a bus company) 
were asked to distribute approximately 10 questionnaires each at their workplace, 
sports club or family. This distribution method could be seen as a form of snowball 
sampling, which ensured access to social groups beyond the researcher's 
immediate social circle and made it possible to collect data across a diverse 
population. A known limitation of the sample for this study is that unemployed, 
unskilled or manual workers were only included marginally.  
 
It was acknowledged that researcher's bias could have occurred when selecting 
participants. Response rate and quality of survey data was very high due to the 
questionnaire distribution on a personal basis.  An additional benefit of this 
approach was that respondents could receive help with completing the 
questionnaire if necessary. Only a few people refused to fill in the questionnaire, 
mainly due to time constraints, and one person did not want to participate as she 
perceived questionnaires as an invasion of her privacy. It is acknowledged that due 
to the chosen non-probability sampling method, the number of non-respondents and 
their reasons for not taking part in the study could not be known. 
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3.4.5 Online survey 
In addition to the paper-based version, an online version of the questionnaire was 
published on the internet on a website developed by the researcher 
(http://www.locationprivacy.org). The survey questions were identical for both 
distribution media so that the results could be pooled. An online survey was seen as 
a convenient way to collect additional data with minimum involvement of the 
researcher in data collection and analysis. Results of the survey were automatically 
gathered in a database and could be downloaded in form of tabular data which then 
could be imported into Ms Excel. Advantages of electronic surveys include being 
able to direct respondents to particular sections of the questionnaire, depending on 
the way they have answered previous questions. Respondents can be automatically 
prompted when they provide an invalid response, such as selecting several tick 
boxes when only one should be marked. However, electronic surveys also have 
distinctive technological, demographic and response characteristics which were to 
be taken into consideration for this study. For example, only individuals with 
computer and internet access were able to fill in the survey. To account for these 
differences data from the electronic survey was stored and analysed separately 
from the data collected by the paper-based version. However, a comparison 
between the responses from both distribution media showed that results were 
similar (see section 4.3.1). 
 
3.4.6 Email as distribution medium 
Email was planned to be used as a distribution medium for the survey but discarded 
due to particular problems to this approach. Two alternative methods for using email 
to distribute surveys were considered; firstly, to send the survey as an attached 
word document, and secondly to include the questions in the email body. However, 
for the first option it would have been necessary for the respondent to download the 
attachment, complete and save it and then re-attach it to the email to send it back to 
the researcher. This is a rather cumbersome process and if any of these steps is not 
followed correctly, the survey is returned blank. The second option would not have 
allowed the researcher to control how the questions are displayed, as this depends 
on the respondent’s email programme. For these reasons the use of email was 
restricted to distributing the questionnaire’s website link and to contact respondents.  
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3.4.7 Question design and coding 
Questions were worded carefully and avoided long and ambiguous, leading, biased 
questions, as well as jargon. The following question types of questions were used: 
 
Numerical rating 
A Likert scale from 1 - 6 was used. The reason for using an even number of 
options was to not allow non-committal answers. In the data analysis, each 
statement was assigned a separate variable.  
 
8. How important is your phone to you on a scale from 1 to 6? 
My phone is VERY IMPORTANT to me. 
It would be difficult to live without it. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 NOT IMPORTANT at all to me.  
I could live without it. 
 
 
Multiple choice 
Require respondents to choose just one response from a list of alternatives. 
Only one variable per question was necessary in the data analysis.  
 
14. Giving up some privacy is necessary to fight terrorism and crime 
Agree    Disagree    Don't know   
 
 
Check lists 
List a set of items of which respondents select those that apply. Each statement 
was assigned a separate variable in the data analysis.  
 
18. In your opinion, what would be good uses for location data?   [Select all that are appropriate]   
Solving crime   Employers to track their employees   
Preventing acts of terrorism   Emergency services  
For parents to track their children          (e.g. rescue, ambulance, fire brigade)  
 
Open questions 
Open questions allow respondents to formulate their own statements and can 
lead to unexpected responses. Nevertheless, open questions are more difficult 
to analyse and take respondents longer to respond. For this reason only one 
question of this type was included. 
 
9. What comes to mind when you think about the term 'privacy'? [Keywords are fine] 
 
      --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
      --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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Non-committal responses 
The survey questions raised many issues which respondents might not have 
thought about before taking part in the study or might not hold an opinion. Hence, 
alternative responses such as 'don't know' or 'no opinion' were provided where 
appropriate. It would create false and unreliable answers to force the respondents to 
express an opinion. Some see the danger in providing these options that some 
respondents might select them out of laziness (Converse and Presser, 1986 in 
DeVaus, 2002). Therefore, alternative responses were always the last one in a list 
of options (see Appendix L). 
 
3.4.8 Coding missing responses 
In every survey there will be missing data occurring for different reasons, which 
needs to be recorded and coded in a similar way to valid responses. In this study, 
different codes were given to different types of missing data. The following types of  
non-responses were identified: 
 
1) The respondent has not responded to a question. The reason might have been 
by choice or simple overlooking of the question. The code given was ‘9’. 
 
2) The respondent was not required to answer this question. After responding to 
the question ‘Do you own a mobile phone?’ individuals who did not own a phone 
would proceed straight to Section B ‘Privacy’. The missing responses in Section A 
‘Mobile Phone’ was coded with an ‘8’ to distinguish those from other missed 
responses (see above). 
 
3) Response was invalid, e.g. where only one answer was required but the 
respondent ticked several responses. However, this was only the case with one 
questionnaire and therefore in this case was assigned a ‘9’. 
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3.4.9 Data entry 
The survey data was firstly entered into an Excel spreadsheet and then imported 
into the statistical analysis software SPSS (Statistical Package for Social Scientists). 
The reason for using two different software packages was that Excel would 
automatically update graphs showing the frequencies of responses as survey data 
was entered. This gave early impressions and ideas about the data and helped 
reflecting on findings at an early stage. Another reason for entering the data first into 
Excel was that there was no character limit for variables, which was convenient for 
open question and comments. Afterwards, data was imported into SPSS to facilitate 
advanced analysis of data, such as correlations between variables. In addition, 
SPSS could help to prevent false entries, as data ranges could be set, so that for 
example no number greater than 6 could be entered for a question. 
 
3.5 Analysis of findings 
Data collected by pilot study and survey were compared to the grounded theory 
categories identified in the interviews in order to support the analysis of findings. 
This process of triangulation between qualitative and quantitative data was used to 
confirm and validate the findings.  
The interplay between induction and deduction, in other words between data 
collection and interpretation, was another process of validation of findings but also 
part of the theory development (see section 3.1.1). In what is known as a process of 
abduction, the interpretation of observed data to the best explanation helps to form 
a tentative theory, which then needs to be confirmed or disconfirmed with help of 
further data collections and analysis. This procedure is repeated until the best, the 
most plausible interpretation of data is found (Charmaz, 2006; Haig, 1995). The 
findings from empirical data were compared to the reviewed literature, as described 
in Chapter 5, which then lead to conclusions and recommendations (Chapter 6). 
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3.6 Chapter summary and conclusion 
This chapter has introduced and discussed the choice of grounded theory 
methodology as a suitable research methodology for this study. The continuous 
generation and long-term retention of mobile communications data are inherently 
related to the every day transactions of every mobile phone user. The views of 
mobile phone users are necessary to be captured as information about their lives is 
at the centre of debates around data retention. 
A grounded theory has been developed to provide an explanation for the 
phenomenon under study: the relationship between mobile phone location data and 
individuals' perceptions of privacy in the UK. The theory can be categorised as 
‘substantive’ as opposing to a ‘formal’ theory, since the collection of data and their 
interpretation focus on the explanation of a particular area. The chapter has in great 
detail explained each of the three data collection phases, including sampling and 
ethical considerations. A mobile phone location tracking pilot study, a survey and a 
series of interviews have been conducted to learn about individuals’ perceptions of 
privacy in relation to location data. The iterative cycle of data collection and analysis 
is an essential element of GTM and has helped to shape the on-going data 
collection.  
 
The following chapter, Chapter 4 - Presentation of Findings, discusses in detail the 
findings of all three data collection phases, pilot study, interviews and survey. 
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Chapter 4 Presentation of Findings: Mobile phone location tracking       
              Pilot study, Interviews and Survey 
 
This chapter provides a detailed account of the findings from the three empirical 
data collection phases. Accordingly, this chapter is structured into three parts; the 
first part discusses findings from the pilot study, the second part focuses on the 
analysis of the in-depth interviews and the third part presents findings from the 
survey. Grounded theory codes, memos and visual demonstrations of ideas provide 
an insight into how the final grounded theory categories were developed. The 
methodology for this study, which had been discussed and explained in the previous 
chapter, has guided the data collection as will illustrated in this chapter. The focus of 
this chapter is to present and discuss the results of the three phases of data 
collection, a comparison of those findings with the relevant academic literature will 
be provided in the following Chapter 5. 
 
Relationships between data collection phases 
The following methods were used to collect empirical data: mobile phone tracking, 
interviews and a questionnaire. As explained in the previous chapter,  
Chapter 3 - Methodology, data collection and analysis took place in several stages 
and in alternating sequences (see Table 4.1). This was an important and beneficial 
element of the grounded theory methodology.  
 
 
Table 4.1: Data collection and analysis phases 
 
Time line Data collection Data analysis Analysis method  
 
August and 
September 2004 
 
Interview phase 1 
- Conduct and 
transcribe 2 x 4 pilot 
study interviews 
 
- Track location of 5 
mobile phones over 4 
weeks 
 
 
Initial codes 
 
- Analyse data with 
content analysis 
matrix 
 
- Open coding with 
NVivo software 
 
March 2005 
Interview phase 2 
 
- Conduct and 
transcribe 5  
 
Focused 
codes 
 
- Focused coding 
with post-it notes and 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Memo 
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in-depth interviews 
 
NVivo software 
 
writing 
 
 
April to 
September 2005 
Survey 
- Develop and test 
pilot questionnaire 
- Distribute 
questionnaires paper-
based and online, 
N=477 
- Data entry into Excel 
- Data analysis with SPSS (frequency 
tables, graphs and cross-tabulations) 
 
 
October and  
November 2005 
Interview phase 3 
 
- Conduct and 
transcribe 5 in-depth 
interviews 
 
 
Focused 
codes 
 
- Focused coding 
with NVivo software 
 
September to 
December 2005 
 
 
Develop final categories 
 
 
 
To begin with, eight pilot study interviews were analysed with the help of a content-
analytic summary table, as shown in Appendix G. Four interviews were scheduled 
to take place before the tracking period in which the geographical location of the 
participants' mobile phones was requested once a week. After this four week period, 
each of the four participants was interviewed again. The results of this first interview 
phase are illustrated in the first part of this chapter (section 4.1.2). Following this, 
the pilot study interviews were analysed with help of the grounded theory 
methodology. A large number of initial and tentative codes were assigned to every 
interview. Subsequently, two more sets of interviews, representing interview phases 
two and three, were conducted and assigned with focused codes. In-between the 
latter two interview phases the questionnaire was distributed, for the most part 
paper-based but also via the internet. The results of the survey are discussed in the 
final part of this chapter (section 4.3, Presentation of survey findings). Memos were 
written during the entire process of collecting and analysing data, as this facilitated 
reflection on the collected data. A number of memos are shown throughout the 
chapter to demonstrate their importance for the development of the final categories 
(see section 4.2 Development of categories based on interview data).  
As described in Chapter 3 - Methodology, participants' names were replaced with 
code numbers to ensure their anonymity. Participants of the pilot study were 
assigned the numbers P116_F, P117_M, P118_F and P119_M. "M" indicates males 
and "F" stands for female. The codes for respondents of the second and third 
interview phase followed the same system, starting with number P131_F. 
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4.1 Mobile phone location tracking pilot study 
The pilot study set out to achieve the following two aims: for one part to evaluate the 
practical aspects of location tracking and for the other part to learn about 
participants impressions. Therefore, the pilot study involved two data collection 
methods. At first all four participants of the pilot study were interviewed, followed by 
a four week period in which their mobile phones were located at different times once 
a week. The participants could not know when a location request for their mobile 
phone was submitted. This collection of mobile phone location data is discussed in 
part one of this section. Part two presents findings from the interviews and focuses 
on the participants' experiences with location tracking. 
 
4.1.1 Part one: Mobile phone location tracking  
Five mobile phones, those of the four participants and the researcher's mobile 
phone, were registered with a commercial mobile phone tracking service provider 
(see Chapter 3 Methodology, section 3.2). 
 
The aims of the technical and procedural side of mobile phone location tracking 
were set out as follows:  
 
Aim 1: Reliability of the mobile phone location service 
  - How well does the service work for four UK service providers (Vodafone,       
  O2, Orange, T-Mobile)?  
- Do all location requests bring results? 
- Will the result be displayed within a reasonable amount of time, e.g. a few 
seconds? 
 
Aim 2: Text message reminder 
 - How often and when do mobile phone users registered with the service  
  receive text messages asking for their consent to be located? 
 
Aim 3: Accuracy of tracking results  
 - What is the accuracy of the service? 
- Are the results sufficiently accurate to identify the participant’s approximate  
  location? 
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4.1.1.1 About the four pilot study participants 
Both male participants (P117_M and P119_M) had owned their phone longer (5 and 
9 years) than the female participants P116 and P118 (2 and 4 years). Two 
participants had signed up for monthly paid mobile phone contracts and the other 
two used pre-paid mobile phone contracts. All participants happened to own a 
black-and-white Nokia handset and all stated that they would usually carry their 
phone with them and have it switched on 24 hours each day. All participants used 
their phones for calls and text messaging, some as an alarm clock and some 
occasionally for games. Only the participant P119_M sometimes used WAP 
services, and he owned his mobile phone for the longest period of time in 
comparison to the others (for details see Appendix G - Content-analytic summary 
matrix for pilot study interviews).  
 
4.1.1.2 Aim 1: Reliability of the mobile phone location service 
Tracking results were supplied by the commercial tracking service provider for all 
five mobile phones which were registered with the four UK mobile phone providers: 
Vodafone, O2, Orange and T-Mobile. Results of location requests were provided 
almost instantly after submitting the request and were reasonable accurate (see Aim 
3, below).  
Only a number of location requests for one of the two mobile phones using the T-
Mobile network (P116_F's phone) did not provide immediate results. For this 
participant, three out of four location tracks did not succeed on the first attempt. This 
was especially paradoxical, as on one occasion  P116_F had been contacted on her 
phone shortly before a location request, which meant that she had her phone 
switched on and was receiving a network signal.  
 
4.1.1.3 Aim 2: Text message reminder  
A few minutes after registering the participants’ phones with the tracking service 
provider, each phone received an activation text message. This text message 
contained a password which the participants had to forward to the researcher. 
Those passwords were then entered on the researcher's account at the tracking 
service provider's website. Shortly afterwards the participants received the following 
text message "You have authorised a.gorra@leedsmet.ac.uk to locate your phone. 
To stop call 0870XXXXX". 
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Figure 4.2: Least accurate track
(P116_F)
From now on the participants' phones could be located 24 hours a day. The same 
authorisation text message was received by all participants 4 and 8 weeks after the 
initial registration but then ceased to be received by all registered phones. The 
potential reason that this text message ceased to be sent might have been that no 
further tracking request were submitted after the pilot study ended. 
 
4.1.1.4 Aim 3: Accuracy of results  
The precision of the tracking results varied widely and mainly seemed to depend on 
the size of the cell in which the user stayed when the location request was 
submitted. The best 
precision with a radius of 
500 metres was achieved 
in Leeds city centre (see 
Figure 4.1), and the least 
accurate result was found 
near the sea side and with 
a radius of accuracy of 
11km  (Figure 4.2).  
Urban city centres have 
more mobile phone users 
and hence more masts 
and therefore smaller cells than places in the country side (see Chapter 2 - Part 2: 
Mobile phone location data, section 2.2.1.2).  
 
In addition to the precision in metres, “Eastings” and “Northings” were provided for 
each location request, which 
indicate coordinates on Ordnance 
Survey maps (see Figure 4.1). 
Those coordinates corresponded to 
the centre of the circle shown on the 
map and were for the majority of 
tracks very close to the participants' 
actual position. For an example, see 
Figure 4.1 above, which shows 
participant P119_M's location 
supplied by the tracking provider.  
Figure 4.1: Most accurate track (P119_M)
   P119_M 
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This location can be compared to the participant’s actual location determined by his 
postcode at time of tracking (see Figure 4.3). In Figure 4.3, below, the blue circle 
indicates the area provided by the tracking provider. The red circle shows 
participant P119_M's actual location. 
 
 
Figure 4.3: Actual location of P119_M 
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At first sight, the accuracy of 
the majority of location tracks 
seemed disappointing. The 
average precision of the 16 
location requests was 2.271 
km for the radius of the circle 
in which the participants' 
phone was located. This 
means that the area in which 
participants could have been 
at the time of tracking can be 
calculated with 16.2 km2. 
Figure 4.4 shows a location 
track with the approximate average precision to illustrate the size of the area. The 
red circle indicates the area in which the mobile phone user P117_M might have 
been when the location request was submitted.  
 
Figure 4.5 compares P117_M's actual location (red circle) to that provided by the 
tracking service provider (blue circle).  His actual location was identified with the 
help of the post code 
supplied by the participant 
in the final interview. This 
comparison shows that 
the average precision of 
location tracks within 
approximately 16 km2 fails 
to identify the precise 
location of the mobile 
phone user but instead 
only gives an indication of 
geographical location at 
the time of tracking. 
Figure 4.5: Actual location of P117_M
Figure 4.4: Location of P117_M, 
11th August 2004, 8pm (radius 2.237km)
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4.1.1.5 Summary Part 1: Mobile phone location tracking 
The majority of location requests were successful, with a small number having to be 
repeated, possibly due to network problems (see Aim 1). Overall, the tracking 
results have been acceptable in terms of indicating the participants' geographical 
location. For all 16 tracks, the participants' actual locations have been within the 
circle marked by the tracking service provider. On the one hand, the circles have 
indicated a large area, on the other hand however, in nearly all cases the 
participants' locations have been near the middle of the circle, as indicated by the 
Eastings and Northings (see Figure 4.2).  
 
In addition, even though the tracks were not able to show the exact location of the 
participant at the time of the track, in the form of a street name or postcode, this 
information could often be deduced. Assumptions could be made about participants' 
specific whereabouts based on other information known about the participants. 
These assumptions were mostly confirmed in the final interviews when the 
participants were questioned about their actual locations at the time of tracking. 
Hence, it can be argued that the current precision of the tracking system is sufficient 
for personal purposes, such as parents identifying the whereabouts of their children 
or employers interested in their employee's current location within a particular 
number of company sites. It could be claimed that the bigger the capture area in 
which those being tracked could be, the more valuable are location tracking results 
based on a postcode. For example, the participants of this study mostly stayed 
within the Leeds area during the four week tracking period. However, if they would 
have travelled all over the UK to visit a particular number of sites, the results would 
have indicated their approximate area and hence the nearest site could be 
identified. 
 
The tracking service provider utilised for this study appeared to make use of the  
cell-of-origin tracking method but it is technically possibly to determine a mobile 
phone handset's location with a much higher accuracy (see Chapter 2, section 2.2). 
An interview with the director of the tracking service provider could not provide any 
clarification, as he did not want to convey any technical details about their method of 
location tracking for reasons of business competition. This may indicate that the 
geographical location of mobile phones could constitute a worthwhile business 
opportunity and may be increasingly used commercially in the future (see also 
section 2.2.3 for existing location-based services). 
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4.1.2 Part two: Pilot study interviews 
The pilot study interviews aimed to learn about the participants' awareness of issues 
relating to mobile phone location data, such as 
 
Aim 1: Awareness and attitudes towards mobile phone location data 
Aim 2: Geographical location and privacy 
Aim 3: Participants’ definitions of privacy 
Aim 4: Potential influences of having their location identified on participants'  
           behaviour and regarding given scenarios 
Aim 5: Participants' concerns regarding misuse and storage of location data 
Aim 6: Privacy in relation to CCTV and loyalty cards 
 
The pilot study interviews were conducted in two stages: one interview with each of 
the four participants was conducted before and one after the four week mobile 
phone tracking period. Interview aims 1, 2 and 3 were addressed in the first 
interview and aims 4, 5 and 6 were addressed in the interviews after the tracking 
period. 
The interview data had been arranged in content-analytic summary tables to 
condense the data and to be able to compare the respondents’ statements for each 
question (see Figure 4.6, below). Each of the interview aims is discussed below and 
the complete content-analytic summary tables for all pilot study interviews are 
shown in Appendix G. Appendix H provides the complete transcripts of all 
interviews. 
 
4.1.2.1 Aim 1: Awareness and attitudes towards mobile phone location data 
Both female participants stated that prior to this study they had not been aware 
about their mobile phones transferring information about their approximate location 
to the mobile phone service providers. Both male participants explained that they 
had heard about location data before the study, such as from TV programs dealing 
with crime. None of the participants was aware of the legal requirements of mobile 
phone service providers to retain communications data for several months. All 
participants agreed that access to their location data should be granted to police 
and other security services. They also stressed that the information should not be 
used for commercial reasons. Regarding the ownership of location data, only one 
participant (P117_M) claimed he wanted to have access to this data and compared 
it with one’s credit history, which is accessible against a small fee (see Figure 4.6, 
below). P119_M suggested that “the people who generate it should look after it”, 
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which for him were the mobile phone service providers. Some of the comments 
suggested that mobile phone location data is not seen as very personal or a 
potential threat, as P119_M explains: “I can’t see it being used against me for 
anything”. 
 
 
 
Regarding the storage of data, all agreed that the police should be allowed access 
to mobile phone location data. And when asked in the final interview about who they 
would trust to store their location data, three out of four participants stated that they 
would rather believe in the service providers to keep the data safe than the 
government. In addition, P116_F mentioned that she would only grant powers to the 
police to distribute location data. P119_M expressed the opinion that judges should 
be the ones to decide about dissemination of data.  
 
4.1.2.2 Aim 2: Geographical location and privacy 
In the initial interview, all participants were invited to talk about their thoughts 
regarding their geographical location in relation to privacy. Two participants 
(P118_F, P119_M) did not seem to be concerned at all about information revealing 
their geographical location because they "would not do anything wrong". After the 
tracking period, P119_M stated that having his mobile phone tracked did not affect 
his behaviour and for this reason location tracking was not an invasion of his 
privacy. P118_F stated that as long as she was in a public space, everybody could 
see what she was doing anyhow. She explains "what we do in public is not private 
(…) privacy is only inside my house" (P118_F). However, both P116_F and 
P117_M mentioned that they would find it "very intrusive" and would "feel 
Figure 4.6: Extract from the content-analytic summary table
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uncomfortable" if their location would be constantly recorded and both stated later 
on that they valued privacy even though they did not have anything to hide.  
 
4.1.2.3 Aim 3: Participants’ definitions of privacy 
The descriptions of privacy in the participants' own words largely corresponded to 
concepts identified in the privacy related literature, such as territorial privacy, bodily 
privacy (see section 2.1.2). P116_F said privacy would be hard to define “because 
it does mean so many different things these days”. Two participants (P118_F, 
P119_M) focused in their description of privacy on their personal space or territory. 
"you should have a reasonable expectation of privacy in your bedroom" 
(P119_M), "Anything out of my house, there is no privacy there" (P118_F).  
The other two participants, P116_F and P117_M also talked about personal space 
but did not see it in restrictive terms of territorial boundaries but rather related it to 
the concept of liberty. Both highlighted their desire to have "individual freedom (..) 
being able to do things legally that not everyone knows about" (P116_F) and "to 
get away with doing what I want to do without other people finding out" 
(P117_M).  
 
4.1.2.4 Aim 4: Potential influences of having their location identified on 
participants' behaviour and regarding given scenarios 
All participants said that they had forgotten that their phones were registered with 
the tracking service provider after the four week tracking period. This might have 
been the main reason why all four stated that the tracking study had not influenced 
their behaviour in those four weeks. In the final pilot study interviews, the 
participants were asked to comment on two imaginary scenarios related to their 
work place and their partner. All responses were very similar. The participants said 
that they would not object to their partner wanting to track their mobile phone but all 
raised issues of trust. Some mentioned that they would want to know the reasons as 
to why their partner would want to track them. 
None of the four participants could imagine that if their manager tracked their work 
mobile phone, then this would have an effect on their behaviour. P117_M compared 
this to telephone and email logs, which some workplaces keep and said that as long 
as no one is confronted with those, employees just tend to forget about the potential 
of being monitored. P116_F, P118_F and P119_M mentioned that because they 
would not "do anything wrong", they would not be worried about having their 
location tracked at work. These answers related to another question in the final 
interview “Do you believe that people who have got nothing to hide should not worry 
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about their privacy?”. P118_F and P119_M agreed with the statement, whereas 
P116_F and P117_M believed that they should have some privacy even though 
they would not have anything to hide. This seeming contradiction between the 
desire to have privacy (in life in general) but not necessarily expect it at the work 
place, is picked up upon later in the final grounded theory categories (see 4.2.9 
Different areas relevant to privacy). 
 
4.1.2.5 Aim 5: Participants' concerns regarding misuse and storage of 
location data 
The female participants, P116_F and P118_F, articulated as the main concerns 
regarding the misuse of mobile phone location data that the data could fall into the 
hands of criminals. For example burglars would be able to identify, with the help of 
location data, when they would not be at home. Both male participants once more 
stressed that it was important for them to know the reasons for being tracked and 
whether under certain circumstances this data could possibly be used 'against 
them'. As P119_M explains "But I think it all depends why people are tracking, to 
be honest. And then you have to work out what is using it and what is misusing 
it". When asked if they would rather trust the service provider to keep their data safe 
or the government, all participants, except of P118_F who worked for the local 
council, stated that they would not trust the government but rather the service 
provider. The main reasons given for not trusting the government were security and 
data access issues and the majority of participants believed that the data to be 
handled more securely by the private sector. 
 
4.1.2.6 Aim 6: Privacy in relation to CCTV and loyalty cards 
None of the participants seemed to mind CCTV cameras recording their movements 
as the cameras were seen to offer benefits for society, such as security. In the same 
manner, the majority of participants did not perceive it as an invasion of their 
personal privacy when using loyalty cards, as they helped to save money. P118_F 
and P119_M pointed out that purchases took place in the public sphere and that this 
would not be private anyway. P116_F and P117_M, who seemed generally more 
conscious about privacy related issues, said that it would depend on the benefits 
received in exchange for personal data and that these benefits should be clearly 
communicated to the consumers up front. These statements can be seen as an 
early indicator of the Core category 'Balancing' (see section 4.2.4 Development of 
Core category 'Balancing). 
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4.1.3 Summary of pilot study interviews 
All four participants expressed similar opinions during the interviews which could be 
influenced by the somewhat homogenous sample of respondents who were all aged 
between 25 and 35. However, this was known beforehand and accepted in favour of 
gathering early data. Nevertheless, although the sample only consisted of a limited 
number of four people, a range of privacy-related opinions could be noted. One 
male and one female participant (P118_F and P119_M) did not seem to be 
concerned at all about their privacy in everyday life "I don't think I have got 
anything to hide and I am not worried about it" (P119_M). Whereas the two other 
participants, P116_F and P117_M, felt a bit more conscious about this subject. As 
P116_F put it "even though I haven't got anything to hide, I still like the fact that 
I have got some privacy". 
 
The use of location requests via a mobile phone tracking service provider was a 
useful way to make mobile phone location data more tangible. However, as all 
participants stated that they had forgotten about being registered with a tracking 
service provider, this approach ceased to be used for future interviews. The content-
analytic summary table had proven to be useful to summarise the interviews but did 
not support an in-depth analysis. This confirmed the researcher's decision to utilise 
a different approach to guide further data analysis and collection. For this reason, 
the pilot study interviews were analysed again using the grounded theory 
methodology (see section 3.3.5). The pilot study interviews were coded and 
followed by further more in-depth interviews based on initial findings without tracking 
participants' mobile phones. A discussion of these early interviews in relation to the 
relevant literature will follow in Chapter 5 Discussion and Analysis of Findings). 
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Figure 4.7: Initial interview codes in NVivo
 
4.1.4 False starts with initial coding in NVivo Software 
In order to analyse the pilot study interviews using the grounded theory 
methodology, four pilot study interviews were coded with the help of the qualitative 
analysis software NVivo. However, this first phase of coding was not successful as 
over one hundred codes were assigned to only four short interviews and some 
codes had only been used once or twice. Figure 4.7 shows a list of codes that were 
devised at this stage. In addition, it seemed that 
some of the codes and categories were 'forced 
upon the data’, as Glaser and Strauss would call it 
(Glaser and Strauss, 1967). In other words, some 
codes resembled themes from the literature and 
were not explicitly mentioned by the interviewees. 
Figure 4.8 below, shows some 
interview codes relating to 
privacy. These codes closely 
resembled categories of privacy 
commonly identified in the 
literature, such as ‘territorial’, 
‘bodily’ and ‘information’ privacy 
(see Chapter 2, section 2.1.2). 
These reasons made it 
necessary to adopt a different 
approach for coding. 
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Balancing privacy with other needs
big brother state ~ surveillance
bodily privacy
connecting of databases
fear of future privacy limitations
information privacy
not doing anything wrong
Privacy
Privacy equals control
privacy relating to action ~doing~
territorial privacy
Elements of privacy
 
 
Figure 4.8: Initial NVivo model ‘privacy’ for pilot study interviews 
 
 
4.1.5 Summary of initial coding of pilot study interviews 
As explained above, the initial coding of the pilot study interviews did not prove to 
be very successful. This was mainly due to the large number of codes and due to 
numerous codes that seemed to have been influenced by the relevant literature. 
Nevertheless, the codes provided some initial ideas and were used as guidance for 
the next stage of interviews. Most of the initial codes could be grouped into the five 
categories: ‘tracking’, data sharing’, privacy’, ‘data misuse/surveillance’ and ‘data 
safety’ (see Figure 4.9). The numbers in brackets show how often the codes were 
used, for example "[2/4]" indicates that the code has been used in 2 out of 4 
interviews. 
These codes and categories later on guided the development of the final categories, 
including the Core category 'Balancing' (see section 4.2.4 Development of Core 
category 'Balancing'). 
Privacy
El ts of privacy
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Figure 4.9: List of initial codes for pilot study interviews 
 
Another phenomenon that was highlighted by the initial codes was the mobile users' 
relationships to their mobile phones. This relationship varied from user to user and 
seemed to be related to the ways in which the phone was used, particularly to 
determine how others can get in touch with the user. Some codes around this area 
could be grouped together, as shown in Figure 4.10, below.  
 
 
Figure 4.10: Some initial codes for pilot study relating to mobile phone use and privacy 
 
Receiving Calls                            
|     |              | 
awareness (“not bothered  choice of taking calls enhanced           different ring tones 
whether I hear it ringing/bleep”) with caller-ID display            for diff. situations 
 
 
Privacy 
| 
Fear of future limitations of privacy; equals control; balancing privacy with other needs; not 
doing anything wrong 
- public  
- privacy relating to movement or action (doing) 
- perceiving privacy as only being inside one's house 
- not caring about doing something in public 
 
Relationship to phone 
| 
- symbol of freedom 
- dependence 
- disturbance 
- obsession 
- phone use is voluntary (not forced upon) 
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4.1.6 Verifying initial codes and categories 
It is important for a sole researcher to verify all codes and categories that are 
assigned to interview data to ensure that they are applied consistently 
(Miles and Huberman, 1994). In order to verify the initial codes set up in NVivo in 
the first phase of coding, the researcher started afresh by open coding the pilot 
study interviews with a different method than before. The interview transcripts were 
coded with pen and paper, and following this the codes were transferred onto post-it 
notes. The post-it notes could be arranged in groups and this helped to identify 
patterns in the data. Afterwards, the codes were then entered into a Microsoft Word 
document together with some comments and finally transferred back into a new 
NVivo file (see Chapter 3, section 3.3.5 and Appendix J). 
 
A comparison between new and previous assigned codes helped to clarify whether 
the codes were reliable and truly represented the empirical data. The comparison 
showed that past and present codes were similar to each other. However, initial 
codes were often either too narrow, too close to the interviewees’ exact words or 
seemed to mirror themes known from the literature. Hence, the benefit of re-coding 
the interviews consisted of reconfirming and refining the codes. Memos were used 
to reflect on changes in codes and the respondents’ perspectives on the subject 
area.  
 
Additional verification of categories was achieved by swapping a number of 
interview transcripts with a fellow student who also used the grounded theory 
approach. In a feedback session following this exchange, codes were discussed 
and confirmed. 
At the end of this lengthy process, a set of codes was devised that captured on a 
conceptual level what had been expressed in the interviews.  
 
4.1.6.1 Some initial concepts not confirmed 
The extended coding process proved to be an important element of data analysis 
and showed that some concepts were not as prevalent as previously identified in 
the initial coding phase. The category 'Legal', which had been identified in earlier 
coding exercises became redundant and three broad categories remained: mobile 
phone, privacy and location data. In addition, the researcher had initially presumed 
that CCTV would be related to individuals' perceptions of privacy and technology. 
This assumption was based on the relevant literature (see section 2.1.4) and also 
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potentially on a cultural bias. In the researcher's home country, Germany, the use of 
CCTV is not as wide-spread as in the UK, which is known to have the most CCTV 
cameras in Europe (see section 2.1.5). However, in contrast to the researcher’s 
initial expectations, the respondents did generally not identify CCTV as interrelated 
to privacy. Instead, many of the interviewees talked about the benefits of it and 
described a trade-off between privacy and security in relation to CCTV. Later on this 
would become relevant regarding the development of the Core category 'Balancing' 
(4.2.4 Development of Core category 'Balancing').  
 
Every interview conducted during this study was transcribed and coded immediately 
after it took place, which was an essential element of the grounded theory 
methodology. This routine helped to bring up early findings which could then shape 
subsequent interviews and therefore guide the data collection from early on. For 
example, initial results from interviews and survey showed that participants did not 
perceive topics such as CCTV and loyalty shop cards as related to privacy as 
strongly as anticipated by the researcher.  
Consequently, the second interview phase used the existing findings and codes as 
a guidance and followed Charmaz’ (2006) advice to sample along the categories in 
order to develop them. In other words, the researcher selected individuals as 
relevant to the initial codes and categories. The focus of subsequent interviews 
moved away from CCTV and loyalty cards and towards mobile phone use, privacy 
and location data. This meant for example to interview mobile phone users who 
perceived their phone as an important part of their lives and others who either did 
not have a phone or did not use it on a frequent basis. In addition, people older than 
those taking part in the pilot study were approached in subsequent interview 
phases. The interview conversation was structured around user’s relationships to 
their mobile phones, individual’s awareness and opinions of location data and 
definitions of privacy.  
 
The on-going interview analysis also influenced the interview questions. Questions 
regarding loyalty cards were omitted in the second interview phase ,and questions 
were more open-ended so that participants could talk more about what was 
important to them. Prompts were increasingly used to learn about respondents’ 
meanings of words instead of making assumptions. Appendix D shows the set of 
interview questions used for the second phase of interviews, Appendix E shows 
questions for the third interview phase. 
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4.2 Development of categories based on interview data  
The second phase of interviewing and coding helped to develop the initial codes 
further. This focused coding phase was more directed and selective than the initial 
phase of open coding. The focused codes were not meticulously assigned to every 
single line of interview transcript but made use of some initial concepts to focus on 
specific issues. These concepts were, for example, the respondents’ relationship 
with their phones and the status of the mobile phone in a person’s life.  
 
These focused codes have particularly guided the development of categories. In the 
following sections the development of the Core category 'Balancing' is described in 
detail to demonstrate the process of developing categories from codes. The 
development of categories was facilitated by two intertwined processes; for one part 
the iterative process of coding, which used different methods to help verify the 
codes, and for the other part reflecting on the codes, facilitated by memos, to 
establish links between codes and tentative categories. In order to give an insight 
into this process and to illustrate how the researcher has arrived from the interview 
transcripts at the final categories, codes, categories and memos will be presented 
and explained in the following sections. 
 
4.2.1 Summarising the focused codes  
Table 4.2, below, shows a list of codes that were devised based on the multi-staged 
coding process as described in the previous section and in the methodology chapter 
(see section 3.3.5 Interview coding). More detailed descriptions and comments to 
each of the focused codes can found in Appendix K - Quotes for codes.
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Table 4.2: List of focused codes 
 
The focused codes listed above are based on codes developed with help of post-it 
notes (see Appendix I). After adding comments and notes, each interview was re-
coded electronically with the NVivo software. By going through the process of 
coding the interviews on paper, noting the codes on post-it notes and entering those 
into the computer, the codes and categories were re-fined and reaffirmed. Appendix 
J provides an overview of the different coding phases. 
A_Phone usage 
 
A.1 [Phone ownership] 
a) [duration] 
b) [handset] 
c) [spending] 
d) [Contract type] 
 
A.2 [Features of 
phone being used] 
a) Type of feature 
b) Frequency of use 
 
A.3 [Attitude towards 
mobile phone 
technology] 
[Use phone to 
coordinate social 
interactions] 
 
A.4 [Use phone/ 
ringtone settings 
according to situation / 
location] 
A.5 [Being reachable 
(via phone)] 
A.6 [Being able to 
contact others] 
A.7 [take phone with 
me]  
 
A.8 [phone switched 
on] 
A.9 [Being dependent 
on phone] 
B_Location 
 
B.1 [location data] 
a) [generation] 
b) [storage] 
c) [ownership] 
d) [access] 
e) [dissemination] 
f) [regulation] 
g) [use] 
h) [reliability] / 
technical details 
i) [ accuracy] 
j) [history – realtime] 
k) [existence of loc 
data] 
 
B.2 [Having 
knowledge about a 
person's location] 
 
B.3 [Parents tracking 
children] 
 
B.4 [Feeling about 
one's location] 
 
C_Privacy 
 
C.1 [space] 
C.2 [controlling information] 
C.3 [liberty (to do things)] 
C.4 [bodily privacy] 
C.5 [balancing act] 
 
 
D_Emotions, "me" 
 
D.1 [trust] 
D.2 [being/ feeling respected]
  
D.3 [worrying] 
D.4 [thoughts about future] 
 
D.5 [data/information about 
me] 
a) access 
b) financial 
c) share 
 
 
E_"State", "they" 
 
E.1 [Law] 
 
E.2 [CCTV] 
 
E.3 [Attitude towards 
government] 
 
a) Menwith Hill 
 
E.4 [Big brother (state)] 
E.5 [safety-security] 
 
E.6 [Crime] 
a) serious crime 
E.7 [terrorism] 
E.8 [ID card] 
 
 
 
F_Other 
 
F.1 [Other people 
knowing what I am 
doing] 
 
F.2 [Doing s.th. wrong] 
 
F.3 [being monitored] 
 
F.4 [use of data]  
a)  share data 
b) my knowledge about 
it 
c) consent 
d) [combining data] 
 
F.5 Attitude towards 
commercial businesses 
] having knowledge 
about me 
a) Marketing 
b) Selling of personal 
information 
c) junk mail 
d) loyalty cards 
 
F.6 [other people] 
 
F.7 [being anonymous] 
F.8 [Other people 
knowing about aspects 
of my life] 
F.9 [reason]  
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The final list of codes could be grouped into five themes that were of importance to 
interviewees in relation to mobile phone location data and privacy (see Table 4.3, 
below). 
 
Table 4.3: Groups of focused codes and their descriptions 
Groups or themes of 
focused codes Description of the code 
 
1. Mobile phone use 
 
 
 Phone ownership (details about mobile phone contract, usage, 
settings and reasons for getting a phone) 
 Features of phone used (use ring tone settings according to 
situation) 
 Awareness of & attitude towards technology, relationship to phone, 
including feelings (being contactable via phone, being dependent 
on phone) 
 
 
2. Location 
 
 
 Location data (awareness of, thoughts about regulation, storage, 
technical aspects, ownership, access, dissemination) 
 Implications of knowledge of one's location (feelings/thoughts 
about one's location, use and misuse of location data: parents & 
children, workplace  
 
 
3. Privacy 
 
 
 Participants' definitions, what is it about (space, controlling 
information, liberty to do things, bodily privacy) 
 Balancing act 
 
 
4. Emotions, "me" 
 
 
 Trust, feeling respected, worrying, thoughts about future, 
information about me: financial, access to information, sharing 
information 
 
 
5. State, "they" 
 
 
 CCTV, attitude towards government, Big brother, safety/security, 
crime, terrorism, ID cards 
 Other people knowing what I am doing, (not) doing something 
wrong, being anonymous  
 Attitude towards commercial businesses (loyalty cards, etc) 
 
 
Coding interviews constitutes an important link between collecting data and 
developing theory. Grouping the codes under different headings or themes, together 
with writing memos has helped to make sense of the respondents’ statements. 
Particularly relevant codes have been explored in further depths, for example by 
looking at their properties and dimensions. These could then be interlinked and 
related to other codes to devise more abstract categories. Categories represent the 
basis for the developing grounded theory, which aims to explain and sometimes 
predict phenomena based on empirical data (see Methodology chapter section 
3.1.1.2). 
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The following sections illustrate how the focused codes were used to develop the 
final categories. Memos allow an insight into the analytical process guided by 
grounded theory methodology. At the end of this lengthy process of coding, memoing 
and developing categories, a grounded theory was developed explaining individuals' 
views of privacy in relation to mobile phone location data (see Chapter 5). 
 
4.2.2 Using a situational map to appreciate the wider social context 
While conducting and analysing the interviews it became evident that location data 
and privacy could not be seen in isolation but needed to be placed within the wider 
political and social context that the respondents were experiencing at the time. In 
addition, the study aimed at developing a substantive grounded theory that 
interpreted and explained the subject area in a specific setting. In other words to 
describe individuals' views of privacy in relation to mobile phone location data within 
the context known to the participants of the study. It was not the aim of this study to 
make the findings generalisable across the UK or the rest of Europe. This would 
have been addressed by a more general theory, known as a formal grounded 
theory, which is less specific to a time, group and place but considers a wider range 
of settings, concerns and problems, taking into account a variety of conditions (for 
more detail about substantive and formal theories, see Chapter 3 Methodology, 
section 3.1.3). In order to help recognise the interviewees' micro and macro 
relationships, which may have shaped their perceptions of mobile phone location 
data and privacy, a situational map was constructed. Developing the situational map 
helped to identify the elements in the situation of concern and to examine the 
relations amongst them. Situational maps can also assist in deciding which GT 
codes to keep and pursue and which are no longer important (Clarke, 2005).  
 
The starting point for a situational map is the situation of concern, which can be 
described for this study as follows: Mobile phone location data has to do with 
privacy as it is data generated by every mobile phone and hence reveals 
information about the mobile phone user. However, the matter is whether mobile 
phone users perceive location data as personal data and therefore would like to 
claim control over it. This also makes it a political issue as mobile phone service 
providers are required to store the data, which is then accessed by governmental 
organisations. The situational map, below, lays out the most important human and 
non-human elements in the situation of concern. Ten categories or areas as 
suggested by Clarke (2005, p. 90), have been used for reflection and ideas (see 
Table 4.4, below). A memo was written to keep a log of those ideas (see Memo 1, 
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below). When using grounded theory methodology, memos reflect the researcher’s 
thoughts and ideas at the time of data collection and analysis. A discussion of the 
empirical findings in relation to the literature will therefore be provided in the 
following Chapter 5. 
 
Table 4.4: Situational Map (after Clarke, 2005) 
Individual Human Actors 
 
Unorganised private individuals, such as 
- mobile phone users 
- non-mobile phone users 
- criminals 
- terrorists 
 
 
Collective Human actors 
 
Organisations 
- mobile phone service providers (such as O2, ..) 
- commercial organisations (retail businesses, 
marketing) 
- UK government, EU commission ('legislative') 
- police ('executive') 
- emergency services 
- NGOs (e.g. Privacy International, Statewatch) 
- terrorist and criminal organisations 
Political Elements 
 
- political parties 
- government / parliament 
 {the gov.'s 'task' to provide national 
 security} 
- NGOs (see also Organisations) 
 
- is terrorism a political element? 
 
What if there would a lesser terrorist threat?  
Would data retention not be an issue then? 
Would any other uses for the retention of 
communications data be advocated?  
Economic Elements 
 
'Condition' of  
- economy (fairly good) 
- particular industries 
 - mobile phone - handset 
    - service provider 
    - network infrastructure 
 - internet service providers 
 
-> What if the economy was worse than now, 
would the situation of data retention be the same?  
Would this mean- fewer handsets on the market (& 
mobile phones not as wide spread in society) 
 
- data storage costs could be too high to make blanket 
data retention possible 
Temporal elements 
 
- 9/11, terrorist attacks in Sept. 2001 in the US 
- 07/07, London terrorist attacks in July 2005 
 
{I call these 'temporal' because these events have 
lasted only for a few moments. However, the 
political and social impacts have lasted much 
longer.} 
Major issues / debates 
 
In the daily politics 
- security and ‘fight against terrorism’ vs. civil liberties 
and privacy (particularly after London terrorist attacks, 
July 2005) 
 
- ID cards 
 
Non-Human Elements 
 
Technologies in general 
- trend towards digital generation, access and 
storage of data,  
- increasing access to broadband internet, 
ubiquitous electronic communications (email, chat, 
voice-over-IP)  
 
Mobile phone technologies  
- handsets: mobile phones as versatile lifestyle 
accessories: music player, organiser, games, .. 
- mobile phone network infrastructure: 99.9% 
coverage in UK 
 
Socio-cultural / symbolic elements 
 
- the British population does not want to have 
(biometric) ID cards 
 
- mobile phones as 'life style accessory', a 'must' for 
many: OAPs to school kids (safety, connectivity, 
convenience) 
 
- Britain's multicultural society 
 
Spatial Elements 
 
- spaces relevant for situation. How accurate is 
location data? 
- geographical aspects of terrorism: (Yorkshire), 
UK, Europe, the world 
Related discourse 
 
- Normative expectations "in the name of terrorism, I 
am happy/expected to sacrifice my privacy." 
- mass media: terrorism needs fighting with all means 
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Memo about situational map, taking into account power relationships 
 
Mapping the social conditions that might be experienced by interviewees in daily life 
has helped me to highlight the position and influence of stakeholders involved with 
location data, such as NGOs and security services. 
The situational map has emphasised the relevance of the phenomenon terrorism, 
which can be classified as political element. Terrorism has an impact on major issues 
and debates of Britain as a nation. Currently, there are numerous discussions in the 
media, revolving around national security, such as ID cards and the introduction of new 
terrorism laws. Temporal events such as the 07 July 2005 London terrorist bombings 
have added to the increased media coverage about national security. Particular these 
temporal events have led to the normative expectation of the government towards the 
general public to sacrifice some privacy in the name of terrorism; 'there is nothing to 
fear for citizens if there is nothing to hide'. 
And of course the widespread use of electronic communications, predominantly the 
mobile phone, has a great impact on the situation of concern. All these reasons have 
turned the long-term retention of communications data (incl. location data) into a widely 
accepted utensil in the government's tool box for the safeguarding of national security 
and fight against terrorism.  
Related to all these human and non-human elements is the notion of power. 
Respondents mention a link to power regarding different data collections and seem to 
perceive a varying degree of power of other actors depending on the area in their life 
(see graphic below). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Implications of power 
abuse/misuse are different for 
all three areas. 
What about? 
- trust 
- confidence 
- influence (related to power) 
Commercial Companies. I get the 
feeling that ‘consumer rights’ are well 
understood by respondents. And that 
the commercial companies haven’t 
got much power. 
 
Individuals, Friends/family have  
Other individuals  
have power but in a different way. 
People can track me down if I give 
them my mobile phone number 
(P133_M), ‘I choose what I tell’ 
(P117_M) 
The government has the most 
power (to use data against me) 
 Who has power? 
Memo 1: Memo about situational map, taking into account power relationships
Chapter 4 - Presentation of Findings 
 
Andrea Gorra          Page 139 
Participant P136_F provides the following reflection on the retention of mobile 
phone location data: 
"The fact that like, it’s a way of controlling people. People’s movements. 
And the fact that like that you are thinking, you are being watched and there 
is government organisations and like people who have more power and they 
are able to .. kind of .. manipulate your actions or control you through fear 
of .. kind of doing wrong or .. ehm, .. sort of leading towards, leaning in 
towards more criminal activities or something. So, .." (P136_F). 
 
Memo 1, above, together with P136_F’s thoughts (see quote, above) about power 
relationships have prompted the researcher to further explore the relationship that 
individuals have with the government and the importance of power. 
 
4.2.3 Category 'Process of monitoring and use of data'  
The following issues have been raised by the participants when reflecting on 
individuals or organisations having access to their personal information and to their 
mobile phone location data:  
 
• Who is tracking 
• Reason for tracking, why? 
• Concern about what might happen to collected data (this depends on who is 
tracking – see interview P117_M), What is data used for (P135_F) 
How is data used (P134_F)  
• Who is going to have access to information (P135_F, P131_F) 
• Consent of user is needed to pass data onto somebody else (P135_F, 
P134_F, P131_F) 
 
For the participants of this study it is important to know who uses and has access to 
their mobile phone location data. Often people stress the point that the act of being 
monitored or ’observed’ does not concern them (e.g. 119_M, 118_F). This 
particularly became evident in the pilot study, where the participants could have 
potentially been ‘under surveillance’ at any time while taking part in the study. 
P119_M's quote below shows that it seems to be most important to respondents to 
know the reason for being monitored.  
 
“So, it's not necessarily somebody tracking you, it's more what they do with it. 
And the reasons why they are tracking you is more important than actually 
being tracked yourself” (P117_M). 
 
“You'd wonder why. (..) But eh, yeah, unless they'd come up with some 
reason which I can't think of other than but, some justifiable reason. Then 
fair enough” (119_M). 
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Respondents believe that depending on who has got access to the data will have an 
effect on the use of data. Who has got access to my data and how much ‘power’ 
they have got defines the scope for potential misuse. This is seen as being far more 
important than the ‘process‘ of being monitored. 
The respondents trail of thoughts can be conceptualised as illustrated below (Figure 
4.11, below).  
 
The respondents describe the process of being monitored, such as for example by a 
CCTV camera, as justified by a reason, such as recording images for future crime 
investigations. This reason for monitoring is perceived to drive or influence the use 
of the collected data. 
For the respondents of this study, the actual act or process of being monitored, 
particularly having their location data recorded, is the least important step in this 
chain of processes (Figure 4.11). Of most importance to the respondents is the 
actual use of data, which relates to Participants’ privacy definitions (section 4.2.10). 
In addition, all three steps of the monitoring process are affected by who is 
monitoring and their position of power in relation to the subject under scrutiny. 
 
4.2.4 Development of Core category 'Balancing' 
One concept that occurred frequently in the interviewees' accounts was the 
idea of 'balancing', in the sense of weighing up different needs or requirements, 
such as privacy with security. 'Balancing' was introduced as a category early on and 
had been promoted as the core category, also known as the central category (see 
section 3.1.1.2) because it links up all other themes and findings. 
In interviews and survey responses, participants frequently mentioned different 
areas in life in which privacy plays a role: Firstly, friends, family and other social 
contacts, secondly, commercial organisations and thirdly, the government. In each 
of these three areas balancing takes place in relation to privacy. Further detail to 
this category will be provided in section 4.2.9 Different areas relevant to privacy, 
below. 
The following section outlines the development of the Core category 'Balancing' to 
provide an example for the coding process as described in the methodology chapter 
  
 Being monitored 
  Reasons for  
monitoring 
is justified by influences 
 
 Use of data 
Least important Most important 
Figure 4.11: Steps of a monitoring process and their importance
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(see section 3.1.2 Use of GTM for this study).The category balancing was included 
from early on in the form of an ‘In vivo code’, which is a code that uses a 
respondent’s words as a code name. In addition, ‘Balancing privacy with other 
needs’ was already devised in the first phase of coding the pilot study interviews in 
NVivo (see Figure 4.8, above). 
 
Post-It Notes - ‘trading privacy’ 
The coding process started off with writing the codes with a pen on the margins of 
interview transcripts. Following this the majority of codes was jotted down onto post-
it notes (see Appendix I). In this coding phase the code ‘trading privacy’ was noted 
on a post-it note, based on P_117_M's description of his feelings about using 
location data for safety purposes (see Figure 4.12, below). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The codes written on the post-it notes were arranged into groups and different 
codes related to the concept of balancing or trading were assembled together.  
 
Use of NVivo software - ‘Balancing Act’ 
After coding more interviews and making 
comparison between them, the NVivo 
software was used. The code ‘Balancing Act’ 
was established within the category privacy, 
together with several other sub-codes (see 
Figure 4.13) 
 
 
 
                                           Figure 4.12: Example on post-it notes for code 'trading privacy' 
Figure 4.13: Focused codes about Balancing in NVivo 
[trading privacy]
- security 
- consumer benefits 
 
dimensions: awareness, agree, 
disagree       
Post-it note reads:
P117_M
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The sub-codes of ‘Balancing Act’, such as ‘Balance privacy with security’ and 
‘Exchanging personal data for benefit’ capture the range of situations that this code 
can be applied to. These different situations correspond to the distinction of different 
areas of privacy, which later on would become one of the final categories (see 
section 4.2.9 Different areas relevant to privacy). 
 
Respondents used expressions such as “discourse” (P131_F) or “grey area” 
(P133_M) to describe the balancing act between privacy and security. 
 
 “Pphh.. (sighs) [pause], Ehm, [pause] that's a bit of a discourse. Because 
I am for the one being, you know civil liberties and they shouldn't be out to 
track you and do this and do that. But then if it does help track people like 
that girl from New Year’s Eve or terrorism, then I think maybe that's a good 
thing” (P131_F). 
 
Others described a balancing act between privacy and security regarding CCTV and 
between getting consumer benefits and releasing personal information with shop 
loyalty cards, see Figure 4.14, below.  
 
 
Figure 4.14: Interview excerpt for code 'Balancing Act' in NVivo (P117_M) 
 
 
Whilst reading and coding the interview transcripts, the researcher has captured her 
thoughts and ideas about the category balancing act in memos, such as for 
example the following: 
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Memo ‘Balancing security and privacy’  
And then there is the issue of people being okay with the government collecting 
data on people because it is for safety and security reasons. 
People seem to be in two minds, they don’t seem to be too sure whether it would 
be useful to store location data or not. On the one hand, if the data was stored, it 
could be used for crime investigations and emergencies. However, on the other 
hand, storage of everyone’s data would mean interfere with individuals’ 
needs/perceptions of privacy. This is a very complex issue with many “variables”.  
Should the data be stored for everyone or just for some suspects? In other words, 
which one should be preferred ‘data retention’ or ‘data preservation’? In the latter 
case, there would be a difficulty if someone would only become a suspect after the 
crime or terrorism act has occurred. This is where the participants start using terms 
such as ‘discourse’, a ‘grey area’. However, this dilemma could potentially be 
solved by informing people as soon as they purchase a phone that their 
communications data might be recorded. All participants would welcome a more 
open policy regarding data retention that is more information provided by mobile 
phone service providers and the government. It would be possible to integrate 
‘checks and safeguards’ (P135_F) into the policy scheme. People feel that there 
should be an independent panel (of judges) to decide in every case (of use of 
location data or communications data) whether the use of communications data for 
crime investigations is justified by the circumstances. This is the relevant code to 
use here: [code: justify measure of crime].  
 
Memo 2: Balancing security and privacy 
 
After establishing some tentative categories, such as ‘Balancing act’ and different 
areas of privacy, such as social contacts and the government, potential links 
between these categories and individuals’ attitudes to mobile phones were 
explored.  
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Figure 4.15: Codes relating to mobile phone use
 
4.2.5 Use of mobile phone settings to regulate privacy in the social area  
Every interview was initiated by inviting people to talk about their mobile phone and 
mobile phone use in general. It quickly 
became apparent that mobile phone use 
- the participants’ own use and that of 
others - was perceived as related to 
privacy. Numerous codes regarding 
mobile phone were devised, as can be 
seen in Figure 4.15 (right). Some codes 
related to the use of mobile phones, 
such as the code ‘having the phone 
switched on’ or ‘features of phone used’. 
The interviewees talked about how they 
used their phones in day-to-day life and 
the researcher identified that many used 
their phone to manage or influence how 
others would get in touch with them. 
The code ‘use of mobile phone to 
manage social interactions’ was applied 
to sections such as the following, where 
P117_M describes the different phone 
setting he uses during a normal day: 
 
P117_M: “I generally have it 
switched on all the time but 
usually have it on discreet for 
most of the day. This is when I am 
at work, I don’t want to be 
disturbed and when I am at home too knackered to pick it up by large. 
 
A: and you also have it switched on at night? 
 
P117_M: Yeah, I do but I tend to put it on silent because eh.. you know 
people tend to text message and stupid things. 
 
At the same time as talking about mobile phone settings, respondents described 
particular routines related to their phone usage, such as   
 
"And then, ehm, it goes on in the morning. Because I got a phone at side of 
bed, you see. And I just look at it, like when I go to my lunch. And go over to 
me office to have my lunch and have a quick look and do any phone calls or 
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text messages if I need to. And then mid afternoon and evening when I get 
home, before I sit down to watch TV" (P135_F).  
To capture this phenomenon of phone use, the category ‘use of mobile phone to 
manage social interactions’ was developed. This category encapsulated the 
different codes relating to mobile phone use.  
 
Following Strauss and Corbin’s (1998) advice, properties and dimensions were 
developed for some of the tentative categories to map out the characteristics of 
those and to explore their meanings (for detail see section 3.1.1.2). Dimensions can 
be used to recognise variations of that category and of the final theory. Table 4.5, 
below, provides an illustration of the properties and dimensions of the category 'Use 
of phone to regulate social interactions'.  
 
Table 4.5: Category 'Use of phone to regulate social interactions' and its properties 
and dimensions 
 
Category Properties Dimensions 
Use phone to 'regulate' 
social interactions  
- Ring tone settings 
 
ring, vibrate, silent, mute, 
switched off 
 - Features of phone used voicemail on/off 
 - Phone with person  Yes, no, usually rarely 
 
The following memo has helped to reflect on the category ‘use of phone to regulate 
social interactions’ and its meaning. 
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Figure 4.16: Category 'Using phone as a 
tool' showing properties and dimensions
'Using the phone as a tool'
Purpose of having/using a phone 
Dimensions 
- safety reasons
- stay in contact 
- manage life 
- to ‘kill’ time 
Properties 
- Purpose 
- (Perceived) usability of phone
- (Technical) curiosity practice   
         [time and/or opportunity] 
4.2.6 Memo ‘Using the mobile phone as a tool’ 
Memo 3: Using the mobile phone as a tool1 
 
Figure 4.16 illustrates the category 
‘using the phone as a tool’ and shows 
its properties and dimensions. A 
phone is seen as a means of 
communication but also as a fashion 
accessories and a handy gadget, 
such as music player, camera. A 
phone can be used for various 
purposes, and voice communication 
is only one of them. Mobile phones 
can be utilised to make someone 
available to others and to contact 
others, to organise or manage one's 
life from doctor's appointments to 
                                                
1 The term 'having' (a phone) instead of 'using' is utilised deliberately in this context, as these 
routines are evident even if the phone is not used for communication. 
Memo and 'Relational statement' about mobile phone use (after Strauss 
and Corbin, 1998) 
 
The mobile phone is used as a means of communication, either direct (voice 
calls) or temporally delayed (text, voicemail). The mobile phone has become part 
of everyday life, part of family, work and emergency. People develop certain 
routines when having1 a phone. Many people do not leave the house without 
their keys, their wallet and their mobile phone, as the following respondent 
describes: 
 
"I think, they've just become part of life now, haven't they? I now, as soon 
as I get up in the morning and put my clothes on, the first thing I do is 
put my mobile into my pocket" (P137_F). 
 
Strauss and Corbin (1998) advocate the use of so-called relational statements to 
explore a phenomenon.  
 
1) When some people are bored or have some spare time on their hands, such 
as when travelling (see P119_M),  the mobile phone is considered a welcome 
tool to 'kill time'. It enables to get in contact with others, play games or access 
the internet via WAP (to access published information). 
 
2) 'Using the mobile phone for non-(direct) communication' (games, WAP, radio; 
text) is the action/interaction to 'kill time' 
 
3) As a consequence of 'trying out the functions of a mobile phone', those 
people are likely to acquire 'a good knowledge about using a mobile phone' and 
are able to 'use their phone as a tool' (i.e. be in charge of phone, be able to use 
/ f )
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babysitting. Phones are most frequently carried for safety reasons (car break down, 
fewer phone boxes around and so on). Phones can be used to 'kill time' with help of 
functions, such as games, radio, camera, calendar, internet access (WAP). This 
seems to be more pertinent to the younger generations, who have not got a set 
work place with constant internet access but spend a lot of time on the move. There 
are skills to be learned when using a phone and these need time and practice. In 
addition, perceived usability of the phone plays a role and can encompass attitudes 
towards writing text messages and the motivation to adapt to small screens. 
The traditional landline phone number is for one place, a mobile phone number is 
for one person. Mobile phones tend to be carried 24 hours per day, everyday by the 
respondents (see section 4.3.2, below). Hence, the mobile phone is a very personal 
device and relates mainly to the area of privacy of social contacts and not as much 
to commercial companies and government. 
 
The method of breaking down a category into its properties and dimensions, as 
advocated by Strauss and Corbin (1998), proved to be of limited use for the 
analysis. For some categories it was possible to devise a number of suitable 
properties. However, the researcher decided that for most of the categories it did 
not make sense to assign properties and dimensions, as this forced the qualitative 
data into a rigid framework without adding much value to interpretation of data and 
analysis. Instead Charmaz’ (2006) approach was adopted, which uses the less 
restrictive way of making comparisons between data (see also section 3.1.1.1).  
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4.2.7 Different types of mobile phone users 
The primary purpose for which a mobile phone tends to be used depends on the 
type of mobile phone user. Even though it has not been the aim of this study to 
identify different types of mobile phone users, the variations in phone use between 
the different respondents could not be overlooked when conducting and analysing 
the interviews. Principally two types of users can be distinguished: 
 
Table 4.6: Two types of phone users 
Type of user Low User Power User 
 
 
User 
characteristics  
 
- low spending 
- older handset model 
- often on pay-as-you-go contract 
- phone mainly for 
   - travel 
   - emergency 
   - sometimes shared with someone  
     else 
 
- higher spending 
- colour phone, often with camera 
- monthly contract 
- use phone as 'toy' (games, used 
for non-communications) 
- sometimes the only phone, no 
landline. 
 
Power users use their phone on a day-to-day basis and tend to be very familiar with 
the settings of their phone. These users tend to carry their phone at all times and 
use their phone as a 'tool', for example for storing information, games, to keep in 
contact with peers. Power users often deliberately use settings to ‘regulate their 
contactability' (see 4.2.8 Category contactability), for example by switching the 
phone to voicemail, and or setting the phone on silent or vibration.  
 
“Yeah, I think, I used to put it on silent, like, when I am at work, if I am like 
doing visits for work, I had it on silent or sometimes I might turn it off 
then” (P136_F). 
 
Low users tend not to use their phone on a regular basis but mainly for travelling 
and security or safety related purposes. The mobile phone does not play an 
important role in the everyday lives of these users. Low users can usually be 
reached by family and friends by other means of communication than their mobile 
phone. Many low users tend to view the relationship between phone and 
contactability as critical or disapprove of it, as for example P132_M explains "I hate 
phones, I only got it to run trips. To be contactable”. These users feel annoyed 
with mobile phones and often purposely do not carry their phone or do not give out 
their number, as P113_M reveals:  
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"Ehm, I was travelling quite a lot I think at the time. So, we got it [the mobile 
phone] just to be able to call home. Or in case the car broke down. I don't 
give my number to anybody - ever. Not even my mother. Like it's kind of a 
transmitting device, not a receiving device" (P133_M). 
 
Monetary constraints, age, family status (single or with family) have an effect on the 
use of a phone and hence on the mobile phone user category. However, these 
influences related to demography were not explored in detail as this was not directly 
related to privacy and hence not an aim of this study. 
 
4.2.8 Category contactability 
A mobile phone can be used to manage or regulate social interactions, as described 
in previous sections, such as section 4.2.5 (Use of mobile phone settings to regulate 
privacy in the social area). The traditional communications model 'Sender-Receiver' 
has been modified to reflect this role of the mobile phone.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.17: Communications model ‘sender -> message -> gateway -> receiver’ 
 
The mobile phone acts as a gateway to a person through which the message is 
delivered from the sender to the receiver (Figure 4.17, above). This model has 
inspired the researcher to write the following memo about contactability. 
M
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Message Gateway Sender Receiver 
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Memo 4: Memo about contactability 
 
The mobile phone has got the ability to interrupt on-going conversations and to take 
over the mobile phone owner's time while he or she is still physically occupied with 
other social contacts. This is seen by some people as a negative side of mobile 
phones. For example, respondents perceive it as rude behaviour to be on the phone 
while being with someone else.  
Memo about Contactability 
I can ring out to arrange meetings with friends but I can also give out my number and 
receive phone calls from people. People are reachable through their mobile phone. It 
is one of several 'gateways' to a person, it gives others access to a person / someone. 
Other gateways might be other means of getting in contact with a person, such as the 
landline telephone, email and of course face-to-face contact. 
 
Other people’s access to oneself through the mobile phone can be summarised as 
'contactability'. The concept of contactability is related to a person's feeling of having 
privacy. Some people feel that being constantly available to others means a reduction 
in their liberties and a restriction of their privacy. They do not want to be reachable at 
all times. Others do not mind. Some people mention that other people talking on the 
phone impacts on their privacy. Possibly, because the person listening to someone 
else's conversations is annoyed by this behaviour. This can be summarised by the 
following graphic: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[CONTACTABILITY] affect
Are these affected by people’s 'use of phone as a 
tool'? 
Do ‘power users’ behave differently than ‘low users’?
Mobile phone settings / 
‘routines’ 
- ring tone settings  
- phone on/off,  
- phone with person or not 
Perception 
of privacy 
Figure 4.18: Relationship between phone settings, contactability and privacy
GT Category
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".. in a railway carriage and somebody is like yakking on their mobile phone 
and like that's invading my privacy. And also I think if you are out with 
somebody and then their phone goes, yeah, and they spend all the time 
talking to their phone and not to you. Well, I don't know whether that's 
privacy but that's kind of .. I think that's wrong anyway, rude, whatever" 
(P133_M). 
 
Phone settings tend to be used by phone users to 'regulate their contactability’ (see 
Figure 4.18, above). Phone settings can consist of ring tone settings, such as ring, 
vibrate, silent or switched off. For example some phone users, carry their phone at 
all times and have it on a setting which allows them to be immediately aware when 
the phone rings. Others only carry their phone sporadically, do not use voice mail 
and if they have got their phone on them, they put it on silent. This means, that 
when a phone call arrives, it might potentially go unnoticed because it is only 
signalled by one short beep. Hence, the settings of a phone have an effect on a 
person's availability to others, in this context known as 'contactability'. Mobile Phone 
users develop certain routines regarding carrying their phone and phone settings, 
such as putting the phone on silent when arriving at work.  
 
Some participants have the feeling that they can be "tracked down" (P133_M) when 
they have got their phone with them. Others feel that being constantly available to 
others has an impact on their ‘space’ or in other words their privacy, see P134_F’s 
comments below: 
 
"You know one of the reasons why I necessarily won't have my phone turned 
on is because I don't want people to be able to contact me all the time. I 
don't want .. you know I want to have that .. space" (P134_F). 
 
The participants’ use of their mobile phone to regulate how and when others gain 
access to them supports this study's claim that respondents see privacy 
predominantly as related to themselves and their own lives. Hence, arguments by 
the literature and civil liberties organisations (see section 2.2.5) that the routine and 
long-term retention of communications data is a form of surveillance and can 
potentially have negative effects on society, do not seem to relate to the view of 
privacy as voiced by the participants. This discrepancy will be discussed in further 
detail in Chapter 5 (section 5.3).
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Friends / Family
Commercial 
Businesses 
Government 
Figure 4.19: Three different areas of 
privacy 
 
4.2.9 Different areas relevant to privacy 
Individuals’ descriptions of privacy vary depending on the context, as indicated in 
previous sections. This perception of different areas of privacy became particularly 
evident when one of the interviewees talked about privacy as being on different 
'scales', with each scale impacting on different areas of a person’s life: 
 
“Well, I suppose, it depends what you mean by privacy, really. And like how 
you define it and .. in what sense you mean. 'cause I think, there is privacy 
on different scales. Like there is like on smaller scale in your own 
immediate lifestyle and sort of family and friends and your home.. and 
your workplace. And then there's like the wider sense in terms of, you've got 
down here CCTV and data tracking [points to my sheet with interview 
questions] and stuff like that, location data” (P136_F). 
 
P136_F's depiction of privacy summarises other interviewees' descriptions of 
privacy. Most respondents distinguish the 
following different areas of their life in connection 
to privacy (see Figure 4.19): 
 
- Friends and family - social interactions (blue circle) 
- Commercial companies - marketing, loyalty cards    
        (red circle) 
- Government - CCTV, Data retention (green circle) 
 
These different scales or areas of privacy were presented 
to participants in subsequent interviews to obtain their 
comments (see for example Appendix H, interviews 17  
and 18). Following the constructive responses, the initial  
theoretical framework of perceptions of privacy had been  
developed and is depicted in Figure 4.19, right. 
The smallest scale of privacy includes a person’s closest social environment, which 
can be family, friends and sometimes work colleagues (blue circle). The person 
knows these people and is known to them. Social interaction takes place and there 
are common friends and hobbies. Personal habits and preferences are known. The 
next greater scale (red circle) represents commercial companies, who hold 
particular data about the person, such as shopping habits collected by loyalty cards. 
The ‘green circle’ represents privacy in the widest sense and is related to the 
government. When talking about privacy in relation to the government interviewees 
mention the recording of data in form of CCTV images and mobile phone 
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communications data. An interaction between the government circle and citizens 
only takes place under certain circumstances, for example when a law is broken, in 
case of emergency or in relation to terrorist attacks.  
Initially, another circle had been included in this model which represented 'the 
public' and was wider than the commercial circle. The public includes strangers; 
people who are unknown to the person and the person feels ‘anonymous’ within the 
public. However, this has been dropped after re-reading interview transcripts, as it 
did not seem to be significant enough to the respondents. 
 
4.2.9.1 Privacy relating to friends and family and its relationship to the 
Category Contactability  
In relation to friends and family, interviewees primarily mentioned the concept of 
liberty. Privacy is mainly about "being able to keep things to yourself" (P119_M) and 
the term 'private person' has been used to describe someone "who doesn't like to 
share that much […] who is quite selective about who they want to share.. their 
life with. Personal things to do with themselves." (P134_F) (see also section 
4.2.10 Participants’ privacy definitions) 
 
In the context of the privacy area of friends and family, mobile phone settings play 
an important role in regulating and determining how other social contacts can get in 
contact with the mobile phone user. Hence, the mobile phone can be understood as 
to regulate a mobile phone user's privacy. The metaphor of the mobile phone being 
a gateway to a person is suitable in this context, as explained in the previous 
section 4.2.8 (Category contactability).  
 
The following quote shows P117_M’s approach of gaining over control information 
about his personal life. In order to not share it with others in his social circle, he is 
very much aware what he tells whom. 
 
"I think, privacy basically means ehm .. getting away with doing what I want 
to do without other people finding out. That is pretty much my answer.  
I am a very private person, you see. I don't like to tell people what I am 
doing. I think that, I feel that, if people know what I am doing, then they can 
tell other people what I am doing, whereas if it's just me and I know and it's 
private, then I can keep it all under control in that sense" (P117_M). 
 
Whether they wanted to share the data or not, most frequently interviewees would 
want to know the motivation for someone else wanting to have access to their data.  
“Mmh, no. other than more concerned about the reasons for doing it rather 
than actually being tracked.” (119_M) 
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4.2.9.2 Privacy in relation to commercial companies 
The commercial circle of privacy relates for the most part to individuals' personal 
data. Some interviewees mention that they do not mind giving access to data about 
their shopping habits to certain companies, as long as it is ensured that it will stay 
within those companies; "I don’t mind giving them my details as long as they 
hold on to them, like Tesco" (P131_F). However, some interviewees do not like to 
share any information about themselves with commercial companies at all, "I hate 
them, I hate them. Because they take your information as well and use it to 
make more money for themselves. And con you into buying more stuff you don’t 
want." (P132_M). Whereas others, such as P137_F, did not seem to be aware of 
these data collections "I didn’t realise, they collected the data about what you 
buy, do they?". 
 
Many respondents describe a trade-off between giving their personal information to 
commercial companies, for example via loyalty cards, and getting benefits from the 
company in form of 'points' or price reductions. 
"Well, I use them. but then again, ehm .. , they are using me for 
information. So, I don't see anything wrong with me using them, so I get 
loads out of the points" (P135_F). 
 
Interviewees generally would not want commercial companies to have access to 
their mobile phone location data.  
“That they can track where you live, how much you time you are using on the 
phone. Who you are phoning from, who long it is, bla,bla (…) You are just 
going to be bombarded with all sorts of stuff” (P131_F). 
 
“I think, if the information is important, like I said before, for police or 
whatever, that’s fair enough. I am happy they would be able to use it. But 
not just for commercial purposes, no” (P137_F). 
 
This area of privacy related to commercial companies has been identified as the 
least important one for this study. Firstly, it is not directly related to mobile phone 
use and mobile phone location data. Secondly, most people seem to be aware of 
their rights as consumers in terms of data collection. Either they agree to have their 
data collected (such as P116_F, P119_M, P117_M) or they do not (such as 
P133_M, P132_M). Respondents frequently complain about junk mail and have 
developed strategies to avoid unwanted marketing messages and advertisement. 
The trade-off between exchanging personal information for benefits from 
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commercial companies is an element of the Core category 'Balancing' (see section 
4.2.11, below). 
 
4.2.9.3 Privacy in association with the government and regarding data 
retention 
Awareness of location data mostly comes from the media. Respondents have 
predominantly heard about mobile phone location data in relation to emergencies, 
crime and terrorism, as for example a female respondent describes:  
 
P134_F: “Ehm, yes because of this one program I heard on the radio. (..) 
it was.. a programme about ehm how new technology is being used by the 
police to track people ehm, who have committed a crime. And find them. 
 
A: yeah, find them afterwards 
 
P134_F: “There was a little bit about that and there was a lot more about 
retrieving data from the phone. And how that was being used by the police.” 
 
In this context P117_M fears that "no one is gonna have any privacy", when 
considering the prospect of having mobile phone location data connected to other 
governmental databases, such as the DVLA driving license database. 
 
Other respondents make a distinction between the government and other 
organisations that have an interest in an individual's personal data: 
 
"... I think, ehm, the government having access is different than like say other 
organisations having access to privacy like companies and other people. The 
government is a bit different." (P133_M) 
 
Interviewee’s responses and thoughts regarding the access to mobile phone 
communications data by governmental bodies can be grouped into three broad 
categories, as shown in Figure 4.20, below. 
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Individuals’ responses regarding the access of the government to mobile phone 
location data can be grouped into three predominant responses: indignation, 
resignation and justification or rationalisation of data retention through terrorism. 
Often more than one opinion has been expressed by one respondent during the 
course of an interview. For example, some respondents express indignation when 
first talking about the collection of mobile phone data. And later in the interview, they 
agree with the need for the government to take measures against terrorism and 
crime. The following sections explicate each of the three responses to data 
retention, illustrated by relevant quotes. 
 
Response 1) Indignation 
Some participants had heard about data retention for the first time by taking part in 
this study. Hence, feelings of indignation seem an understandable and natural 
reaction to this new information. Indignation was commonly expressed in the 
following four different ways: 
 
a) Government should not have the right to track me 
Some respondents frequently use the expression ‘right’, such as the female 
respondents below: 
  
"God! I don’t think, they’ve got the right to hold it and use it for certain 
things. I just think, you know, privacy. Why should the police know whether I 
phone from that mobile and then move across the country” (P131_F). 
 
Responses to data retention relating to the government  
 
1) Indignation 
a) "I don't think it's right” (to track everyone)  
b) Desire to feel respected 
c) Wanting to be informed about data collection 
d) The government has got an agenda, it wants to     
     control people (terrorism is used as a "moral lever") 
 
2) Resignation 
  - "That's how it is", "they do what they want" 
 
3) Justification or rationalisation of data retention through  
terrorism 
- Respondents described a 'balancing act' between privacy and security 
 
Figure 4.20: Sub-category: Individuals’ responses to data retention
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"But I don't think it gives the government a right to track every single 
person in the country” and every single minute everyday" (P134_F). 
 
In this context, some people mention Menwith Hill, the American military base in 
North Yorkshire, which listens for keywords in citizens' telecommunications, and 
utter strong feelings of indignation (such as P131_F, see quote above). 
Others were rather concerned about commercial organisations accessing their data 
and did not mind the government accessing it (P118_F). 
 
b) Desire to be respected 
In the interviews, individuals reflected on the access to location data and its 
implications and described privacy as related to respect. Individuals want to be 
respected in their immediate social environment (e.g. P119_M and P135_F). 
However, some expressed the feeling that they did not feel respected by a 
government that collects data about them without their knowledge, such as this 
respondent explains: 
 
"Especially as people, ehm, like your privacy, and your private life is like really 
sacred to people. So, when that’s like affronted [affront = disrespect, insult] 
and when you realise that other people have access to your movements and 
your location. And you weren’t aware of that. ehm, I think, that can cause like 
clashes,.." (P136_F). 
 
c) Wanting to be informed about data collections 
Respondents suggested that customers should be informed about data retention 
when purchasing a mobile phone. This is not the case as a survey of mobile phone 
shops in Leeds has shown (see section 5.1.2.1). 
One participant mentioned Kafka, who in his book 'The Trial' describes Joseph K. 
being arrested without trial and without doing anything wrong 2.  
 
"You know, with the kind of the terror legislation, they tried to get through 
recently, it is all becoming a bit, kind of Kafkarish, I think" (P134_F). 
 
Another respondent describes the stark discrepancy between being and not being 
informed about data collection: 
 
                                                
2 "Someone must have traduced Joseph K., for without having done anything wrong he was 
arrested one fine morning." [The Trial (1925) ch. 1] 
http://www.oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY.html?entry=t91.e1366&srn=2&ssid=5365380
22#FIRSTHIT 
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"Ehm, I think people have a right to know, what the government are 
monitoring and .. why [raises tone of voice]. I think, it makes everything a lot 
clearer and it’s more honest, there is no deception. It’s fairer, ehm, 
everyone has access to the same kind of information. Do you know, it’s when 
there is deceit and when there is like .. other people are hiding. Or like, it 
seems like things are being concealed. I think, that’s when you get more 
confrontation about … stuff. If that makes sense? (…) if it’s concealed, then 
you think, why. Why haven’t I been informed. You know, is there a different 
agenda, ehm. They are hiding something, as well” (P136_F). 
 
P136_F's passionate statement about the need of being informed about retention of 
citizen's personal data has prompted the researcher to write the following memo 
(Memo 5), below. 
 
 
Memo - Indignation about not being informed 
 
P136_F’s interpretation of the situation of data retention is summarised in the table 
below. The left hand column depicts the ideal situation for her: All citizens are 
notified that communications data is retained and accessed for particular reasons by 
the government. The right-hand column shows the opposite scenario in which 
citizens are not informed about the on-going data collection. This raises questions 
about the motivation for not explicitly disclosing that every mobile phone user’s data 
is collated. The respondent P136_F perceives that the current situation in the UK 
matches the latter scenario and this makes her react with anger and indignation. 
Being informed Not being informed about data 
retention 
a lot clearer deceit 
more honest hiding 
no deception concealed 
Fairer different agenda 
everyone has access to the same kind 
of information 
Resulting in 
- confrontation, - clashes, - 
problems 
  
Memo 5: Indignation about not being informed about communications data retention 
 
d) A hidden agenda 
Some individuals perceive terrorism as a moral lever that is used by the government 
to justify anti-terrorism but also crime fighting measures. Interviewees talk of the 
"fear factor" (P131_F) or the "big moral panic thing" (P134_F). People do not 
explicitly say that they do not trust the government but they seem to suspect a 
“different agenda”. Some suspect that the government wants to control and "keep 
an eye" on people (P136_F). 
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Respondents describe different levels of crime which require different measures. 
The police and government’s measures in tackling crime should be justified 
depending on the seriousness of the crime (see quotes P131_F and 136_F). An 
independent panel is suggested to provide impartial oversight for the use of mobile 
phone data to ensure that policing powers can not be misused for petty crimes but 
only for serious offences. The responded P135_F took a look back in history and 
warned that oversight over a government's actions is necessary to secure 
democracy (see Appendix H, transcript 13). 
 
Response 2) Resignation 
Often individuals’ statements regarding data retention carry an element of 
resignation. American military bases Menwith Hill and Filing Dales are mentioned in 
this context:  
 
"And same like with the mobile phone like I know that the government has 
computer programs that listen in for keywords. Yea, and that's just 
how it is” (P133_M).   
 
"It doesn’t help being up by Filing Dales with the Americans; they are sneaky 
gits" (P135_F). 
 
Some showed little surprise about the storage of mobile phone data, even though 
they stated that they had been unaware of this practice before the interview, such 
as for example P133_M (see Appendix H - Interview transcripts). 
 
Response 3) Achieving a balance between privacy and security 
In addition to the notions of indignation and resignation, most participants voice the 
opinion that they agree with the government collecting mobile phone users' 
communications data for safety and security reasons. Others struggle to come to a 
straightforward conclusion: 
 
“So, it's a difficult one. I am sure there are arguments for things that they 
could do with the data but I think there's so many arguments they could 
do bad things or stupid things with it. I would be more concerned about 
them doing stupid things. ... Don't know. I can see the arguments for 
tracking. If it's like society gains something from it, maybe. So, if it's 
like criminals, you could track them” (117_M).   
 
"Pphh.. (sighs) [pause], Ehm, [pause] that's a bit of a discourse. Because I 
am for the one being, you know civil liberties and they shouldn't be out to 
track you and do this and do that. But then if it does help track people like 
that girl from New Year’s Eve or terrorism, then I think maybe that's a good 
thing" (P131_F). 
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4.2.10 Participants’ privacy definitions 
The following two definitions of privacy have been prevalent in the interviewees’ 
accounts: on the one hand, privacy being about personal data and control over this 
data and on the other hand privacy being related to having the freedom to do what 
one wants to do. 
 
4.2.10.1 Privacy is about my data and having control over it  
Participants primarily see privacy as being related to data or information about 
themselves. They mention for example personal data, such as financial and health 
information, views and opinions (see transcripts P131_F, P132_M, P138_M, 
Appendix H). Furthermore, respondents talked about the disclosure of this personal 
data to individuals or organisations and often stressed their desire to retain control 
over this data which can be summarised by P117_M's comments:  
 
“I don't like to tell people what I am doing. I think that, I feel that, if 
people know what I am doing, then they can tell other people what I am 
doing, whereas if it's just me and I know and it's private, then I can keep it all 
under control in that sense […]. So, I think basically privacy to me  …  does 
equal control” (P117_M). 
 
As illustrated in previous memos, respondents describe different fields in life in 
which their data should be kept private, or in other words not accessed by others 
without their consent (see Memo 1, section 4.2.2).  
This control over data is relevant in all three areas of privacy, as illustrated in the 
visual memo, below. The importance of personal data to privacy has also been 
discussed in section 4.2.9 Different areas relevant to privacy, below. 
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4.2.10.2 Privacy is about liberty and freedom of doing what I want 
In addition to relating privacy to data, interviewees often talk about liberty when 
probed about the meaning of privacy.  
 
"having freedom to do things that I want to do, that I don’t have to tick any 
boxes to be able to do. And things, so. Individuals freedom, rights, yeah. 
[Laughs] […]  
I think, privacy basically means ehm .. getting away with doing what I 
want to do without other people finding out.” (P116_F) 
 
And as P134_F puts it succinctly,  
"Yeah.. I suppose, privacy can be tied up with being anonymous to some 
extent. And being able to be anonymous if you want to be; On some level. I 
think this is some kind of freedom in that, on a personal level" (P134_F). 
 
 
Privacy relates to a ‘barrier’ between "me" and "them" or "other people", in relation 
to social interactions. Respondents appreciate the freedom of "not having to tell 
other people what I am doing" (P133_M). To 'share one's life with others' means to 
lower that imaginable barrier and to share some personal information but also 
feelings and opinions.  
Wanting to give consent for 
access & use by commercial 
organisations ('red circle') 
Wanting to have 
CONTROL over data 
Government 
(green circle' - no personal   
                        relationship) 
->sometimes resignation: data is 
shared anyway (Menwith hill) 
-> other times: privacy vs. security 
My data 
Choosing what to tell 
(blue circle' - personal   
                     relationship) 
This is where mobile 
phone settings are 
important
Memo 6: Control over personal data - a visual memo
Respondents describe the desire to retain control over their personal data. This relates to the 
previous memo about ‘power relationships’ (Memo 1) and the Category ‘Process of monitoring 
and use of data’ (section 4.2.3). The potential of what can be done with the personal data 
depends on who has collected the data and who has access to it.  For example, respondents 
distinguish three areas relevant to privacy (see 4.2.9 Different areas relevant to privacy) and in 
each of these areas a Balancing Act takes place (see GT Core Category, section 4.2.11). 
Control over personal data - a visual Memo
(to regulate  
'Contactability') 
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4.2.10.3 Privacy is about space 
Respondents acknowledge that everyone should be entitled to live their life as they 
wish, as long as it does not harm others. This relates to the notion of space, which 
is frequently mentioned by participants in interviews and in the survey. Some 
explicitly point out a distinction between physical space and mental space, as 
P134_F explains, 
"and then you could talk about .. private sphere, and privacy in the home 
and things to do with that. And the idea of private and public spaces. Ehm..  
 
A: so, like the home as a private space? 
 
P134_F: or has been constructed as a private space which has impacted on the 
way in which it is treated in the law and .. I think, it's about space, as well. 
Ehm, .. but also about the person? And who they are. And how they feel about 
things" (P134_F). 
 
Hence, the use of the term 'space' can be interpreted as follows: 
 
a) When talking about their home, where they can ‘do and be what they want’. 
(see interview transcripts 119_M, 118_F, P132_M, Appendix H): 
 
“ (..) you can be private in your house. If you have net curtains up and people 
can’t see in. but if you don’t, people can see in so it’s not private” (P132_M). 
 
b) The term space is used as a metaphor for mental space, having the freedom 
to d and to think what one wants (see interviews P135_F, 116_F, P134_F) 
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4.2.11 Core category 'Balancing'  
In each of these three areas of privacy (see section 4.2.9) balancing takes place in 
relation to privacy. This is illustrated in Table 4.7, below, which summarises the 
relationship between the area of privacy (first column), Core category 'Balancing' 
(third column) and mobile phone use (last column). In all three areas of privacy a 
“technique” of balancing is used to maintain one’s privacy. 
Regarding friends and family, respondents wanted to retain control over their 
personal information because disclosure could have an impact on their immediate 
social environment; and privacy infringements in this area are particularly feared of. 
Concerning commercial companies, respondents frequently mentioned a trade-off 
between receiving benefits in form of points and revealing personal information. As 
with regards to the government, individuals describe a balancing act between 
personal privacy and national security or protection by the government. In each of 
these three areas, the mobile phone plays a role regarding this balancing act. 
Table 4.7: Relationship between area of privacy and the Core category 'Balancing' 
 
Area of 
privacy Description 
Relevance for Core category 
'Balancing' 
Impact of 
phone on area 
of privacy 
 
Blue circle - 
friends and 
family 
 
Immediate social 
environment, ‘everyday 
life’ and social contacts, 
such as friends and 
family. 
 
Control over information  
 
(see interviews P117_M, 
P135_F) 
 
Phone settings 
to regulate 
'Contactability' 
 
Red circle - 
commercial 
companies 
 
Commercial companies, 
such as Boots or Tesco, 
who hold some data 
about a customer if she 
or he uses a loyalty card. 
 
Benefits vs. sharing data 
(see interviews P135_F, who 
is aware of this 'trade-off', or 
P132_M and P133_M who are 
strongly against it) 
 
Phone for 
receiving  
junkmail, 
marketing 
messages. 
 
Green circle - 
the 
government 
 
Interaction with this area 
takes place only under 
certain circumstances. 
For example, when a law 
is broken, in case of 
emergency, such as 
terrorist attacks. 
 
 
Privacy and liberty vs. 
security  
 
(also described as a 
“discourse” by P131_F or a 
“grey area” by P133_M) 
 
Location data 
stored and used 
for terrorism 
and crime 
detection.  
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Respondents use their mobile phone settings to regulate social interactions in their 
closest proximity with friends and family. Different types of mobile phone users use 
different strategies for this. Power users are skilled in utilising the settings of their 
mobile phone to regulate how reachable they are to other people. Low users use 
their phone infrequently, the reason partly being that they see constant availability to 
others as limiting their freedom and their privacy (see section 4.2.8 for more detail). 
 
The mobile phone does not play an important role in the area of privacy relating to 
commercial companies. The phone could potentially be used to deliver (often 
unwanted) marketing messages. The privacy related area that is furthest away from 
participants’ day-to-day life concerns the government. Recent terrorism threats have 
prompted the ‘normative expectation’ to give up some civil liberties, including 
privacy, to support the government’s fight against terrorism. The retention of mobile 
phone communications data can be seen as concerning individual’s data privacy. 
Respondents explicitly mention this trade-off between privacy and security, and 
many believe that it is beneficial that communications data can be accessed by 
police and intelligence services. Others do not agree and show feelings of 
indignation and resignation. However, these sentiments do not occur in isolation 
from each other but can constitute phases through which a respondent goes in the 
space of an interview. The GT Category ‘Balancing’ represents a major theme of the 
research and links the different categories that have been established from the 
interview data. For this reasons the category 'Balancing' has been selected as the 
core category. 
In Chapter 5 - Analysis, these final categories will be contrasted to survey findings 
and the literature.  
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4.2.12 A synopsis of the five final grounded theory categories 
Grounded theory methodology has guided the data collection as has been 
illustrated in the previous sections that have discussed the interview findings. In 
order to demonstrate how the final grounded theory categories were developed, 
interview codes and memos were presented. The focused codes have guided the 
development of the categories, while Adele Clarke’s situational map has helped to 
identify the importance of the government in relation to perceptions of data 
retention. The Category 'Process of monitoring and use of data' encapsulates the 
steps that respondents identified regarding the process of being monitored and 
having their personal data collected. In the interviews participants described 
different areas in their lives in which privacy was important to them, and these have 
been grouped into the grounded theory Category A - Areas of privacy (section 
4.2.9). The privacy definitions that were recurrently referred to by respondents are 
represented by the grounded theory Category B (see section 4.2.10). The 
participants’ descriptions of privacy were closely related to those commonly 
discussed in the literature and this will be further explored in the following Chapter 
5. The Core category 'Balancing' is linked to and significant for all three areas of 
privacy that have been identified in the respondents’ statements: social contacts, 
commercial companies and government (see section 4.2.9). 
 
Individuals tend to develop particular routines in using their mobile phone. Often the 
mobile phone becomes an important tool to manage peoples’ lives, particularly for 
those who fall into the category 'power user' (see section 4.2.7). ‘Low users’ tend 
not to perceive significant benefits from carrying a phone every day and every hour. 
Individuals belonging to this group of mobile phone users feel that the mobile phone 
truncates their privacy, their space, their liberty by making them always available to 
everyone who knows their phone number. This highlights that the mobile phone can 
be used to manage one’s ‘contactability’, in other words one’s availability to others 
(see section 4.2.8). This phenomenon particularly relates to the area of social 
contacts. 
 
The following table (Table 4.8, below) provides a further summary of the GT 
Categories developed from the interview data. The table lists all categories and 
highlights how the focused codes have shaped the developed of each category. In 
addition, the relevant sections and memos that provide details about each category 
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are listed. The categories have been labelled with the letters A to E, so that they are 
easier to refer to in the following chapters. 
 
Table 4.8: List of categories and their relationship to codes 
Category Related theme of focused codes 
 
Development illustrated in 
section or memo 
Category A: Areas of privacy 
Privacy relating to friends and 
family 
- Privacy in relation to commercial 
companies 
- Privacy in association with the 
government 
- Privacy,  
- Emotions, "me", 
- State, "they" 
 
- Memo 1: Memo about 
situational map, taking into 
account power relationships 
 
- see 4.2.9 Different areas 
relevant to privacy  
 
-Memo 5: Indignation about not 
being informed about 
communications data retention 
 
Category B: Privacy definitions 
 
- Privacy is about my data and    
   having control over it 
- Privacy is about liberty and  
  freedom of doing what I want 
- Privacy is about space 
 
- Privacy 
 
- 4.2.10 Participants’ privacy 
definitions  
 
- Memo 6 : Control over data  
Category C: Contactability - 
use of mobile phone to 
regulate privacy 
- Mobile phone use
 
 
4.2.8 Category contactability 
 
-Memo 4: Memo about 
contactability 
 
Category D: Process of 
monitoring and use of data   
- Location 
 
- Memo 1: Memo about 
situational map, taking into 
account power relationships 
 
- 4.2.3 Category 'Process of 
monitoring and use of data'  
 
Category E: Core category 
'Balancing' 
Links to all 
categories 
 
- 4.2.4 Development of Core 
category 'Balancing' 
 
-Memo 2: Balancing security 
and privacy 
 
- Error! Reference source not 
found. Error! Reference 
source not found. 
 
The five final categories will be revisited in the next chapter, Chapter 5 - Analysis of 
Findings, and related to findings from pilot study, survey and relevant literature. 
The following section provides a descriptive summary of data obtained by the 
survey. 
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4.3 Presentation of survey findings 
This section presents the findings from the questionnaire, which has helped to 
further explore issues raised in the initial interviews (see Appendix L for a copy of 
the questionnaire). The results will be presented following the structure of the 
questionnaire, with a summary at the end of this section. The questionnaire was 
circulated as a paper-based version and over the internet (for details regarding 
sampling, see section 3.4.1). The results should be taken as indicative and not 
completely representative as the survey is based on a volunteer sample. The 
figures indicate a general trend and give an idea of individuals’ responses on a 
greater scale than it would have been possible with interviews. 
 
4.3.1 Three distinct phases of questionnaire distribution due to terrorist 
attacks 
Data collections for research projects do not occur detached from real-world events. 
The London terrorist attacks in July 2005 occurred while the paper-based 
questionnaire was being distributed. Because these attacks could have potentially 
had an influence on individuals’ perceptions, it was recorded which questionnaires 
were filled in before and which ones after the attacks. In addition and taking into 
account the potential implications of different distribution media, the survey data 
collection was broken down into three distinct phases: firstly, the paper-based 
questionnaires distributed before the attacks, secondly those distributed afterwards 
and thirdly those distributed via the internet. The latter ones were all published after 
the terrorist attacks (see Table 4.9).  
 
Table 4.9: Three questionnaire distribution phases 
 
Phase of data collection Distribution  
Paper-based questionnaire, distributed before 07/07 attacks 
distributed 16 April 2005 to 06 July 2005 
N=248 
Paper-based questionnaire, distributed after 07/07 attacks 
distributed September 2005 to February 2006 
N=121 
Online survey, distributed after 07/07 attacks 
distributed 10 August 2005 to January 2006  
N=108 
 
Total number of questionnaires distributed 
 
N=477 
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A comparison between the three phases of questionnaire distribution showed 
differences only regarding a small number of questions and for this reason the 
responses of all three data sets were pooled together. Differences between data 
sets are indicated in the following sections where relevant. The main differences 
between data sets relate to mobile phone handsets and contracts (section 4.3.2.3), 
awareness of location data (section 4.3.4) and use of location data for terror 
prevention (section0). Details are provided in the following sections and complete 
questionnaire results for each data collection phase are displayed in Appendix M. 
 
4.3.2 Survey section A: Your Mobile Phone 
4.3.2.1 Demographics 
Out of 477 respondents taking part in the survey 42.6% were female, 56% male and 
1.5% did not reveal their gender. The majority of respondents fell into the 25 to 34 
age group (31.3%) and into the 35 to 44 year age range (24.6%). Most of the 
respondents stated as occupation ‘professional’ (29.7%), 'office staff or clerical' 
(20.6%) or 'student' (16.1%). The likely reason for the predominance of these age 
groups and professions was that the questionnaire was primarily handed out at the 
researcher’s place of work (the university) or at friends’ places of work (mainly office 
environment). 
 
4.3.2.2 Mobile phone use 
The majority of all respondents (91.4%) owned a mobile phone, only 7.1% did not 
own a mobile phone and 1.5% shared a phone with someone else. The majority of 
all phone users had pay-as-you-go contracts (55.7%), compared to 43.6% of users 
with monthly contracts. Most users (50.5%) had owned their phone for four to six 
years.  These figures are comparable to national statistics. Ofcom, the independent 
regulator and competition authority for the UK communications, provides an 
estimate of around 66.1% of mobile phone pre-paid contracts compared to 33.9% of 
monthly contract subscribers for the year 2005 (Ofcom, 2006). 
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55.9% of mobile phone users indicated that they typically have their phones 
switched on and with them at all times. As previously mentioned in this chapter, two 
different categories of mobile phone users have been identified, power users and 
low users (see 4.2.7 Different types of mobile phone users). Low users do not 
consider their mobile phone as an essential part of their life and tend to have pay-
as-you-go contracts, whereas power users tend to have monthly contracts.  
 
The survey data shows that pay-as-you-go users spend considerably less than 
those with a monthly contract (see Figure 4.21, above). At the same time, users with 
monthly contracts, consider their phone as very important and on average as more 
important than pay-as-you-go users (Figure 4.22, below). 
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Figure 4.22: Associations between importance of phone (Question 8) and contract type (Question 2)  
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Figure 4.21: Associations between monthly spenditure  (Question 7) and contract type (Question 2) 
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4.3.2.3 Differences in data collection phases regarding phone contracts and 
handsets 
When comparing the data sets before and after the 07/07/05 terrorist attacks, 
differences regarding mobile phone use became apparent. The data sample 
collected after the London terrorist attacks in 2005 showed an increase in pay-
monthly phone contracts (+13.6 percentage points), together with an increase in 
camera phones (+20.8 percentage points). Accordingly in the same time period, 
there was a decrease on pay-as-you-go contracts and black and white phones.   
The change in handsets is very likely caused by the increase of monthly paid mobile 
phone contracts, which tend to provide its subscriber with a new state-of-the-art 
phone. 
 
4.3.3 Survey section B: Privacy and Personal Data 
4.3.3.1 Respondents' definitions of privacy in the survey 
The question ‘What does privacy mean to you?' (Question 9) was the only open 
question in the questionnaire (see section 3.4.7). Since the question allowed flexible 
responses, it was possible for a respondent to put forward more than one definition 
of privacy. A number of variables have been constructed to capture all responses 
and similar responses have been grouped together. Counts have been taken of the 
responses to indicate the strength of opinion or commonality of the experience. 
Higher counts suggest that an opinion is more common and hence possibly more 
relevant. The numbers should be taken as indicative as the responses were 
interpreted and quantified by the researcher and therefore researcher's bias cannot 
be ruled out.  
 
The following variables have been set up to capture respondents' privacy 
definitions: 
'Personal' has been referred to most (62 times); ‘control over information (50)’, 
‘space’ (42 times) and ’security’ (41) were frequently referred to, as well as 
‘communications privacy’ (38), which relates to statements regarding 
communications in general and others listening into conversations. 'Information 
privacy - access' (33) comprises statements about other people have access to 
individual’s data. Other responses were coded into the following variables: 'no 
intrusion' (32), 'information privacy in general' (31), 'solitude' (31), 'secret' (26), 
'information privacy - no sharing' (23), 'no marketing'  (19), 'surveillance' (18), 'others 
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not knowing what I am doing' (15), 'liberty' (15), 'data protection' (14), 'private vs 
public' (13) and ‘home’ (11).  
A complete list of the variables, including examples, is shown in Appendix M - 
Survey Figures for all three data sets. 
 
Parallels between survey findings and interviews (GT categories) 
Respondents' privacy definitions supplied in the survey confirmed the privacy 
categories identified in the interviews (see section 4.2.10 Participants’ privacy 
definitions): 
 
GT Category B: Participants’ privacy definitions 
- Privacy is about my data and having control over it 
- Privacy is about liberty and freedom of doing what I want 
- Privacy is about space 
 
A large number of respondents' privacy definitions provided in the survey related to 
‘personal data’, ‘own information’ or ‘personal details’. The variable ‘information 
privacy’ has been created to capture these comments. Because respondents used 
terms relating to their personal data frequently and in different ways, sub-variables 
for ‘information privacy’ were introduced, such as 'control', 'access', 'no sharing', 
'financial', 'ownership of data', 'storage', and 'misuse'.  
 
Particularly, the following definitions of privacy provided in Question 9 confirmed the 
interview findings. For example, 152 references to 'information privacy' were made 
by 398 respondents, which confirms the relevance of the grounded theory Category 
B ‘Privacy is about my data and having control over it’ developed from the interview 
data (see Table 4.10, below). Tables 4.11 and 4.12 show survey variables relating 
to GT Categories A and C. The relationship between interviews and survey finding 
will be further explicated in the next chapter, Chapter 5 - Analysis of Findings. 
 
Table 4.10: Survey responses relating to Personal data and control (Category B) 
 
Variables relating to 'Privacy is 
about my data and having control 
over it' (GT Category B) 
Some examples of respondents’ comments 
about privacy 
[numbers in brackets indicate questionnaire number] 
‘Information privacy - control’ 
(mentioned 50 times)  
 
“being able to choose what information is known 
about me” [Questionnaire no. 171], 
 
“Privacy – private – not for unwanted people to 
know about – personal to me and the people I 
choose to confide in” [431] 
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“others not knowing personal information about 
you without your permission” [3] 
 
“my phone number is my property, I choose if I 
want to take calls “ [217] 
 
“Organisation or acquaintance – who intrudes 
into my personal life without seeking my 
permission or following social etiquette” [190]  
 
information privacy - access 
(mentioned 33 times) 
 
- “no-one should have access to my personal 
data” [10], 
- ”others not knowing or having access to 
information about me or my behaviour” [21]. 
- “Not available to everyone” [152] 
- “Privacy = I decide to whom and when access 
to me or my information is divulged” [193] 
 
 
 
Variables relating to 'Privacy is 
about liberty and freedom of doing 
what I want' (GT Category B) 
Some examples of respondents’ comments 
about privacy 
[numbers in brackets indicate questionnaire number] 
Liberty 
(mentioned 15 times) 
- "Freedom to do what you want (legally)" [33] 
 
- "To do what one wants to do when one wants 
to do it without anyone else caring"[73] 
 
- "freedom to make decision without 
interference from outside influences" [172] 
 
- "comfort to behave in a manner I wish. [109]  
 
- "to be able to do anything I like when I like in 
private" [362] 
 
‘Others not knowing what I am 
doing’ 
(mentioned 15 times) 
- "No one knows what your are doing." [8]  
- "People not knowing what I do!" [25]  
- "Something which is told or kept on and a 
need to know basis with the person involved 
liable for this. (if you don't need to know, you 
are not told)" [67]. 
 
Space  
(mentioned 42 times) 
- “a space where I can be uninterrupted" [233] 
- "my own space (mental and literal)" [47] 
- “personal space” [6],  
- “Not having your personal space invaded” 
[426] 
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Table 4.11: Responses showing indignation and resignation (GT Category A) 
Responses indicating indignation 
and resignation (GT Category A) 
Some examples of respondents’ comments 
about privacy 
[numbers in brackets indicate questionnaire number] 
Indignation and resignation 
(mentioned 7 times) 
- "it doesn't exist - big brother is always 
watching!"' [127]. 
 
- "Masks - there is no longer. Privacy - but there 
is a crucial need to protect what safeguards we 
have, e.g. medical research" [Questionnaire 
262] 
 
- "that our privacy is becoming more and more 
constricted. That it's claimed that this is for your 
own protection, but crime and terrorism still 
persist" [297] 
 
 
 
Table 4.12: : Survey responses distinguishing between public and private space (GT Category C) 
Responses distinguishing 
between private and public life (GT 
Category C) 
 
Some examples of respondents’ comments 
about privacy 
[numbers in brackets indicate questionnaire number] 
Respondents distinguish between 
private and public life, between home 
and work life (mentioned 13 times) 
 
- “Privacy of conversation, not wanting to hear 
other peoples conversations, using mobile 
phones in privacy, not in public spaces." 
[Questionnaire 437] 
 
- "Respecting my family life as opposed to my 
work life" [15] 
 
- "What 'privacy'? Today you have not any more 
a private life. You are reachable day and night. 
Working mobile (Phone, Computer, etc.) all over 
the world." [22]  
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4.3.3.2 Attitudes towards given views of privacy 
After formulating their own thoughts on privacy, as described in previous section 
4.3.3, respondents were requested to select privacy definitions out of a given list. 
These definitions were based on the pilot study findings and literature; several 
answers were possible. Numbers in brackets indicate the number of respondents, 
who have selected this definition, out of 477 total respondents: 
 
Table 4.13: "Do any of these definitions correspond to your view of privacy?" (Question 10) 
 
Answer option Number of times 
selected 
‘No one having access to my personal data without my 
agreement’  
422 
'No one listening to my conversations'  367 
'Privacy is about my home and my personal space'  365 
‘I can legally do what I want without feeling the need to 
tell anybody’  
212 
'Freedom from identification and from surveillance in 
public places'  
158 
 
Comments under the option ‘Other’ included “ability to block usage of records that 
have been collected about me.” (Questionnaire 388) and "once electronic 
communications are used they are difficult to keep private 
intentionally/unintentionally" (Questionnaire 183). 
 
The majority of respondents (88.4%) chose the definition ‘No one having access to 
my personal data without my agreement’ which confirms once more that 
respondents mainly associate personal data with privacy. 
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4.3.3.3 CCTV and loyalty cards 
Respondents were asked to give their opinion regarding CCTV on a 6-point Likert 
scale. 79.2% of respondents chose the options 1, 2 or 3, which may suggest that 
the majority of respondents feel positive towards the use of CCTV cameras. Only 
20.8% of respondents selected options 4, 5 or 6 which may indicate a sceptical 
point of view towards the use of CCTV cameras (see Figure 4.23) 
 
 
When correlating the responses regarding CCTV use (Question 11) and whether it 
is beneficial to store location data for 12 months (Question 16), it became apparent 
that respondents who felt positive 
towards CCTV tended to approve of 
storing location data for 12 months 
(Figure 4.24). These results may 
indicate that those respondents, who 
believe in recording data for security 
purposes, do not make a distinction 
between CCTV pictures and mobile 
phone communications data (see also 
section 4.1.6.1). 
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Figure 4.23: "What is your opinion about CCTV cameras on a scale from 1 to 6?" (Question 11)
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Figure 4.24: Association of attitudes 
about CCTV with data retention 
(Questions 11 and 16)
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Another Likert scale was used to identify respondents’ opinions regarding loyalty 
cards, commonly used by supermarkets or petrol stations. Options 3 and 4 were 
chosen most often, which may indicate that the majority of respondents felt 
indifferent towards loyalty cards or might not relate personal data collections to 
privacy (see Figure 4.25).  
 
 
4.3.3.4 Opinions towards popular privacy related statements 
 
The majority of respondents (67.3%) 
disagreed with the statement “People 
who have nothing to hide should not 
worry about their privacy” (Question 
13). A quarter of all respondents 
stated ‘Agree’ and only 7% selected 
‘Don’t know’ (Figure 4.26).  These 
figures might indicate that a 
considerable majority of respondents 
believe in privacy, even though they 
have nothing to hide. 
 
 
Figure 4.25: "What is your opinion on loyalty cards?" (Question 12) 
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Figure 4.26: "People who have 
nothing to hide shouldn’t worry about 
their privacy" (Question 13) 
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Only just over half of the respondents (54%) 
agreed with the statement "Giving up some 
privacy is necessary to fight terrorism and 
crime” (Question 14). About one third (31.1%) 
disagreed and 15% stated 'Don’t know' 
(Figure 4.27). The percentage of those who 
selected 'Don't know' was twice as high as for 
the previous question (Question 13). The high 
percentage of those stating 'Don't know' could 
be seen as a confirmation of the 'Balancing 
act' that respondents have described in the 
interviews regarding security and privacy (GT 
Category E). 
 
 
4.3.4 Survey section C: Location Data and Legal Framework 
The London terrorist attacks in July 2005 seemed to have influenced individuals’ 
awareness of mobile phone location data. After the London terrorist attacks, the 
number of respondents who had ‘Never heard of’ location data fell significantly (by 
12.8 percentage points.). In contrast, the number of those who said to be aware of 
the existence of location data increased. Those who claimed to have heard of 
location data increased slightly by 2 percentage points and the proportion of 
respondents who claimed to know about location data almost doubled (see Figure 
4.28). 
 
34.1%
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Figure 4.28: "Have you heard of location data before taking part in this study?" (Question 15) 
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necessary to fight 
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Figure 4.27: "Giving up some privacy is 
necessary to fight terrorism and crime"
(Question 14)
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Regarding the question “Do you think it is beneficial to store location data for 12 
months for terror and crime prevention?” 
(Question 16), about half of the 
respondents (55%) agreed, a quarter of 
respondents (25.2%) stated ‘Don’t know’ 
and 19.5% stated ‘No’. Responses stayed 
similar across all data sets, which may 
indicate that the terrorist attacks have not 
had a significant influence on the 
responses to this question. A greater 
proportion of respondents stated 'Don't 
know' rather than 'No', which might point 
towards a lack of information that 
individuals have about the retention of communications data. 
 
 
4.3.4.1 Concerns about data retention 
A majority of 262 out of 477 respondents stated that they were either 'Not at all’ or 
‘Not very’ concerned about data retention, compared to 195 who were ‘Fairly’ or 
‘Very concerned’. This may indicate that respondents are in general not concerned 
about long-term storage of data.  
In the next question, respondents 
could select several reasons for 
their concerns (Table 4.14). Most 
respondents were either 
concerned about not knowing who 
would have access to their data, 
which was selected by 180 
respondents, or how the data 
would be used (172 respondents). 
Further concerns were expressed 
regarding not having control over 
data (131) and not knowing what 
information is held (138). 
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55.3%
Don't know
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Is it beneficial 
to store 
location data 
for 12 
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Figure 4.29: "Do you think it is beneficial to 
store location data for 12 months for terror and 
crime prevention?" (Question 16) 
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Figure 4.30: Concern about long term storage of  
location data (Question 17A) 
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Table 4.14: ‘If concerned, what are your concerns?’ (Question 17B), N = 234 
 
 
4.3.4.2 Respondents' perceived good uses of location data 
The next question presented a list of suggested uses for location data to the 
respondents, out of which they could choose more than one response. The majority 
out of 475 participants who respondent to this question selected ‘Emergency 
services’ (429 times), followed by ‘Solving crime’ (355), ‘Preventing terrorism’ (314), 
'Parents to track their children' (230). ‘Employers to track employees’ was selected 
by only 23 respondents (Table 4.15).  
 
Table 4.15: Good uses for location data (Question 18) 
 Emergency Services 
Solving 
crime 
Preventing 
terrorism 
Parents for 
their 
children 
Employers to 
track 
employees 
Count 429 355 314 230 23 
 
The responses to this question were similar across all three data sets with only 
minor changes in percentage points. After the London terrorist attacks, there was an 
increase for all answer options of Question 18, which was possible because several 
answers could be selected in this question. This may indicate that respondents 
could envisage many potential uses for location data, particularly for Terrorism (+9.2 
percentage points), Children tracking (+5.1 percentage points) and Emergency 
(+2.5 percentage points). Table 4.16 shows details about the differences in results 
between data sets before and after the London terrorist attacks. 
 
 
Table 4.16: Differences in data sets ‘Good uses for location data’ (Question 18) 
 Before attacks 
After 07/07 
attacks 
Change in 
percentage points 
Emergency services 89.1% 91.6% +2.5 
Solving crime 74.2% 75.3% +1.1 
Preventing acts of 
terrorism 61.7% 70.9% +9.2 
For parents to track 
their children 46.0% 51.1% +5.1 
Employers to track 
employees 4.4% 5.3% +0.9 
 
 
Don't know 
who has 
access 
How will 
it be 
used? 
What 
information 
is held 
No 
control 
No 
concerns Other 
Count 180 172 138 131 18 9 
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4.3.4.3 Access to location data without mobile phone user’s consent 
A similar trend could be observed regarding respondents’ views about the access of 
location data without their consent. Out of 477 respondents, ‘Emergency services’ 
was chosen the most often (352 times), followed by 'Police' (247), 'Intelligence 
services' (238), 'None' (75), 'Government departments' (23), 'Local councils' (10) 
(see Table 4.17). 
 
Table 4.17: "Which of the following organisations should be allowed access to your 
location data without your consent?" (Question 19) 
 
 Emergency Services Police 
Intelligence 
services 
Government 
departments 
Local 
Councils None 
Count 352 247 238 23 10 75 
 
After the London terrorist attacks, the most significant changes consisted of an 
increase for Intelligence services (+ 12.8 percentage points), Emergency services  
(+ 9.1 percentage points), Police (+ 5 percentage points) and a decrease for 'None'  
(-6.7 percentage points).  
 
Table 4.18: Comparing responses before and after London terrorist attacks (Question 19) 
 
 Before attacks 
After 07/07 
attacks 
Change in 
percentage points 
Emergency 
services 69.8% 78.9% + 9.1 
Police 49.6% 54.6% +5 
Intelligence 
services 44.0% 56.8% +12.8 
None 19.0% 12.3% -6.7 
Government 
departments 4.4% 5.3% + 0.9 
Local Councils 2.8% 1.3% -1.5 
 
The responses to Questions 18 and 19 (Table 4.15 and Table 4.17) draw attention 
to the fact that respondents believe that location data should be best used for 
emergency services, followed by the purpose of fighting crime and terrorism. This 
confirms interview findings in that individuals comprehend location data primarily as 
a crime investigation tool (see section 5.2.1, Chapter 5). 
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4.3.4.4 Access to location data with mobile phone user’s consent 
When respondents selected who they would give access to their location data with 
their permission, several options could be selected. 'Family’ was selected the most 
often (296 times), followed by ‘Friends’ (146), ‘None’ (127), 'Workplace' (41) and 
'Commercial organisations' (12).  
The option ‘None’ was chosen less often after the London terrorist attacks with a 
decrease in 9.2 percentage points. There was an increase of 8 percentage points 
for the option ‘Family’ after the attacks compared to before, as can be seen in 
Figure 4.31, below. 
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Figure 4.31: “Who would you allow access to your location data once you have given your 
consent?” (Question 20) - Comparison of responses before and after 07/07 attacks 
 
Responses to Question 20 also correspond to findings from the interviews, as they 
show that respondents are very cautious about sharing their data with commercial 
companies, as they fear to be inundated with marketing material (see section 
4.2.9.2). The fact that the option 'None' had been selected less often after the 
London terrorist attacks relates to the results described in section 4.3.4.2, in that 
respondents could see more beneficial uses for location data after the London 
terrorist attacks. 
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4.3.5 Summary of survey findings 
This third and final part of Chapter 4 has summarised the findings from the survey. 
A relatively large sample of 477 respondents has helped to explore individuals' 
definitions of privacy and attitudes towards location data on a greater scale that it 
would have been possible with interviews. The London terrorist attacks, which 
occurred during the distribution phase of the questionnaire, appeared to have 
influenced individuals' responses regarding mobile phone location data. After the 
attacks, respondents showed an increased awareness of location data and at the 
same time could imagine more beneficial purposes for location data. Responses to 
the open question about privacy (section 4.3.3.1) predominantly referred to personal 
information and the desire to retain control over this data. Liberty and having the 
freedom to behave as they wished within legal boundaries was the other definition 
of privacy that was prominent in respondents' comments. 
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4.4 Chapter summary and conclusions 
Mobile phone users' privacy should be at the heart of the debates about 
communications data retention. As it is their data containing specific information 
about their location and communications habits, that is being generated as a 
technological necessity and stored by default on a regular basis. For this reason, 
the views of citizens should have an influence on future policies regulating the 
collection, analysis and use personal data (Surveillance Studies Network, 2006), 
and hence this study has put considerable focus on the collection of empirical data.  
This fourth chapter has presented the empirical findings from all three data 
collection phases, which aimed at learning about citizens’ awareness of location 
data and its impact on people’s everyday lives. A detailed account of findings from 
the mobile phone location tracking pilot study, the in-depth interviews and from the 
survey has been provided. References to grounded theory codes, memos and 
visual representations of ideas have been made throughout this chapter, in order 
illuminate the process of developing the five final grounded theory categories. 
 
The pilot study, in which the mobile phones of four participants were being tracked, 
has proven indispensable to render the abstract concept of location data visible to 
both the researcher and the participants. The first interview phase provided an initial 
insight into the participants’ views and was followed up by more in-depth interviews 
that highlighted the status of the mobile phone in participants’ lives. Furthermore, 
the interviews gave the researcher crucial insights into individuals’ interpretations 
and perceptions of privacy in relation to mobile phones. Finally, the collection of 
further data in form of a survey helped the researcher to delve into issues raised by 
the interviews. The quantitative nature of the survey enabled the collection and 
analysis of data on a large scale and thus helped to process the data in a timescale 
feasible for a sole PhD researcher. 
 
The subsequent chapter provides a discussion of the findings obtained from the 
three data collection phases. The chapter will highlight a number of parallels that 
can be drawn between survey data, interview findings and pilot study. 
Interpretations of the data are offered together with a comparison of empirical 
findings to the relevant literature. 
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Chapter 5 Discussion and Analysis of Findings: Divergent 
Perceptions of Privacy between Individuals and the Privacy related 
Literature 
 
This analysis chapter has three parts. The first part makes explicit the relationships 
and connections between the grounded theory categories which were based on the 
interview analysis as presented in the previous chapter. The categories and their 
relationships are the basis of the grounded theory that offers an explanation about 
the phenomenon under study: individuals' views of privacy in relation to mobile 
phone location data. Each GT category is related to findings from the pilot study and 
survey, and this triangulation of empirical data and comparison to the relevant 
literature has helped to verify and strengthen the theory. The second part of this 
chapter presents four main findings relevant to the relationship between location 
data and respondents’ perceptions of privacy. These originated from the categories 
and the connections that have been established between them. The third part of the 
chapter discusses divergences between the respondents’ views of privacy and 
those commonly presented in the literature.  
 
5.1 Part 1: Respondents' Views on Privacy 
The main grounded theory categories developed from empirical findings are: 
 
o GT Category A: Areas of privacy 
o GT Category B: Participants’ privacy definitions 
o GT Category C: Contactability - Use of mobile phone to regulate privacy 
o GT Category D: Perceptions of location tracking and power relationships 
o GT Category E: Balancing (Core category) 
 
 
5.1.1 GT Category A - Different areas of privacy relating to location data 
Three areas of privacy were identified in participants' descriptions of privacy and 
these have been grouped into grounded theory Category A - Areas of privacy (see 
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section 4.2.9 for details). This GT category has served as a framework for analysing 
participants’ statements about location data, as depicted in the following. 
 
5.1.1.1 Privacy area of friends and family related to location data 
The respondents did not perceive the potential access to their location data by 
family or friends as problematic. It was rather met with curiosity as to why someone 
would want to have access to information about their location. Survey results 
indicate that respondents would give access to their current geographical location in 
form of mobile phone location data to friends and family rather than to their 
workplace or commercial organisations. After the 07/07 terror attacks in London 
there was an increased consensus in giving location data access to family members 
in favour of not sharing location data with anyone (see section 4.3.4.4). 
 
Respondents described as most important in this context the reasons for someone 
wanting to track a person's location. On the one hand, this confirms the existence of 
different areas in which privacy is important to participants. For example, because 
the participants taking part in the pilot study knew the researcher, they did not seem 
concerned about having their whereabouts monitored. As P117b_M explains: 
 
“Because if you were maybe a government body or something or something a 
bit more sinister then I think it might do. But as it is just you, it doesn't 
matter“ (117_M).  
 
On the other hand, P117_M's comments stress the significance of power 
relationships. Respondents want to know the motives for someone wanting to track 
them in order to be able to judge for what purposes the location data will be used 
(see GT Category D, section 5.1.5). In addition, these comments confirmed again 
that the control over personal data is important to individuals (see GT Category B, 
section 5.1.4).  
 
5.1.1.2 Privacy area related to commercial companies  
Interview and survey respondents expressed reluctance to give commercial 
companies access to their location data. In the survey, commercial companies were 
chosen the least for accessing respondents’ location data, along with respondents' 
workplaces (see section 4.3.4.4). Respondents did not perceive any benefits for 
disclosing their geographical location to commercial companies but rather feared 
that they would be inundated with marketing material (see section 4.2.9.2). The 
balancing act of trading personal information with consumer benefits, such as 
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discounts, becomes particularly apparent in this context (see GT Category E, 
section 5.1.6). 
 
5.1.1.3 Privacy area related to the government 
The majority of interview and survey respondents had been aware of location data 
before taking part in the study. The London terrorist attacks in July 2005 seemed to 
have impacted on this awareness, as significantly more respondents stated to know 
about location data after the 2005 London terrorist attacks in comparison to before 
(see section, 4.3 Presentation of survey findings). Most respondents claimed to 
have heard about mobile phone location data from the media and primarily from 
radio or TV programmes about emergencies, crime or terrorism (see section 
4.2.9.3). 
 
Taking into account the respondents' apparent general awareness of location data, 
it could be deduced that phone users are also aware of their own data being 
retained by mobile phone service providers. However, statements regarding the 
uses of location data, indicated that very few respondents felt that location data in 
particular and mobile phone communications data in general did have any 
connection to their lives (see respondents’ comments in pilot study, section 4.1.2.1, 
such as “I am not doing anything wrong” or “I am in public anyway”).  Possible 
reasons for this may be that there are currently not many location-based 
applications or services available to citizens. Additionally, even though every mobile 
phone generates communications and location data, the mobile phone user does 
not see it, hence is not reminded of the data at any point in time. 
It appears as if individuals only show an awareness of location data when 
specifically enquired about it. The reason for this may be that location data has not 
got a direct impact on their day-to-day activities and therefore individuals do not 
relate it to their own lives. 
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5.1.2 Responses to data retention 
Respondents' comments and statements regarding communications data retention 
can be categorised as follows: firstly, indignation about not being informed about 
this retention of data, often in relation to with not feeling respected; secondly, 
resignation of users about having their data collected; and thirdly, acceptance  of 
the retention of data because of crime and terrorist threats. Some respondents 
expressed all three attitudes towards data retention during an interview, which may 
indicate that they considered benefits and disadvantages of data retention from 
different view points in order to deal with the complexity of this subject area.  
 
5.1.2.1 Expressing indignation in response to data retention 
Statements about respect and wanting to be informed about the storage of mobile 
phone location data have been fielded into the sub-category ‘indignation’. 
Respondents pointed out that the government should not have the right to track 
them without their consent. They wanted to be informed about collection of their 
data, and did not feel respected because of this. The respondents believed that they 
received very little information on the long-term data retention in the public media 
and in mobile phone contracts. With this in mind some respondents suspected that 
the government had a hidden agenda and could be hiding something (see section 
4.2.9.3). For this reason, some interviewees suggested that the terms and 
conditions of mobile phone contracts should explicate that all communications data 
will be stored. This confirms GT Category B as it explains the respondents’ 
perception that privacy is about data, the desire to have control over this data and 
who it is shared with or accessed by (see GT Category B - Respondents’ definitions 
of privacy, section 5.1.4).  
 
A survey of eight mobile phone high street shops at the end of July 2005 in Leeds 
city centre showed that shop assistants were not informed about current practices of 
the mobile phone service providers or the data retention legislation. In contrast to 
this seeming unawareness of the shop floor staff, the terms and conditions of the 
mobile phone service provider Vodafone provides the following information related 
to communications data retention: 
 
“10) Vodafone Limited and Personal Data  
a) Personal data includes: Call, network and traffic information generated by 
your use of the service covered by this Agreement or your use of products, 
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services and content accessed via or facilitated by your use of the Services 
covered by this Agreement, including but not limited to the numbers you call, the 
type, date, time, location, duration and cost of calls, messages or other 
communications.“ (Vodafone, 2006) 
 
Vodafone, one of the four mobile phone service providers in the UK, classifies 
‘location’ as personal data and declares that this personal data may be used to 
“Comply with any legal, governmental or regulatory requirement imposed on us or in 
connection with legal proceedings” (Vodafone, 2006).  
 
To summarise, the storage of communications data by service provider is referred 
to in the contract that every user signs, albeit in the small print where it is not 
straightforward to detect by consumers. In other words, customers of mobile phone 
service providers give their consent to the retention of their communications data by 
signing their contract.  
 
5.1.2.2 Feelings of resignation 
Several interview respondents expressed sentiments of resignation when talking 
about their communications data being accessed without their consent (see section 
4.2.9.3). These feelings were mirrored when respondents provided their thoughts on 
privacy in the survey (section 4.3.3.1 Respondents' definitions of privacy in the 
survey). Their comments described the notion of resignation, potentially because 
respondents felt that they were not in control over personal data and unsure about 
who accesses their data and for what purposes.  
 
5.1.2.3 Approving of data retention to fight crime and terrorism 
Individuals describe a balancing act between privacy and security in each of the 
three areas of privacy identified: social, commercial and governmental (see Core 
category E, section 4.2.11). Particularly in the privacy zone related to the 
government, respondents point towards the conflicting roles of privacy and security 
(see section 4.2.9.3). In the interviews, respondents used expressions such as 
“balancing act” (P117_M), “grey area” (P133_M) or “double-edged sword” (P138_M) 
and these comments referring to a balancing act were again reflected in the survey 
data. For instance, the statement “Giving up some privacy is necessary to fight 
terrorism and crime” relates to the balancing act between privacy and security. More 
than half of respondents agreed with the statement and only less than a third 
disagreed (for details see section 4.3.3.4).  
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In the survey, most respondents showed little concern about the long term storage 
of their communications data by mobile phone service providers (see section 
4.3.4.1). Instead, respondents identified many purposes for which location data 
could be used. As good uses for mobile phone location data were chosen: firstly, 
emergency services; secondly, solving crime; and thirdly, preventing acts of 
terrorism. These choices are identical to the organisations to which the respondents 
would give access to their location data without consent: firstly, emergency services, 
secondly, police and thirdly, intelligence services. All answer options relating to the 
three organisations and their services were selected significantly more often after 
the 2005 London terrorist attacks. At the same time the option ‘none’ was selected 
significantly less times (for details see sections 4.3.4.2 and 4.3.4.3).   
 
5.1.3 GT Category C - Using mobile phone settings to regulate privacy in the 
social area of privacy 
Mobile phones are an essential part of many people's lives in Britain. There are over 
65 million mobile phone subscriptions in the UK, according to Ofcom (Mobile 
Operators Association, 2006). A comparison of this figure to an estimated UK 
population of 60.2 million (National Statistics, 2006) illustrates the widespread use 
of mobile phones in the British society - there is more than one mobile phone per 
British citizen. Other statistics suggest that more than 78% of households in Britain 
own at least one mobile phone (National Statistics, 2005). Findings for this study 
correspond to these mobile phone statistics, as 91 % of the 477 survey respondents 
owned a mobile phone.  
 
The majority of mobile phone users taking part in the survey stated that they had 
their phone switched on and with them at all times. This was confirmed by the 
interviews, when individuals talked about routines and habits when using their 
mobile phone. In terms of communications data retention, this also means that, the 
location data generated by the participants’ mobile phones are identical to that of 
the phone users’ real-time location at most times. This raises the issue of individuals 
being traceable through their mobile phones at most or all times during the day and 
over a extended period of time, and confirms arguments voiced by human rights 
organisations that the continuous and routine retention of communications data 
subjects every citizen to the certainty of ongoing and unremitting interference in his 
or her private life’ (Privacy International, 2003a). The richness of mobile phone 
communications data makes it possible to compile a detailed profile of a person's 
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interests and reveals sensitive information about a person’s private life and social 
networks.  
It was not one of the main aims of this study to identify different types of mobile 
phones users. Nevertheless, it soon became evident that respondents could be 
divided into two broad types of users based on the way they used their phones: Low 
users and power user (see section 4.2.7). The distinction between different types of 
phone users was confirmed by findings from the survey (see section 4.3.2.2). The 
two groups of phone users make use of their phone settings in different ways in 
order to establish a degree of control over how others can get in touch with them. 
This corresponds to regulating how others gain access to a mobile phone user, 
which in turn relates to individuals' perception and protection of privacy (see section 
4.2.10.3), as the following comment shows:  
 
"You know one of the reasons why I necessarily won't have my phone turned 
on is because I don't want people to be able to contact me all the time. 
I don't want .. you know I want to have that .. space" (P134_F).  
 
The mobile phone is mainly used to regulate access to a person relating to a 
person’s social circle as explained in previous sections (see GT Category A - 
Different areas of privacy relating to location data, section 5.1.1).  
 
Already in the 1960s, McLuhan has recognised the disruptive nature and potential 
of the telephone, which he describes as “an irresistible intruder in time or place” 
(McLuhan, 1964, p. 271). McLuhan makes this observation when talking about how 
effortless otherwise elusive managers can be reached by the telephone - a new 
technology in those days. The mobile phone can influence the way individuals 
manage time and space in their lives, as Green (2002) remarks. She points out that 
the use of technologies can help individuals to control time, which can result in 
spatial and temporal flexibility. The mobile phone can bridge distances and help the 
user to engage in work and social relationships irrespective of distance or location. 
The mobile phone can be used as a tool for "negotiating social relationships and 
conflicting roles in everyday life" (Green, 2002, p. 289). The GT Category 
Contactability (Category C), which was developed based on the respondents’ 
statements, encapsulates this phenomenon as described by Green. 
 
Geser (2004) claims that users gradually progress in using their phone over the time 
of phone ownership. He describes different phases of expanding mobile phone 
usage from emergency use to routine and more sophisticated use.  Hence, this may 
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lead to the hypothesis that phone users adapt their ways of protecting their 
accessibility by others when changing their way of using mobile phone technology. 
However, it is not in the remit of this study to explore the long-term usage of mobile 
phones.  
 
The Category C - Contactability supports claims that the mobile phone has become 
an inherent part of the citizens’ lives (Harkin, 2003). However, this also means that 
mobile phone location data is collected about the mobile phone user on a 
continuous basis and irrespective of the place or the role that the individual holds in 
private or work life. As will be discussed in the following section, the mobile phone 
user’s ability to manage and access personal data as advocated by data protection 
legislation is not achievable under the regime of blanket data retention. The data 
protection legislation had been developed to prevent harm to individuals and 
negative consequences on society, however, these protections have been 
significantly weakened as has been discussed in previous sections (see for example 
2.3.3). 
 
5.1.4 GT Category B - Respondents’ definitions of privacy 
The following sections interlink respondents' definitions of privacy as presented in 
the previous chapter (section 4.2.10) with survey findings and definitions from the 
literature.  
 
5.1.4.1 Control over personal information 
Participants of this study relate the notion of privacy to their personal data and 
express the desire to retain control over it (see section 4.2.10.1). Survey responses 
confirm these findings and draw attention to the different aspects of information 
privacy, such as ownership of data, control, access and preferences who to share 
data with (see section 4.3.3.1). In the survey, the statement ‘No one having access 
to my personal data without my agreement’ was chosen by the majority of survey 
respondents as the most suitable definition of privacy, and hence confirms the 
importance of personal data to individuals. In the interviews, respondents’ describe 
a balancing act between telling others about oneself while at the same time 
retaining control over information that is communicated to others. The mobile phone 
as a ubiquitous communications tool can take the role as guard or as privacy 
protector by shielding the person from access by others, as explained by GT 
Category C (see previous section 5.1.3).  
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Respondents’ thoughts about privacy regarding personal information and control 
correspond to what has been recognised by scholars for many years (see Chapter 2 
- Literature Review, section, 2.1.2. What is worth noting here is that 
characterisations of privacy by participants seem to have remained similar to the 
rather traditional definitions, in spite of the increased use of digital data to store 
details about individuals (see section 2.1.4).  
 
Mobile phone location data and control over information 
It may seem remarkable that respondents' thoughts about privacy do not 
significantly differ from early privacy definitions by Warren and Brandeis in 1870. 
Especially as it could be argued that the relationship between privacy and personal 
data should have become more important because of the increased and routine 
generation of information facilitated by technological means. In other words, one 
could assume that definitions of privacy might change and adapt to technological 
developments. 
Nevertheless, individuals do not ponder about the digitised processes of data 
collections and even more importantly the potential effects or consequences of 
those on their lives. For example, participants talk about keeping their information to 
themselves in relation to friends and family. However they do not mention concerns 
specific to the retention of communications data. This may seem startling 
considering that the mobile phone - one of today's most predominant means of 
communication - generates and enables the keeping of digitised data logs for all 
communication transactions over which individuals have very little control. A 
seeming paradox could be identified here between, on the one hand, control over 
information in a social context, and on the other hand, a laissez-faire attitude 
towards personal information in other contexts. This might find a part explanation in 
the different areas in life that individuals associate with privacy: friends/family, 
commercial and government (see GT Category A - Different areas of privacy 
relating to location data, section 5.1.1).  
 
To summarise, despite the increased use of technologies in citizens’ daily lives, 
respondents still refer to ‘traditional’ definitions of privacy, which are irrespective of 
technological influences and have been elaborated by scholars already many years 
ago. However, the increased use of digital technologies has an influence on 
citizens’ loss of control over their personal information; in particular the generation 
of information and access to this information by others. Mobile phone location data 
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is a fitting example for this loss of control. Location data can be classified as 
information about the mobile phone user. It is generated in such a way that the 
mobile phone user does not have a choice over its generation, as the data is 
generated by default. Furthermore, the mobile phone user is often not aware of this 
data in everyday life and cannot know who accesses this data and for what reason. 
Hence the user cannot influence or control this type of personal data, which may 
lead to feelings of indignation or resignation (see 5.1.2 Responses to data 
retention). 
 
 
5.1.4.2 Liberty and freedom of doing  
On the one hand, it is important for individuals to retain control over their personal 
information, and on the other hand, it seems equally significant to them to not be 
controlled in the way they lead their life. Individuals’ comments in the interviews tell 
of the desire to have the choice to do what they want within legal limits. 
Respondents’ survey responses also confirm this notion of liberty and freedom (for 
more detail see section 4.3.3.1). 
 
The empirical findings of this study relate to the philosophical work 'On Liberty' by 
John Stuart Mill, first published in 1859 (Mill, 1974).  
P135_F’s describes Mill's harm principle in her own words as follows, 
 
“(…) you generally treat everybody as you would want yourself to be treated. 
Then that's all that's matters to me. I don't see that what I do, ehm, unless it 
impinges on somebody else, affects anybody else” (P135_F). 
 
Mill wrote that "Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is 
sovereign" (p. 69). The author has articulated the often referred to principle which 
states that one should do no harm to others. Related to this is the concept 
nonmaleficence, which requires avoiding doing harm and is an obligation in many 
moral theories (Chadwick, 2001). 
 
Mobile phone location data and liberty 
Some of Mill's beliefs from over a century ago, still correspond to the arguments that 
critics have raised in response to the current data retention regime (section 2.3.5). 
Mill talks about the "struggle between authority and liberty" and proclaims that the 
authorities need to be controlled by the liberty of the citizens, else the government 
can be a "dangerous weapon".  
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Individuals’ desire for liberty is indeed related to the retention of mobile phone 
location data.  It could be argued that in theory, the recording of location data does 
not affect or interfere with an individual's day-to-day activities because the 
generation and collection of communications data is not noticeable by the mobile 
phone user. Therefore the retention of communications data does not have an effect 
on their life or perception of privacy (see also P119_M’s statements in section 
4.1.2.2, Aim 2: Geographical location and privacy). In reality, however, the recording 
of a user's location data involves keeping evidence of a person's whereabouts; 
present and past. Location data can be combined with other communications data 
or information about the person. This pool of data can be compiled into a profile 
which conveys the phone user's habits and could also be related to the profiles of 
other persons (see section 4.1.1.5). 
 
Following this, it is argued that a mobile phone user’s awareness of the retention of 
communications data may have an impact on individuals' actions in everyday life 
(see also section 2.3.5.1 Objection on the ground of human rights and civil liberties). 
Respondent P133_M reflects on this relationship between perceptions of freedom 
and privacy as follows: 
  
“I just think like not my personal freedom in terms of like my freedom to do 
things but my perception of my freedom would change. Because, I might feel 
like I am being tracked by something or somebody” (P133_M). 
 
In other words, the retention of location data may indeed have an impact on a 
person's freedom to make decisions about his or her actions and on how to lead 
one's life. In the same manner, the retention of communications data may prevent a 
person from partaking in communications with others or influence these 
communications, due to the person's awareness of a data log being taken of every 
communication. However, other findings suggest that mobile phone users rather 
forget about being tracked and hence it does not influence their behaviour (see 
section 5.1.5). 
 
This study has focused on individuals' perspectives regarding the relationship 
between mobile phone location data and privacy, in order to identify how these 
compare to the positions of stakeholders such as NGOs, the British government or 
the academic literature. Despite this focus on a particular viewpoint, it is necessary 
to assess the potential impact of communications data retention on a person's 
freedom from a wider social context rather than merely a research participant's life. 
For one part, it can be argued that an individual's needs have to be balanced with 
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the requirements of the wider society (see situational map, section 4.2.2). For the 
other part, mobile phone data retention may have a potential impact on society as a 
whole. In other words, the behaviour of one individual may change in response to 
data retention. And this in turn would mean that if a considerable number of 
individuals change their behaviours, long-term data retention would have an effect 
on society as a whole. 
 
To summarise, individuals describe personal liberty as an important element of their 
perception of privacy. The long-term retention of mobile phone location data can be 
seen as related to individual liberty, as its storage and use by various actors impacts 
on the interplay between individuals' needs and those of the wider society. 
 
5.1.4.3 Privacy relating to space 
Interviews and survey results indicate that respondents frequently relate privacy to 
the concept of space. On the one hand, they refer to ‘mental space’ in the sense of 
having the freedom to express oneself, which is related to the concept of liberty, as 
discussed in the previous section. On the other hand, respondents use the term 
space in the sense of territorial space, such as one's home, when defining privacy 
(see section 4.2.10.3). Survey respondents used the term “space” most frequently, 
after noting down “personal” and "control over personal data" when providing their 
own definition of privacy. Respondents make a distinction between private and 
public life, between home and work life, as highlighted by responses to the open 
question in the survey (see section 4.3.3.1). The privacy related literature defines 
the category of territorial privacy, which concerns the setting of limits on intrusion on 
physical space such as domestic and other environments (see also Territorial 
privacy in section 2.1.2.). 
 
In addition to this, participants distinguish between different privacy related areas in 
their lives, as the interview and survey data indicate (see GT Category A, section 
4.2.9). At the same time respondents' comments show that the mobile phone is a 
technology - potentially one amongst others - that blurs the boundaries between 
private life and work or public life. The phone user can be contacted, or in other 
words access to his or her personal space can be gained, whether at home, at work 
or at any other place. Hence, the distinction between different areas in life is not as 
uncomplicated as it is initially portrayed by some respondents. 
Green (2002) confirms this observation of blurred boundaries by pointing out the 
shift from distinguishing between 'public' and 'private life' to the metaphors of 'on 
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time' and 'off time'. In other words, mobile phone users are reachable when the 
mobile phone is switched on, as opposed to having privacy when the phone is set to 
a less obtrusive ring tone setting or switched off, hence the expression 'off time' 
(see also GT Category C, section 4.2.8).  
 
Mobile phone location data and space 
Mobile phone location data is another case in point to illustrate the crossing of the 
imaginative borders between “my space” and that of “the others”, as 118_F 
discovers during the location tracking pilot study: 
 
A: Would you be concerned if the location service would be more accurate 
[than in the pilot study]? 
 
118_F: yes.  
 
A: If it would show on a map what house you are in? 
 
118_F: Mmh, not really.. what house.. yeah! Because it's my house. This sort 
of privacy if I am at home, no one should know where .. you know.. that's 
what we talked about: privacy. If it's government body, it's alright to know 
where I am. But other agencies, they shouldn't know where I am, if I am at 
home. But if I am in public places, like park or road, it is okay. But then 
how will they distinguish between, okay where I am now. How to 
differentiate between she's at home now okay we will leave her alone. That's 
the tricky thing, I think". 
 
The mobile phone is a constant appendage to the majority of citizens, and mobile 
phone location data is generated and corresponds to a person's geographical 
location as long as a mobile phone is carried. This means that location data is 
stored whether the person is in a public space, at home or anywhere else - location 
data makes no distinction between different areas in life. Hence the storage of 
mobile phone location data does not distinguish between different territorial areas of 
space and therefore intersects private and public areas of a mobile phone user's 
life. In other words, mobile phone location data allows intrusions into traditionally 
private areas like homes. The only means that a mobile phone user has to avoid the 
transmission of location data is to switch off his or her phone (Harvard Journal of 
Law & Technology, 2004). 
  
In addition, mobile phone location data contains information about a particular 
mobile phone user. As indicated in pervious sections (see GT Category B, section 
5.1.4.1), it is important for individuals to keep in control over information about 
themselves, who it is shared with and accessed. This raises the question whether 
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location data retention also has an impact on an individuals’ space in the 
metaphorical sense, in terms of liberty as discussed in the previous section 5.1.4.2. 
 
This separation between public-self and private-self as described by respondent 
P118_F is also acknowledged in the literature (Nissenbaum, 1998). Others, such as 
Stalder (2002), warn that digital and ubiquitous technologies perforate the boundary 
between public and private life. This will be further discussed in part 3 of this 
chapter (section 5.3.4). 
 
5.1.5 GT Category D - Perceptions of location tracking and power 
relationships 
Respondents described a close relationship between who stores and accesses data 
about them and the potential uses, including misuses, of this data (see also section 
4.2.3). The potential usages of personal data are particularly influenced by how 
much power the entity holds that has collected the data. Regarding location data 
and other forms of surveillance such as CCTV, respondents feel that the use of data 
is significantly more important, than the process or act of being monitored, as 
illustrated by Figure 5.1, below. Survey findings as presented in section 4.3.4.1 
'Concerns about data retention', confirm that it appears to be most important for 
respondents to know who has access to the data, as this will have an effect on how 
the data will be used.  
 
 
 
Figure 5.1: Steps in process of monitoring 
 
All four participants agreed without hesitation to take part in the location tracking 
pilot study. They explained that they trusted the researcher to not misuse the data 
and to only make use of it for the study. In addition, all participants admitted in the 
final pilot study interviews to have forgotten about being tracked. This may be seen 
as an indication that the respondents did not feel concerned about neither the use of 
location data nor about being tracked by the researcher. An explanation for this may 
be that the researcher was known to the participants and hence part of their social 
privacy zone. She was therefore either trusted or not believed to have the capacity 
  
 Being monitored   Reasons for  monitoring 
is justified by influences 
 
 Use of data 
Least important Most important 
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to use the data for malicious purposes. In addition, it could be remarked that 
participants forgot about being tracked because it was not intrusive, hence they 
were not reminded of it. In this context, the claim of Blanchette and Johnson (2002) 
that the long-term retention of data results in the disappearance of 'social 
forgetfulness' seems to be particularly relevant. In contrast to human memory 
information technologies enable data to be recorded and never forgotten, which 
means that every action in the past can be recalled. And this may be an aspect of 
data retention that individuals can easily to overlook (see section 5.3). The authors 
believe that the value of social forgetfulness is a concept that allows individuals a 
second chance and is necessary for a democratic society, as "democracy is 
squelched when individuals live in fear of repercussions for any nonconforming 
behaviour" (p. 36). In contrast to this line of reasoning, it needs to be argued that it 
is necessary to hold information about individuals in order to make them 
accountable for their actions. Related to this are debates about data retention 
versus data preservation, which evolve around the question whether data for all 
citizens should be stored and if yes, for how long (see section 2.3.4). 
 
5.1.6 Core category E - Balancing Act: Relationship between categories as a 
grounded theory about individuals’ perceptions of privacy in relation to 
mobile phone location data 
The following section summarises the relationships between the final categories and 
relates each of the categories to the Core category 'Balancing'.  
The main grounded theory categories are: 
 
o GT Category A: Areas of privacy 
o GT Category B: Participants’ privacy definitions 
o GT Category C: Contactability - Use of mobile phone to regulate privacy 
o GT Category D: Perceptions of location tracking and power relationships 
o GT Category E: Core category ‘Balancing’ 
 
All main categories are connected to the Core category ‘Balancing’ (see Figure 5.2). 
Privacy has a variety of meanings for participants, more than one for each 
participant. First, personal data and having control over it, second, liberty and 
freedom of doing what one wants to do and third, space (GT Category B). These 
meanings of privacy occur in particular areas and these include: friends and family, 
commercial companies, and government (GT Category A). Each of these three 
areas requires an act of balancing from the individual. Participants use mobile 
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phone settings to regulate their contactability or in other words their availability to 
others, mainly regarding their social contacts (GT Category C). Customers trade 
personal data against benefits from commercial organisations. Regarding the 
government privacy area, many respondents describe the need to balance privacy 
with security in the current political situation of terrorism threats (see section 4.2.12). 
Communications data, including mobile phone location data, constitutes data about 
a person. The data reveals a person’s geographical location and communication 
habits whenever a mobile phone is carried and used. Findings from this study 
confirm that the vast majority of phone users carry their mobile phone at most times 
during the day. Many participants were aware of location data before taking part in 
the study. Some show feelings of resignation or indignation about having their data 
recorded without consent. Other respondents describe a balancing act between 
personal privacy and national security, which result in their acknowledgement of the 
need for long-term data retention to fight crime and terrorism. 
 
Respondents of this study did not feel that they were under surveillance when their 
location data was recorded and stored by their mobile phone service providers and 
could have been accessed by governmental agencies; even if they understood that 
the data was being recorded. The actual process of having one's mobile phone 
communications data stored was not of importance to the participants but rather the 
reasons for the data collection (GT Category D). In addition, findings suggest that 
because the monitoring of location was not intrusive and happened without being 
seen by the participants, it did not seem to affect their behaviour.  Factors such as 
fear, safety and convenience play a part, when determining whether data is stored 
for beneficial purposes. Of most importance to mobile phone users is the use of 
data, which once again highlights the relevance of personal data for individuals’ 
perceptions of privacy. The GT Category D relates to the Core category 'Balancing' 
(GT Category E), in that the use of data is more relevant to respondents than the 
actual storage of location data. This could be interpreted as weighing up potential 
privacy invasions against the advantages of beneficial uses of data. 
 
The debate about the balance between privacy interests, on the one hand, and 
wider societal and community obligations, on the other, has also been referred to by 
Bennett (1995, p. 7). He summarises adequately that "this debate raises central 
theoretical questions about the relationship between the individual and the state, 
about boundaries of public and privacy and about the essential contest between 
individual liberty and social values and concerns".  
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Mobile phone settings & 
‘routines’ 
- ring tone settings 
- phone on/off,  
- phone with person or not 
CONTACTABILITYaffect
Perception 
of privacy 
Figure 5.2, below, provides a graphical display of relationships between the main 
elements of the grounded theory developed from empirical data.  
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5.2 Part 2: Interpretations of Empirical Findings - Individuals' 
perceived Relationship between Mobile phone location data and 
Privacy 
This second part of the chapter provides further interpretation of the empirical data 
and focuses on four main findings, which encapsulate the relationship between 
privacy and mobile phone location data. The findings are based on the GT 
categories, developed from pilot study, interviews and survey, as illustrated in part 
one of this chapter. The comparison between findings from this study and the 
privacy-related academic literature leads to the development of the main argument 
of this study (see section 5.3.3).  
 
5.2.1 Finding 1: Location data is not a threat to privacy - it is primarily a 
crime investigation tool 
The retention of location data in particular and communications data in general, is 
not perceived as a concern in terms of privacy for participants of this study.  
The majority of participants claim in interviews and survey to have heard of mobile 
phones generating location data and that the data is used together with other 
communications data by police and intelligence services. This awareness of location 
data increased significantly after the London terrorist attacks whereas the number of 
those who stated to have never heard of location data fell (see section 5.1.1.3). At 
the same time, respondents describe privacy as being about personal data and the 
ability to exercise some sort of control over this data (see Category B, section 
5.1.4).  
 
Mobile phone location data can be seen as privacy invasive according to criteria 
identified in the literature (see section 2.1.2.1). Hence, it could be concluded that 
respondents either do perceive mobile phone location data as not personal or if they 
do, it is acknowledged that the data is useful to be stored in response to crime and 
terrorism threats. As highlighted by GT Category D (section 5.1.5), the reasons for 
retaining data are of most importance. Hence the retention of communications data 
for national security purposes is seen as a sufficient justification by respondents. 
Consequently, the majority of survey respondents believe that emergency services, 
police and intelligence services should be allowed access to location data without 
their consent.  
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It appears as if respondents perceive the potential misuse of communications data, 
such as profiling of citizens, as distant and abstract threats. In contrast to this, the 
need of emergency services or of the police to access communications data for 
citizens' protection is seen as more a tangible use of the data. The three privacy 
areas as identified by GT Category A support this idea. Predominantly the social 
area of privacy is important to individuals' perceptions of privacy. In other words the 
mobile phone user’s immediate social environment and life style, associated with 
friends and family. However, mobile phone location data is seen to be linked 
predominantly to the government area of privacy, which is the most distant one to 
participants in terms of privacy. This may explain as to why the current long-term 
retention of communications data by service providers and its access by 
governmental agencies is not perceived as a threat to privacy by the majority of 
respondents.  
 
Communications data is primarily understood as a crime investigation tool and 
because participants are "not doing anything wrong" (P119_M), they are not 
concerned about the storage of their data. In addition, they do not feel concerned 
about the storage of their communications data because they are just "one amongst 
a hundred and million other people" (P117_M). For these reasons, individuals 
believe that it would be unlikely for them to "be singled out" (P117_M) and become 
a victim of a miscount of justice. 
Participants expressed only little concern about 'function creep' (Lyon, 2001), that is 
the use of data for another purpose than that for which it had been originally 
collected for. The respondents' views towards communications data retention may 
be called the "triumph of public interest" at the expense of privacy rights, as 
pronounced by Davies (1997, p. 161). There is a trade-off between privacy and 
security, or in other words, a desire of individuals to keep communications data 
private which needs to be weighed up against the efforts of the government to 
provide national security. This is detailed by the Core category 'Balancing' (see also 
5.1.1.3 GT Category A - Privacy area related to government). 
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5.2.2 Finding 2: Location data is not related to day-to-day life 
Even though individuals claim to be aware of location data in interview and survey, 
they do not relate this data to their day-to-day lives. This became particularly 
evident in the pilot study in which the geographical location of participants' mobile 
phones could be accessed by the researcher at any time. In an initial interview, the 
researcher had discussed the study with the participants. After the four week 
tracking period a final interview took place, in which all participants admitted that 
they stopped thinking about the researcher being able to access information about 
their real-time location.  
 
This may on the one hand be seen as confirming the existence of different areas of 
privacy (see GT Category A, section 5.1.1). The researcher was known to the 
participants, hence, belonged to the friends and family privacy area. As explained 
above, communications data retention only affects the government zone of privacy, 
hence it has not an immediate effect on the life of mobile phone users and is hence 
not at the forefront of their minds. On the other hand, this may indicate that even 
though individuals claim to know about the existence of location data, they do not 
relate it to their personal lives. When they hear about location in the media, they see 
it as a crime investigation tool (see Finding 1, above). They do not realise that their 
own data is stored or they do forget about it, possibly because the phone has 
become as essential element of modern life. Individuals do not seem to think of the 
'knock-on effects' of communications 
data retention unless they make out visible consequences or particular media 
coverage.   
 
The different views of privacy, as identified by this study correspond to those 
described in the Surveillance Study Network's report to the Information 
Commissioner (Surveillance Study Network, 2006). This report highlights three 
different views of individuals: first, the 'rational view', which corresponds to the 
justification of data retention as described in GT Category A, second the 'compliant, 
paranoid and powerless' reaction to surveillance, which ties in with this studies GT 
subcategories of 'resignation' and 'indignation'. The third view is described in the 
report as 'active' and depicts the views of the concerned citizen who is willing to 
participate in the debate about surveillance. However, this stance had not been 
clearly identified in this study's empirical data (see section 4.2.9.3). 
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This seeming discrepancy also relates to the concept of a privacy paradox as 
indicated by Stalder (2002). When citizens are asked questions about privacy, they 
claim to be concerned about it, however at the same time it can be observed that in 
everyday life they do little to protect it. The metaphor of a privacy gap is evoked by 
Viseu et al. (2004) to describe the same phenomenon. They provide the example 
that if requested to give out personal information, citizens provide it without asking 
further questions, as for example when asked about credit card application details 
on the street.  
The fact that participants had forgotten about being tracked is also related to other 
findings from the pilot study (see section 4.1.2.3). Here the respondent P117_M 
explained that he was aware about his workplace keeping a log of email 
transactions and phone conversations. However, he would still use it for personal 
purposes as he frequently forgets about the potential of being monitored. 
 
 
5.2.3 Finding 3: Beneficial uses for location data  
Mobile phone location data does not currently play a role in respondents' day-to-day 
lives (see Finding 2, above). Even though an increasingly large number of 
respondents claimed to be aware of location data, no one mentioned to have used 
any of the commercially available services (see section 2.2.3 for examples of mobile 
location-based services). This corresponds to Finding 1, above, in that location data 
is predominantly perceived as a crime investigation tool. 
 
Nevertheless, the survey data indicate that respondents could imagine several 
useful purposes for location data, particularly in the survey sample after the London 
terrorist attacks, in which more respondents claimed to know about location data. 
The majority of survey respondents stated that they would be willing to give access 
to their location data to family (70%) and friends (33%) and would give access to 
their communications data without their explicit consent, firstly to emergency, 
secondly to police and thirdly to intelligence services. And in correspondence to 
these figures the majority of respondents perceived the retention of communications 
data as useful (for more detail see Chapter 4 - Presentation of Findings, sections 
4.3.4.2 ff.). When relating these findings to the GT categories, this means that 
respondents would share their location data within two out of three privacy areas as 
identified by GT Category A. For one part as a crime investigation tool in the 
government area, and for the other part with friends and family, however not with 
commercial organisations. Nevertheless, it could be expected that mobile phone 
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users would want to gain control over this data regarding their social privacy area, 
once location-based services will be more widely used in the UK. Otherwise there 
might the danger of their ‘contactability’ being compromised (see GT Category C, 
Contactability, section 5.1.3). 
 
The participants explained in the interviews that they believed it to be beneficial that 
communications data was retained in response to terrorism threats. This also 
highlights the relevance of the GT Category D to describe individuals’ attitudes 
towards location data and privacy - in that the use of location data is seen as more 
important than the actual act of being monitored. In addition, this also emphasises 
the importance of the Core category E ‘Balancing’ (section 5.1.6), because it was 
most important for respondents to know that location data was used for a beneficial 
purpose. This ties in with Lyon et al.'s (2005) claim that the wider social forces need 
to be taken into account when considering privacy issues. Particularly, as it can be 
desirable for individuals to supply and share their personal information, when this is 
beneficial for them. While Marx (2006) argues that contemporary "new" surveillance 
technologies (see section 2.2.5.1) are taken for granted by citizens and are seen as 
necessary for the "post 9/11 culture of control",  which again helps to understand 
the view that communications data retention itself is not perceived as a means of 
surveillance, especially if it seen to serve a worthwhile purpose. 
 
5.2.4 Finding 4: Location data enables creating profiles of mobile phone users 
As explained in Chapter 2 Literature Review, continuous mass collections of 
digitised personal data can be interpreted as surveillance. These arguments 
seemed to be reinforced as even Britain’s Information Commissioner terms Britain’s 
society ‘a surveillance society’, based on the fact that the vast majority of citizens 
are subjected to frequent collections of personal data on a day-to-day basis 
(Surveillance Studies Network, 2006). Routine collections and potential analysis of 
data associated with individuals may be used for establishing profiles of individuals 
and populations (see section 2.1.5). Marx (2006) highlights as an important element 
of liberty a person's ability to control one's information and be unnoticed or rather 
noticed when one desires it. The capacity to control informational boundaries is 
necessary in civil society. The tendencies of bureaucratic organisations to want to 
amass more and more detailed personal information about individuals in order to 
react pro-actively to threats and risks. The literature on surveillance supports the 
view that quantity and quality of surveillance have changed. The volume of data 
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collected and stored by private as well as public actors has facilitated a range of 
new practices (Bennett, 1995). 
 
It seems in stark contrast to these arguments that the majority of respondents of this 
study did either not seem to be aware of, or not concerned about these potential 
surveillance threats that are so often referred to in the popular and academic 
literature. Particularly the retention of mobile phone communications data bears the 
potential of identifying patterns in the collected data. Even if specific individuals are 
not identified, it is possible to analyse the behaviour of particular user groups or of 
mobile phone users located in a particular area (see section 2.1.5.1). 
 
The pilot study confirmed the potential of location data to establish profiles of mobile 
phone users. The use of data from different sources helped to interpret incomplete 
data about a person and build a profile of a person's activities. The participants' 
geographical locations obtained by the tracking service provider were not accurate 
to the metre but only showed the postcode (see section 4.1.1.5). However, the 
researcher could on many occasions deduce a participant’s actual exact 
whereabouts by combining his or her approximate location with other known 
information about this person. Hence, it would have been possible to establish a 
complete picture of the person's movements and habits over time. 
 
Findings of this study indicate that individuals often do not seem to be able to make 
out or notice digitised processes of data collections. Many pay attention to what is 
taking place in their own immediate environments, such as in their social area of 
privacy, or in other words regarding friends, family or work. However, 
communications data retention is only relevant to the government area of privacy 
and not any other of the areas associated with privacy (see Finding 2). The 
unawareness of collections of personal data inevitably leads to a loss of control over 
the generation and resulting usages of personal information (as described in section 
5.1.4.1). Data protection and the lawful and responsible handling of data are 
essential when routine data collections take place for a particular purpose. 
GT Category E (section 5.1.6) explicates the balancing act between the need for 
data collection with the actual use of the data. 
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5.3 Part 3: Individuals’ Perceptions - Parallels and Divergences 
from the Academic Literature 
Many stakeholders have debated the issues related to communications data 
retention as presented in the Chapter 2 - Literature Review (section 2.3.5). In order 
to examine the individuals' picture of privacy in relation to location data, this study 
has chosen an inductive methodological approach. This final part of the chapter 
illustrates similarities and variances between individuals’ perceptions and those 
predominantly expressed in the literature.  
 
Based on the empirical findings, as discussed above and in the previous chapter, 
two arguments have been developed:  
 
For one part, this study confirms existing definitions of privacy known from the 
literature.  Respondents perceive privacy to be about personal information, 
control over it, personal liberty and space (see section 5.1.4 GT Category B - 
Respondents’ definitions of privacy). 
  
For the other part, despite these similar and familiar privacy definitions, 
significant discrepancies can be identified between participants’ views of 
privacy and the privacy related literature regarding the scope of privacy 
invasions and the use of technology.  
 
Scope of privacy definition 
Firstly, this study has identified that - perhaps not surprisingly - an individual's focus 
on privacy relates to and is based upon the individual's point of view, a person’s 
individual life. Gestalt psychologists believe that individuals will always 
decontextualise data back into an individually defined whole or context in order to 
interpret it (Introna, 1997), which may explain the behaviour of the respondents of 
this study. Individuals describe the impact of retention of communications data on 
their life and do not to consider society as a whole which is, however, the 
predominant view in the literature. For example, individuals’ definitions of privacy 
mainly relate to their personal data and not to the technologies that generate or 
handle the data. This may provide an explanation as to why participants do not see 
or not comprehend the impact of digital data collections, such as communications 
data retention or shopping loyalty cards, on a greater scale then their own 
immediate environment. Finding 2, above, supports this argument as individuals do 
generally not seem to be concerned about the retention of their communications 
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data and do not tend to relate this to themselves or to their own life. Also Marx 
(2006, p. 34) has found that individuals tend to "ignore the power of aggregating bits 
of data into a mosaic which is greater than the sum of the individual pieces". 
 
In contrast to these views of the participants of this study, other academic literature 
predominantly focuses on the impacts of digital data collections on the society as a 
whole. The retention of mobile phone communications data of all British mobile 
phone users has an impact on the wider society as it can result in a climate of 
suspicion, threaten the freedom to speak and think freely (see section 2.3.5.1 
Argument 1: Objection on the ground of human rights and civil liberties). The 
retained data can be accessed for every mobile phone user in retrospective and 
also may be used to make predictions for the future of individuals or groups of 
people with certain characteristics (see also Finding 4, section 5.2.4).  
 
The notion of privacy influenced by technologies 
Secondly, the respondents' privacy definitions mainly relate to traditional views of 
privacy, that is to say, they tend to be independent of technological influences. For 
the respondents of this study privacy is about moral rights and personal liberties. 
Threats to privacy are intrusions of personal space and also personal affronts 
associated with mass data collections, such as identity theft or annoying marketing 
calls. In summary, respondents' privacy definitions are about personal information 
and control, space and liberty (see section 5.1.4). Respondents do not perceive it as 
important that data is collected per se, as illustrated in GT Category D. Individuals 
describe that the uses of the data and who collects the data are the most important 
factors regarding personal data collections. For these reasons, it is argued that 
respondents' views of privacy predominantly relate to definitions of privacy in the 
literature that are not connected to new technologies or digital data.  
 
When individuals talk about their views of privacy it seems that technologies do not 
play an important part (see Finding 2). What seems most relevant is the role of 
privacy in different areas in life (social, commercial, government). The mobile phone 
is a technological tool that helps to regulate access to a person, particularly in the 
area of privacy related to social contacts (GT Category C Contactability). However 
at the same time, a blurring of boundaries occurs between different areas in life 
such as private and work life because of mobile phones, which is to some extend 
recognised by individuals (see previous section 5.1.4.3 Privacy relating to space).  
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The literature, however, takes a different view of privacy compared to that of the 
individuals taking part in this study. Privacy literature published over the last 
decades - that is during the era of the so-called information society - predominantly 
focuses on the role of technology in relation to privacy. And particularly on the 
potential of technologies to invade the privacy of individual consumers and citizens, 
which in turn is argued to have an impact on society as a whole. Terms such as 
'dataveillance' have been coined to describe the mass data collections of digitised 
data and the impact of this data retention on individuals and society (see section 
2.1.5.2). 
 
To summarise, two different views of privacy can be identified. For one part the  
predominant privacy definition of this study’s participants which can be interpreted 
as corresponding to the traditional values of privacy, such as the “right to be alone” 
as postulated by Warren and Brandeis already in the late 19th century. This privacy 
definition will be referred to in the following as 'individual view of privacy'. In contrast 
to this stands the 'collective view of privacy' which can be predominantly identified in 
the more recent literature about privacy. This view of privacy relates to impact of 
technologies on privacy and the implications of these influences on the wider 
society. 
 
These two distinct notions of privacy developed from the analysis of empirical 
evidence and its comparison to the literature lead to the following claim: A 
fundamental rift can be identified between the perceptions and definitions of privacy 
between individuals and the academic literature in relation to mobile phone location 
data. The depiction and recognition of this divergence is relevant as it can affect 
future policies regulating collections, storage and analysis of personal data. This 
discrepancy between individual and collective views of privacy is to some extent 
recognised by the participants of this study and also in the literature, as explained in 
the following sections. 
 
5.3.1 Respondents' views regarding privacy, society and technology 
Some interviewees pondered about the fact that they are one individual within the 
wider society, and the connection of this to mass data collections. The following 
quotes provide an example:  
 
”So, I don't think, I would be that bothered because I am not one of these 
people that worry about this big brother state they talk about. Because 
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frankly in my thinking there is so many people out there anyway. That I am 
just one person amongst a hundred and million other people. So that's 
why I am not too bothered about being tracked, I don't think to be honest. 
And I think, I do nothing wrong anyway but” (P117_M). 
 
“You are just once more want part of like a bigger picture and you are like 
insignificant… individual, you are just like a figure or something (..)" 
(P136_F).  
 
Some respondents grapple with the concept of being one citizen within the whole 
UK population. On the one hand this means to them, that they are one “insignificant” 
part of the overall “bigger picture” (see quote P136_F, above). On the other hand, 
this also suggests that they are very unlikely to be “singled out”. In other words, they 
feel that it is very unlikely that their communications data will be scrutinised by the 
authorities. Particularly, as P117_M in the quote above points out that he is not 
doing anything wrong, meaning that he is not committing any legal offences that 
would require police investigations. The GT Category E ('Balancing Act') 
encapsulates this interplay between wanting to release personal information to be 
used for crime and terrorism investigations, and the desire to retain control over 
personal data.  
 
Respondents often refer in interviews and survey to ‘Big Brother’ when talking about 
data retention (see Appendix M variable 'surveillance' in Question 9). In Orwell's 
novel 'Nineteen eighty-four’, the fictional character Big Brother keeps the whole 
society under complete surveillance in order to punish those who rebel against the 
system (Orwell, 1959). Those being watched are kept subordinate by means of 
uncertainty which results in the situation that citizens can never be sure whether Big 
Brother is watching or not. This also relates to Jeremy Bentham's Panopticon prison 
plan; the Greek word Panopticon translates as 'all-seeing place'. In 1791, Bentham 
envisaged a prison layout which established control and power over inmates by 
subjecting the prisoners to the unseen and potentially constant gaze of the guards. 
No-one could be sure whether or not they were being observed (Lyon, 2001). 
It can be argued for and against interpreting communications data retention as a 
version of surveillance similar to that described by Orwell or Bentham. On the one 
hand, there are parallels in that the retention of communications data can give 
mobile phone users the feeling that they are constantly under observation (see 
section 5.1.4.2). Mobile phone users do not have any means of determining whether 
their (present or past) data is being looked at or not, as the data is transmitted 
continuously and by default. On the other hand, individuals are often either not 
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aware of data collections, because they do not know about the long-term data 
retention or have forgotten about it (see Finding 2). This would mean that 
comparisons between the surveillance practices as imagined by Orwell or Bentham 
are not adequate, because most mobile phone users are not conscious of having 
their data collected and therefore do not feel monitored.  
 
5.3.2 Individual and collective privacy in the literature 
Phillips and Curry (in Lyon ed., 2003) describe three forms of privacy concern in 
relation to geodemographic systems. Geodemography is related to location data as 
it combines geography, the study of divisions of land according to latitude and 
longitude, with the demographics of the land’s inhabitants. Geodemographic data 
can be used by commercial companies to target information towards those they 
want to influence; geodemographic segmentation classifies small areas with similar 
demographic profiles.  
 
Phillips and Curry’s analysis encapsulates privacy concerns articulated in other 
publications about personal space, mass data collection and private versus public 
data. Firstly, Philips and Curry recognise an invasion of personal space, which 
makes privacy a matter of individual rights and autonomy. Secondly, the authors 
identify privacy concerns in relation to corporate practices in the form of mass 
collections of consumer data. These can result in social discrimination through 
consumer profiling. Thirdly, the distinction between public and private issues, as 
also discussed by Nissenbaum (1998) (see also section 2.1). Regarding these three 
foci of privacy, Phillips and Curry identify different trends in social research over the 
last decades. In the 1980s scholars introduced the matter of social discrimination to 
privacy definitions. This opinion corresponds to Clarke's observations about the 
dangers arising from the systematic use of personal data stored in databases for the 
investigation or monitoring of individuals’ actions (see Clarke, 1988, and also 
section 2.1), and therefore relates to the ‘collective view’ of privacy, as discussed 
above. 
Furthermore, Phillips and Curry argue that the focus of privacy concerns has shifted 
in the 21st century towards the personal affront due to the increased use of mobile 
phones and PDAs which are carried by and assigned to one person. The mass 
collection and analysis of personal data, as well as discriminatory classification of 
individuals have moved into the background in favour of issues of trespass and 
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nuisance. This view corresponds to the privacy definitions of the respondents of this 
study, as it focuses on the individual view of privacy. 
 
Phillips and Curry’s accounts, and those of others support this study's claim that 
privacy definitions in relation to personal data can be divided into two distinct 
categories: firstly, privacy as an individual matter and secondly privacy on a 
collective level. The former focuses on individuals’ perceptions of invasions of 
personal space, whereas the latter takes into account social dimensions and 
questions of social justice regarding data collections. Respondents of this study 
perceive privacy as an individual matter, independent of technology, whereas 
scholarly authors (such as Lyon, 2001; Stalder, 2002; and Marx, 2002) focus on the 
impacts of technology on privacy and tend to take into account wider social impacts 
of digitalisation of data deriving from use of technology. 
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5.3.3 Using GT categories to support the differing notions of individual and 
collective privacy 
The distinction of two differing views of privacy as identified by this study and in the 
literature leads to the following argument. Whilst individuals still hold a rather 
traditional picture of privacy, not influenced by technology and solely related to their 
own personal lives ('individual privacy'), scholars paint a picture of privacy that is 
affected by technology and relates to society as a whole (‘collective privacy'). This 
observation is supported by the notion brought forward by Stalder (2002), 
proclaiming that many authors see recent developments in information and 
communications technologies as shifting the notion of privacy, away from a view 
focused on the individual towards a social concern on a wider scale. The study 
support this view proclaimed by Stalder but at the same time acknowledges that 
citizens' interpretations of privacy do not match up with this shifted concept of 
privacy. 
 
The GT categories developed by this study (see Part 1 of this chapter) and the 
findings based on these categories (see Part 2) support the idea of a changing 
notion of privacy. 
 
Grounded theory categories 
The GT categories derived from empirical findings support the argument described 
above as follows: Privacy definitions of respondents correspond to the traditional 
views of privacy, not related to technologies (see GT Category B). Individuals’ views 
of privacy are predominantly related to the social area of privacy, in other words 
friends and family (see GT Category A). The mobile phone is a communications 
technology that can be used to negotiate and regulate privacy in this social area 
(GT Category C). Respondents explain that the actual process of personal data 
collection is not of relevance for privacy - whether facilitated by technology or not - 
but instead it is of particular importance who collects the data and for what purpose 
(GT Category D). In all three areas of privacy, there is a balance that needs to be 
struck between the reasons for data collections and its use, such as justifying 
communications data retention of all citizens with crime and terrorist investigations 
(GT Category E). It is important for individuals to know and agree with the reasons 
of data collection and to have trust in the entity gathering the data. Therefore it 
could be deduced that the consent of mobile phone users to store the data is not a 
relevant matter in this context. The mobile phone user's agreement with the long-
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term communications data retention regime is provided when signing a mobile 
phone contract. In addition, it can be supposed that citizens would also give their 
explicit consent if required, as long as they would perceive beneficial purposes of 
data retention, such as for example benefits for safety and security. 
 
Four main findings 
To summarise, mobile phone location data is not perceived as a threat to privacy by 
participants because of its beneficial use by police, intelligence and emergency 
services (Finding 1). These uses of location data are not related to individuals' 
social area of privacy but to the government area of privacy. Hence location data 
retention is not perceived to be related to every day life (Finding 2). However, 
individuals could imagine beneficial uses of location data, in their social zone 
(Finding 3), in which case it could be expected that individuals would want to control 
location and other information related to themselves (GT Category B).  
 
Despite location data seemingly not being related to an individual citizen's daily life, 
it is important to be aware of the potential of using communications data for profiling 
(Finding 4). Finding 4 particularly highlights the differing views of privacy between 
individuals and other stakeholders, the divergences between the concepts of 
'individual privacy' and 'collective privacy'. Individuals still hold the traditional view of 
privacy and hence tend not to consider digital mass data collections as privacy 
invasive, despite the calls of caution by NGOs, academics and some of the popular 
literature. 
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5.3.4 Using a bubble metaphor to explicate the changing the definition of 
privacy in response to technological developments 
A bubble metaphor as evoked by Stalder (2002) is particularly appropriate to further 
illustrate the divergences in privacy views of participants of this study and the 
literature. Stalder uses the metaphor of a bubble to illustrate and at the same time to 
criticise the commonly used definition of privacy related to personal data.  
 
Privacy can be described as a bubble surrounding each person (see Figure 5.3). 
Size and dimension of the bubble differ from person to person and determine a 
person’s ability to control who enters the bubble or in other words the person’s 
personal space. This bubble metaphor relates to the 
notion of 'individual privacy', as described in the 
previous section, and hence corresponds to the 
research participants' definition of privacy: privacy is 
about personal data, space and liberty (GT Category 
B). According to this definition, privacy is an entirely 
individual matter and concern as opposed to relating 
to society as a whole.  
 
However, the findings from this study also confirm Stalder’s claims that the bubble 
metaphor for privacy is not applicable for the following two reasons.  
 
The first point of critique of the bubble metaphor is that a privacy definition 
according to the bubble metaphor would mean that privacy protection is about 
defending a boundary between 'private' and 'public'.  
The metaphor may be useful to illustrate 
the use of mobile phone settings to 
regulate access to a person, in other words 
to regulate access ‘from the outside’ by 
others. The phone acts as a shield, just like 
the bubble, to protect an individual’s 
privacy (see GT Category C 
'Contactability'). 
 
However, this boundary is not as rigid as the metaphor suggests, as modern life 
styles are often dominated by networked and communications technologies such as 
 
Figure 5.4: Privacy bubble is pierced by 
connections from the outside
 
Figure 5.3: Privacy bubble 
surrounding a person
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the internet and mobile phones. These technologies pierce the bubble and result in 
numerous connections from and with the outside (Figure 5.4). Particularly the 
mobile phone pierces this imaginative protective shield in that it continuously 
collects and emits data about its user, such as for example in form of location data. 
New technologies challenge traditional barriers of privacy protection and physical 
means such as walls, distance or sealed envelopes and surpass physical limitations 
to information access (Marx, 2002). This study confirms that the boundaries 
between private and public have become blurred due to the use of mobile phone 
technologies (see in section 5.1.4.3, Privacy relating to space). 
 
The second argument against the use of the bubble metaphor for describing privacy 
is based on the fact that the bubble metaphor assumes an individual’s ability to 
determine who can access this individual's information and under what conditions. 
However, the numerous occurrences of automated collections of personal data 
facilitated by technologies, result in individuals not being able to exercise this control 
over the collection and use of their personal data. This also underlines the 
relevance of GT Category B, which identifies that privacy for the participants of this 
study is primarily about data and control over it.  
 
On the one hand, the argument that individuals would not be able to control access 
to their data themselves seems questionable since most data collection occur 
repeatedly over time. Hence, decisions relating to data collections and data sharing 
do only have to be made once as to whether or not to release the data. On the other 
hand, many individuals are not aware of their data being collected, which relates 
back to Marx’ accounts of new surveillance (see section 2.1.5.1). Additionally, 
individuals have not always got the choice to not release their data due to 
convenience, power relationships (see Chapter 4, Memo 1) or security 
requirements, such as CCTV. In addition, it is often desirable to be represented in 
certain databases, such as for example for credit ratings. 
Because of the increased and automated generation of digital data about citizens 
and the use of this data for numerous purposes, it has become increasingly difficult 
for individuals to identify collections of personal data and react in an adequate way. 
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5.4 Chapter summary and conclusions 
This chapter has provided an interpretation and analysis of the empirical findings 
from interviews, mobile phone location tracking and a survey. The grounded theory 
methodology was utilised to illustrate patterns and themes useful in understanding 
the broader discourses concerning location data relating to privacy, technology and 
policy-setting. The three data collection phases were at the heart of the study, as it 
was of vital importance to learn about and identify the perceptions and views of 
those whose mobile communications data is being gathered by default on a 
continuous basis. The grounded theory categories have been used to connect the 
empirical reality to the emerging theory.  
 
The first part of the chapter has presented the grounded theory categories and the 
relationships between them to offer an explanation about the phenomenon under 
study: individuals' views of privacy in relation to mobile phone location data. A 
triangulation of empirical findings was successful in that pilot study and survey have 
confirmed the GT categories developed in the interviews. Findings from the 
empirical data were contrasted to the relevant literature in order to provide a holistic 
interpretation of the research question. The categories, relationships and the 
comparison to the relevant literature have resulted in the development of four 
findings, which have been presented and discussed in the second part. 
 
Survey findings have shown that participants of the study were largely aware of the 
existence of mobile phone location data. Nevertheless, they tended not to perceive 
the long-term retention of mobile phone communications data and access by 
governmental agencies as a threat to privacy. Participants perceived different areas 
in relation to their view of privacy, as has been discussed in the grounded theory 
Category A (section 5.1.1). Privacy was seen to be mostly important to the 
participants’ 'social zone', which mainly related to friends and family (see also 
Category C, section 5.1.3). Opposing to this zone closely associated with the 
concept of privacy, are dealings with the State and police. This area of privacy is the 
most distant one to respondents, as they tend to only deal with it on an exceptional 
basis, as for example in case of emergency or crime. The most significant of the 
four findings showed that the default retention of mobile phone location data was 
not perceived by respondents as a threat to privacy or a form of surveillance. 
Instead, location data was perceived as a crime-investigation tool, related to the 
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government area of privacy. Location data was not seen to be associated with the 
social privacy zone, as it was not seen to be related to day-to-day life, partly 
because it mobile users would not see any records of that data.  
 
The third and final part of this chapter has drawn attention to the discrepancies 
between the respondents’ views of privacy and those predominantly depicted the 
literature. It has been argued that the concept of privacy is changing with 
individuals' increased dependence on electronic communications technologies in 
everyday life. Whilst individuals tend to hold a rather traditional picture of privacy, 
not influenced by technology and solely related to their own personal lives, scholars 
paint a picture of privacy that is affected by technology and relates to society as a 
whole. Digital mass data collections, such as communications data retention, are 
not perceived as privacy invasive by individuals.  
 
The subsequent and final chapter provides a set of broad conclusions and 
demonstrates how the aims and objectives, as introduced in Chapter 1, have been 
addressed throughout the thesis. Contributions to the field of studies and ideas for 
future research are presented and discussed. 
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Chapter 6 Conclusions  
 
This final chapter highlights the contributions of the PhD research to the field of 
study, but also considers the study's limitations. The aims and objectives, as 
introduced in Chapter 1, are revisited and addressed, as well as the criteria for 
grounded theory research. The chapter provides a conclusion for the overall study 
and makes suggestions for further research.  
 
6.1 Contribution to the field and significance of the study 
This research study has investigated the implications of mobile phone location data 
on individuals' perceptions of privacy. Citizens are being monitored in response to 
threats such as crime and terrorism and these growing collections of data may 
impact on individuals’ civil liberties including privacy. The mobile phone can be seen 
as a very privacy invasive technology. It blurs the boundaries between different 
areas in life, such as family and work life. Mobile phone location data encompasses 
private and public spaces, and communications data is retained for ordinary citizens 
as well as for criminals. This study has taken to heart the call of researchers for 
more empirical studies investigating the impact of communications technologies on 
everyday life (see Chapter 1). Particularly the area of communications data 
retention has received very little empirical research interest so far. Rather prevalent 
are broad statements by the stakeholders involved (see Chapter 2, section 2.3.5).  
 
The main contribution of the thesis is the development of a substantive theory 
grounded in empirical data from interviews, location tracking and a survey. This 
theory is specific to a particular area, as it maps the relationship between mobile 
phone location data and perceptions of privacy within the UK. The theory 
establishes links between concepts such as definitions of privacy and the process of 
monitoring. It explains how individuals use mobile phone settings as a way to 
regulate privacy, in other words, to regulate access to the mobile phone user. 
Five final grounded theory categories were devised directly based on empirical data. 
The categories are as follows, 1) GT Category A: Areas of privacy, 2) GT Category 
B: Participants’ privacy definitions, 3) GT Category C: Contactability - Use of mobile 
Chapter 6 - Conclusions 
 
Andrea Gorra         Page 220 
phone to regulate privacy, 4) GT Category D: Perceptions of location tracking and 
power relationships, 5) GT Core Category E: Balancing. 
By explicating the relationships between those categories, a theory about the 
phenomenon under study was developed. The theory explains that mobile phone 
users are predominantly aware of the existence of mobile phone location data and 
can imagine useful applications for this type of data. They do not perceive the 
retention of mobile phone location data as a form of surveillance or an invasion of 
mobile phone user's privacy but instead see the data primarily as a crime 
investigation tool. Respondents believed that the reasons for data being collected 
were more important than the actual act of being monitored, which emphasises the 
importance of the core category balancing which captures the balancing acts related 
to privacy that every individual needs to perform in everyday life.  
 
Participants define privacy as being about personal data, control over it and 
personal space and liberty. Mobile phone location data can be identified as sensitive 
information about a mobile phone user. While the location information itself may not 
be privacy invasive, it may become so in conjunction with other data about the 
person and the potential to store this data for a long period of time. The data could 
be used to analyse past movements and communication routines of the person, as 
well as predict potential future behaviour, which can have negative consequences 
for the individual (see Chapter 2, section 2.2.5). 
 
Findings from this PhD study support the argument that the concept of privacy is 
changing with individuals' increased dependence on electronic communications 
technologies in day-to-day life. This argument manifests itself in the divergence 
between the views of privacy in the literature and as expressed by the respondents 
of this study. The academic literature paints a picture of privacy that is affected by 
technology and relates to society as a whole. For instance, the literature tends to 
portray continuous collections of communications data as surveillance and hence as 
having an influence on the wider society as they can impact on social justice and 
civil liberties (see Finding 4, previous chapter). In comparison to this, individuals 
tend to hold a much narrower view of privacy, solely related to their own personal 
lives and tend to define privacy independently of technological influences. What 
seems important to them regarding privacy is their immediate social area, such as 
friends and family.  
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These views of privacy are reflected by individuals’ attitudes towards mobile phone 
location data. Participants of this study did not perceive continuous collections of 
digitised data, such as mobile phone location data as a threat. A reason for this may 
be that the data and its uses do not seem to have an immediate and direct influence 
on individuals' lives. Location data is only seen as connected to the governmental 
privacy area (see Category A, section 5.1.1). Hence, location data or 
communications data in general are not perceived as a threat to privacy but 
primarily as a crime investigation tool.  
 
Citizens' perceptions of the long-term retention of mobile phone communications 
data are of relevance - particularly the diverging views of individuals and the 
literature regarding the effects of data retention on privacy. The views of citizens 
can and should have an effect on future policies regulating the gathering, storage 
and analysis of personal data. For example, the Surveillance Studies Network 
(2006) has compiled a report for a conference hosted by the UK’s Information 
Commissioner to address the implications of increasing surveillance and its impact 
on people’s everyday lives. Hence, it is important to portray and represent the 
needs of ordinary citizens in this complex debate about technological influences on 
the privacy of individuals and the British society as a whole.  
 
6.2 Limitations 
The limitations of this study can be characterised as follows: 
 
Firstly, it should be mentioned that the findings and analysis of this study are based 
on a limited number of respondents. A small number of ten interviews were 
conducted and the survey was completed by 477 respondents. In other words, the 
study’s findings are based on a small sample and hence not generalisable across a 
large population. In response to this, it should be pointed out that it was not the aim 
of this study to conduct an entirely quantitative study with statistical validity. Instead, 
the grounded theory methodology was used to develop a small-scale or substantive 
theory to explain the phenomenon of individuals’ privacy and communications data 
retention. Limitations of the GT methodology have been considered and addressed 
in Chapter 3 - Methodology (section 3.1.7). 
 
Secondly and following on from the first point it could be seen as a limitation that 
only a small-scale theory was developed. This substantive theory focuses on the 
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explanation of a particular area, that is the relationship between mobile phone 
location data and individuals' perceptions of privacy in the UK. 
A PhD thesis does not provide the scope and resources to raise this very specific 
theory to a more generalised level such as for example a formal grounded theory. 
This might be a possible undertaking for future research, as several substantive 
theories can build the basis for a more general formal theory. 
 
Finally, it needs to be remarked that the author of this study was relatively new to 
using grounded theory methodology when conducting this research project. Hence it 
could be seen as a limitation that considerable time and resources were spent on 
learning how to analyse the data. However, this grounded theory research project 
has been a valuable learning experience that will help to carry out similar studies.  
In addition, the methodology had not been applied to the subject area of privacy, 
surveillance and mobile phone technology before. This study exemplifies that GTM 
can be a useful tool to study individuals' perceptions, not only in the 'traditional' 
GTM research areas of nursing and general health care. 
 
 
6.3 Addressing the aims and objectives of this study 
The main aim of this research project has been to investigate the implications of 
mobile phone location data on individuals’ perceptions of privacy (see Chapter 1, 
section 1.3).  
 
The objectives of the study were met as follows: 
Chapter 4 (Presentation of Findings) has presented the results from an empirical 
investigation of individuals’ awareness of and attitude towards mobile phone 
location data (Objective 1). The current technological and legal situation regarding 
mobile phone location data for the UK has been addressed in the literature review, 
Chapter 2 (Objective 2). The positions of stakeholders, such as the government, 
mobile phone service providers and individuals were addressed in the literature 
review in Chapter 2, and were supported by speaking to a desk officer for this 
dossier of the European Parliament, the Director of Privacy International and a 
spokesperson from Ofcom (Objective 3). The previous chapter, Chapter 5, has 
addressed and analysed the relationship between individuals' perceptions and the 
relevant literature regarding mobile phone location data (Objective 4). A theoretical 
model explaining the relationship between perceptions of privacy and mobile phone 
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location data has also been presented in Chapter 5 (Objective 5). This final chapter, 
Chapter 6, concludes the study and makes suggestions for further research.  
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6.4 Meeting the criteria of grounded theory  
The grounded theory developed by this study is specific to the current and particular 
historical, social and local context, as captured in the situational map (see Chapter 4 
- Presentation of Findings, section 4.2.2). Charmaz (2006) argues that placing a 
grounded theory in its particular social context strengthens it, as this enables 
comparisons between studies which can then be used to develop more abstract and 
general theories. 
 
The findings of this study are specific to a time when the awareness of terrorism 
threats was prominent in the consciousness and lives of many British citizens. 
Hence, the findings have lead to the development of a substantive grounded theory, 
which is specific for a particular context, a particular area. The following section 
revisits the criteria for grounded theory studies, as presented in Chapter 3 - 
Methodology (see section 3.1.5).  
 
6.4.1 Credibility  
The criterion of credibility is about the links between theory and data, such as logical 
links between the empirical data, the main argument of the study and the analysis. 
For this study, a range of empirical data in form of pilot study, interviews and survey, 
were collected to develop the grounded theory. Open and focused codes were 
carefully devised for the interviews and the categories were developed based on the 
focused codes (see Chapter 4 - Presentation of Findings). Links between categories 
were explicated and have formed the basis for the grounded theory. Comparing the 
theory to the literature has helped to develop the main argument, as described in 
Chapter 5. 
 
6.4.2 Originality  
The criterion of originality assesses whether the categories developed in the study 
offer new insights into the area of research. 
This study claims to be of theoretical significance because mobile phone location 
data has not been researched in relation to privacy using the grounded theory 
methodology. The finding that individuals see mobile phone location data as not 
connected to everyday life but mainly as a crime investigation tool sheds new light 
on the definition of and also protection of citizens' privacy (see Part 2 in Chapter 5). 
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6.4.3 Resonance  
The grounded theory developed for this study portrays individuals' experiences with 
mobile phone location data in relation to their perception of privacy. The criterion of 
resonance aims at assessing whether the grounded theory categories developed 
from the data relate to the studied experience of participants and whether the 
categories make sense to them. Data collection and analysis for this study were 
conducted in alternating sequences in order to verify early findings and to shape 
further data collections (see section 3.1.2). In addition, the last three interviews 
(Interview phase 3, Appendix F) were used to present some of the tentative 
categories to the participants in order to evaluate how participants interpret them. 
 
6.4.4 Usefulness 
This criterion evaluates whether the analysis is related to individuals' day-to-day 
lives and whether it can be transferred to other areas than the one under study.  
A particular reason for using grounded theory was to learn how individuals perceive 
privacy in relation to mobile phone location data, as opposed to for example 
academic scholars or the popular media. For this reason, the empirical data 
collections for this study were aimed at capturing participants' feelings and opinions 
about the subject area and to let them express what is important to them in this 
context. Further research would be necessary to develop a more generalisable 
grounded theory that would be transferable to other subject areas (see section 6.6 
Further Research, below).  
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6.5 Conclusions and lessons learned 
Mobile phone communications data allows establishing a picture of a person's 
social interactions - who has communicated with whom, when and for how long. In 
addition, the user's geographical movements can be tracked, which makes the 
blanket retention of all users' communications data a new dimension in surveillance. 
The study has been of multi-disciplinary nature, encompassing the areas of mobile 
phone technology, privacy and legislation.  
 
6.5.1 Mobile phone users' informational self-determination  
The substantive grounded theory developed for this study has been based on the 
collection of empirical data. The five grounded theory categories, the relationships 
between them and the four main findings have been interpreted to provide an 
explanation for the phenomenon under study: the relationship between mobile 
phone location data and individuals' perceptions of privacy in the UK. Respondents 
of this study explained that it was important for them to be informed about 
collections of their personal data, otherwise they suspected a different agenda (see 
GT Category B, Respondents' privacy definitions). Some of the respondents did not 
consider themselves sufficiently informed about communications data retention, and 
therefore expressed feelings of indignation and resignation (see GT Category A). 
'Compliant, paranoid and powerless with few rights' was a similar observation of 
views of surveillance subjects made by the Surveillance Studies Network (2006) in 
their report to the Information Commissioner. This may indicate a need for 
commercial organisations but also governments to sufficiently inform customers and 
citizens about the long-term retention of their data. However, despite these claims it 
needs to be recognised that the retention of mobile phone communications data, 
including location data, is in effect mentioned in the small print of every mobile 
phone contract (see Chapter 5, section 5.1.2.1). As has been argued throughout the 
thesis, it is increasingly challenging for citizens to make out collections of their 
digitised personal data, as these are often routine and embedded in the process of 
using technologies. However, as previously discussed in section 2.2.3.1, the 
European Court of Human Rights requires that surveillance legislation is sufficiently 
comprehensible, accessible and foreseeable, hence it may require further studies to 
ascertain that this is the case with data retention law.  
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Individuals fulfil different roles in their lives, which cross different social zones (see 
GT Category A, Areas of privacy). There are two main groups of actors to whom 
individuals’ mobile phone location data is of interest for either commercial or for law 
enforcement use. Hence, the role of the mobile phone user regarding the retention 
of communications data differs from a legal point of view, depending whether it is 
defined as consumer or citizen (see section 2.2.7). For commercial purposes the 
permission to use the data needs to be explicitly obtained, whereas its use by 
governmental agencies is seen as a necessity to fight terrorism and crime and 
therefore implies consent. Respondents to this study described a balancing act 
irrespective of the purpose for which the location data was used (see GT Core 
Category E), which may raise concerns in terms of the respondents' superficial 
dealing with this very complex topic. Even though individuals are the subjects of 
surveillance, they seem to have a limited interest in the possible effects of 
communications data retention on human values, such as privacy. In addition, the 
focus on economic benefits on the one hand, and the trading between privacy and 
security on the other hand, raises concerns about the degree of informational self-
determination that individuals are expected to exercise. As has been discussed in 
Chapter 5, individuals may not ‘see’ or be aware of the consequences of long-term 
routine surveillance. Indeed, as the interviews showed many respondents were 
unaware of the potential threats that the retention of communications data could 
have on privacy, human rights and other values.  
 
Yet, this study argues that even if individuals are being informed about data 
collections, it is not always possible for them to keep track of who has access to 
their personal information. Particularly as they are often not able to appreciate the 
wider context in which their personal data are collected (see Finding 2). It is 
therefore concluded that the principle of informational self-determination as 
advocated in current legislations such as the British Freedom of Information Act, 
Data Protection Act and European Data Protection Directives is not entirely 
sufficient to ensure citizens’ protection of privacy (see section 5.3). Individuals may 
be aware of communication data retention but tend not to relate it to their own 
personal lives. In addition, they do not have the capacity to influence data 
collections without restricting their liberty. The Surveillance Study Network (2006, p. 
84) in his report to the Information Commissioner confirms the claims from this 
study stating that “only a minority [of individuals] are probably able to exercise self-
help as fully as ‘responsibility’ might imply”. Even though participants of this study 
wished to be ‘let alone’ as they had expressed in line with Warren and Brandeis’ 
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early privacy definitions (see GT Category B),  they seemed not be able to exercise 
sufficient controls over their personal data. Privacy had been defined by the study’s 
respondents as being about personal data and having control over it. However, 
keeping in control over data is often impossible with the plethora of data collections 
taking place at an on-going basis, and the long-term retention of communications 
data is only one example of this. In addition, the only feasible way for individuals to 
circumvent this data collection is to not participate in electronic communications, 
which is not a valid option for reasons of convenience and practicality, and would 
infringe on a person's liberty and human right.  
 
6.5.2 Communications data retention and human rights 
The retention of communications data by service providers for longer periods than 
necessary for business purposes can be seen as conflicting with the European 
Convention on Human Rights Article 8 'Right to respect for private and family life'. 
The right to privacy as enshrined in the Convention has been brought into British 
legislation in form of the Human Rights Act 1998. As has been discussed in 
previous chapters, private life extends to the right to establish and develop 
relationships with other human beings (see for example the case P.G. vs United 
Kingdom, No. 44787/98, 2001). Nevertheless, this 'right to private life' (Article 8.1) 
may be compromised if seen as necessary under a range of exclusive purposes 
listed in Article 8.2 ECHR, such as national security. As communications data is 
retained to assure national security and support the fight against terrorism, 
European member states can implement the Data Retention Directive in 
accordance with Article 8 ECHR (see section 2.2.1).  
 
Before the September 11 attacks there had been widespread criticism of the long-
term retention of communications data. However, the attacks have been used in the 
UK and EU-wide to evoke a paradigm shift in storing and accessing this type of 
data. Hosein (2004) observes that after the United Kingdom failed to implement a 
data retention policy nationally, the focus shifted to the EU to allow the UK to pass 
such laws under European legislation. The introduction of the Anti-Terrorism Crime 
and Security Act 2001 in the UK, which regulates the retention of communications 
data, has produced some well-publicised debates. The legislative process for this 
Act merely took four weeks, which can be seen as an inappropriate length of time 
considering the complexity of the bill - such a short time span cannot allow for 
sufficient Parliamentary and public scrutiny. 
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It has been argued that blanket retention of communication data offends the core 
principle of law: the requirement of foreseeability. Citizens should be given notice of 
the circumstance in which the State may conduct surveillance, so that they can 
regulate their behaviour in order to avoid unwanted intrusions (Privacy International, 
2003c). In contrast to this, it could be reasoned that the legislation allows everyone 
to foresee that their communications data will be recorded and retained for a certain 
period of time. However, concerns also need to be raised in terms of proportionality. 
The legislation does not make any distinction between different classes of people 
and this disproportionate interference in privacy lives cannot be seen to be 
necessary in a democratic society. The European Court of Human Rights has on 
numerous occasions decided on comparable cases involving governmental 
surveillance of its citizens and found those cases to be in violation with Article 8 
ECHR. For example in the case of Rotaru v Romania (2000, App. no. 28341/95), 
the European Court of Human Rights decided that a violation with Article 8 took 
place, when the Romanian security services had stored information on Mr Rotaru’s 
past activities as a university student. The court commented that “there has to be at 
least a reasonable and genuine link between the aim invoked and the measures 
interfering with private life for the aim to be regarded as legitimate”, as the 
“indiscriminate storing of information relating to the private lives of individuals in 
terms of pursuing a legitimate national security concern is (…) evidently 
problematic". In the case of Klass and others vs Germany (1977 App. 5029/71) the 
Strasbourg Court ruled that "powers of secret surveillance" would only be used 
"under exceptional conditions necessary in a democratic society". 
 
As mentioned above, the introduction of the data retention legislation in the UK was 
deemed to be in accordance with the ECHR, as the data is retained to support the 
fight against terrorism. In spite of this, one of the first proposals for the blanket 
retention of communications data by the National Criminal Intelligence Service 
(NCIS) was made on behalf of the police, HM Customs and Excise and others (see 
section 2.3.3.2). This suggested that the data was not merely intended to be used 
for terrorism prevention and investigation but also for criminal investigations 
(Walker, 2002). Indeed, the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 specifies a 
range of agencies that hold the powers to obtain communications data, such as for 
example the Inland Revenue or the Department of Health. The wide array of 
organisations who may gain access to the data as well as the width of purposes 
specified in the RIP Act for which the data may be used, raises concerns of 
'purpose creep' (see section 2.3.3.1). The data retention legislation permits a much 
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wider range of purposes, such as public safety, preventing serious harm or 
collection of tax, than those for which a warranted interception of a communication 
can be made in order to obtain the content of the communication (Davis, 2003). As 
explained in section 2.3.2, the content of communication is considered as more 
intrusive than information about the communication. 
 
The legislation regulating data retention has been enacted in response to national 
security concerns and with serious opposition on the grounds of human rights 
infringements. For instance, the ATCS Act has been criticised as “the surely the 
most draconian legislation Parliament has passed in peacetime in over a century” 
(Tomkins, 2002). Communications data, including location data, should only be 
requested as part of investigations into clearly defined categories of serious crime 
and terrorism (Harkin, 2003). The use of communications data for purposes that 
only tangentially related to these types of investigations would also violate the third 
principle of the Data Protection Act 1998. Therefore, data retention legislation 
should be reviewed periodically, in order to assess whether the monitoring of 
citizens as a precautionary measure needs to be upheld.  
Stalder (2002) advises to focus on the new landscape of social power and describes 
surveillance as a structural problem of political power. The government should be 
encouraged to put in place adequate safeguards so that the collected data cannot 
be misused. This is currently being carried out under the oversight of the 
Information Commissioner. The Office of the Information Commissioner is the UK's 
independent public body set up to protect personal information and promote public 
access to official information an independent agency. The retention of 
communications data is a form of personal data processing, and hence it is subject 
to the Data Protection Act 1998. Oversight of the 1998 Act is by the Information 
Commissioner (Home Office, 2003c, Section 29). The Office of Surveillance 
Commissioners (2003) provides an oversight of the conduct of covert surveillance 
by public authorities according to Parts II and III of the RIP Act (see section 2.3.3.1). 
Future policies must not only embed protection of data once it has already been 
collected but should also counterbalance the desire of governments to conduct 
excessive data collections, which monitor the vast majority of citizens at all times in 
case of an "investigatory rainy day" (Walker and Akdeniz, 2003, p. 162). Further 
studies are necessary to evaluate whether data retention can ultimately make a 
difference in terrorism and crime investigation and prevention. National data from 
states with and without retention schemes should be compared over time, in order 
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to assess whether blanket data retention is effective in fighting serious crime 
(Breyer, 2005). 
The on-going policy debate highlights the importance for citizens to be informed 
about the implications that the use of communications technologies may have on 
their lives as well as on the overall society. The study’s findings indicate that 
individuals tend to be occupied with the focus on their own day-to-day pursuits and 
may not necessarily consider the scope and impact of their actions on the wider 
society. This makes it necessary for non-governmental organisations and pressure 
groups to keep up their efforts to alert citizens of the consequences of routine and 
underlying ‘dataveillance’ (see section 2.2.5.2).    
Increasingly citizens’ daily lives involve some form of communications technology. 
This means that citizens are subjecting themselves to surveillance by default, as a 
log of all communications activities is retained indiscriminately, preventing users 
from avoiding such surveillance when using modern communications technologies. 
Therefore, it is important for citizens and pressure groups to demand accountability 
of those who collect data and whose power is enhanced by those data collections. 
The Surveillance Study Network (2006) stresses the power that citizens have to 
make a difference, to influence policy by questioning data collections and refusing to 
hand over their data for purposes that are not comprehensible to them.  
 
6.5.3 Data retention as a response to risk 
Information and communications technologies are an essential component of 
Western societies and provide a variety of opportunities to oversee activities that 
may potentially be of criminal nature. As has been discussed in the Introduction 
Chapter, a switch has taken place away from reactive policing of incidents to the 
pro-active management of risks. As the preceding section has indicated, one of the 
major points of dispute of the data retention legislation has been the wide range of 
purposes for which communications data may be used (see also section 2.3.5.5). 
The current trend of the risk society, together with the inherent uncertainty of mobile 
populations, advocates the pro-active management of risks which is greatly 
supported by the accumulation and subsequent analysis of communications data, 
including mobile phone location data (Zureik and Salter, 2005). The routine 
surveillance of digitised personal data aims at gaining more knowledge about those 
who may become part of future risks.  The more knowledge of the risk can be 
obtained, the greater are the powers to reduce the risk. The routine surveillance of 
citizens' everyday actions and communications enabled by networked technologies 
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facilitates the categorising of individuals and populations with the aim to classify 
them in terms of potential risk. This is not only relevant in terms of communications 
data but also for other types of data generated by information and communications 
technologies. Other location-aware and networked technologies, such as Bluetooth, 
RFID and Wifi, raise similar issues which need to be addressed in order to sustain 
civil liberties such as privacy.  
 
6.6 Future research 
This PhD research project has the potential to be expanded regarding the following 
areas. Firstly, the substantive theory of the relationship between mobile phone 
location data and individuals' perceptions of privacy in the United Kingdom could be 
expanded to a formal theory, for instance by generating more far-reaching 
hypotheses. In other words, the theory could be made more widely applicable, as 
for example to other countries and cultures, or to other types of digital data related 
to location tracking, such as RFID tags or location identification via Wi-Fi.  
 
Secondly, a future research project could specifically look at whether the findings 
from this study are transferable to other types of personal digitised data other than 
mobile phone location data. Mobile phone users claim to be aware of location data 
but do not relate it to their personal lives (see Finding 2). These findings may 
correspond to other types of personal data, which would mean that individuals are 
not able to identify different types of data collections and hence have lost control 
over their personal data on a large scale. According to the participants’ definitions 
(see Category B) and those of the literature (Chapter 2), this would translate into a 
significant loss of privacy for the individual. This loss of privacy would take place 
without the individuals’ clear awareness or without any power to influence these 
ongoing process of data collections and potential subsequent uses of this data. As 
explained in Chapter 2, Literature Review, these transactions and communications 
leave behind a trail revealing details about the users’ activities. Indeed, profiles of 
this individual’s habits can be established which can also be used to predict future 
behaviour based on historical (trans-)actions. 
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Thirdly, it would beneficial to expand the research to other European countries to 
identify European citizens' awareness and attitudes towards location data. If the 
study is extended, means of data collection should encompass interviews, 
questionnaires and focus groups. Particularly the questionnaire could be distributed 
on a larger scale that it had been possible for a sole researcher.  This would result 
in a more representative and larger scale survey that enables the comparison of 
awareness of and attitudes towards mobile phone location data across several 
European countries. It may be of particular interest to look at countries that have not 
(yet) implemented CCTV and other means of surveillance technologies on such a 
wide scale as the UK.  
 
In addition to these areas, a longitudinal programme of research could be initiated to 
investigate whether technological efficacy has an effect on attitudes towards 
privacy. Findings from this study show that low users tend to perceive mobile 
phones as a threat to privacy whereas power users do use the mobile phone 
actively to regulate their privacy (see Category C, section 5.1.3). As a result, 
different user groups could be targeted with different messages and advice to 
protect their privacy. 
It has not been an aim of this study to evaluate whether communications data 
retention is a useful means for crime and terrorism investigation and prevention - 
this needs to be left for other researchers to scrutinise. Hence, it may be of value to 
carry out a study to evaluate how useful it is to store all mobile phone user’s data, 
similar to a Dutch study by the Erasmus University (EDRI, 2005b). The European 
Union Directive 2006/24/EC advocates evaluating the current approach of data 
retention, and for this reason it would be important to conduct an independent, 
academic and comparative study to assess whether mobile phone communications 
data retention can be seen an effective approach for dealing with crime and 
terrorism.   
 
Furthermore, the discussion of the various techniques with which location-based 
surveillance technologies can be interlinked, needs to be expanded. Technological 
devices, such as mobile phones are typically assigned to and used by one person 
and are carried for significant periods of time. These location-aware devices have 
the ability to communicate with one another without the need of intervention by its 
user, as for example via Bluetooth or RFID tags. The limitations of technology have 
been used by respondents to this study but also in the literature as a rational for 
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surveillance. Today's technologies do not always function flawlessly and failures to 
interlink data from various systems have acted as protection from surveillance. 
However, this may not be the case in future scenarios that may make the linking of 
for example mobile phone location data to ID card information possible. These 
developments raise concerns about the disconnected and fragmented elements of 
personal identity collections, where multiple agencies collect and have access to 
information about individuals in various contexts. In addition, growing divisions 
prevail between those who have the means to mitigate the effects of growing IT-
based surveillance and those who do not, and the Surveillance Studies Network 
(2006) warns that this may raise tensions. As this study has confirmed, there is the 
danger that information flows are being predominantly invisible, and when citizens 
become aware of the potential for misuse, it may be too late “to put this 
technological genie back in a bottle” (Lloyd, p. 60).  
 
Communications data can constitute an extremely valuable investigative tool, and 
most would agree that police and intelligence services should be provided with the 
best possible means to enable them to perform their vital work. However, the 
premise for the data protection legislation developed over the last decades had 
been to address the potential for misuses of data. Communications data needs to 
be held securely by service providers and also by the governmental agencies that 
obtain the data under the RIP Act. Security breaches in data storage and loss of 
personal data could result in significant changes in citizens' views of how their data 
should be stored and used. A recent example has occurred in November 2007, 
when two computer disks owned by Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs went 
missing which resulted in the data loss of millions of child benefit claimants. 
Instances of data breaches may impact on individuals' perceptions of privacy 
regarding communications data retention, and further research in this area would be 
valuable. 
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